The Need for Long-Range Policies
This "long time" factor is of critical importance.
The Soviet Communists are planning for what they call "an entire historical
era," and we should do the same. They seek, through many types of maneuvers,
gradually to divide and weaken the free nations by overextending them in
efforts which, as Lenin put it, are "beyond their strength, so that
they come to practical bankruptcy." Then, said Lenin, "our victory
is assured." Then, said Stalin, will be "the moment for the decisive
blow."
In the face of this strategy, measures cannot be judged adequate merely because
they ward off an immediate danger. It is essential to do this, but it is also
essential to do so without exhausting ourselves.
When the Eisenhower administration applied this test, we felt that some
transformations were needed.
It is not sound military strategy permanently to commit U.S. land forces
to Asia to a degree that leaves us no strategic reserves.
It is not sound economics, or good foreign policy, to support permanently
other countries; for in the long run, that creates as much ill will as good
will.
Also, it is not sound to become permanently committed to military expenditures
so vast that they lead to "practical bankruptcy."
Change was imperative to assure the stamina needed for permanent security.
But it was equally imperative that change should be accompanied by understanding
of our true purposes. Sudden and spectacular change had to be avoided. Otherwise,
there might have been a panic among our friends and miscalculated aggression
by our enemies. We can, I believe, make a good report in these respects.
We need allies and collective security. Our purpose is to make these relations
more effective, less costly. This can be done by placing more reliance on
deterrent power and less dependence on local defensive power.
This is accepted practice so far as local communities are concerned. We keep
locks on our doors, but we do not have an armed guard in every home. We rely
principally on a community security system so well equipped to punish any
who break in and steal that, in fact, would be aggressors are generally deterred.
That is the modern way of getting maximum protection at a bearable cost.
What the Eisenhower administration seeks is a similar international security
system. We want, for ourselves and the other free nations, a maximum deterrent
at a bearable cost.
Local defense will always be important. But there is no local defense which
alone will contain the mighty landpower of the Communist world. Local defenses
must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power.
A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions
that suit him. Otherwise, for example, a potential aggressor, who is glutted
with manpower, might be tempted to attack in confidence that resistance would
be confined to manpower. He might be tempted to attack in places where his
superiority was decisive.
The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and
able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing.