V
Let us, however, resume our discussion from the point at which we
digressed. To judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men
of the most vulgar type, seem (not without some ground) to identify
the good, or happiness, with pleasure; which is the reason why they
love the life of enjoyment. For there are, we may say, three prominent
types of life- that just mentioned, the political, and thirdly the
contemplative life. Now the mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish
in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts, but they get
some ground for their view from the fact that many of those in high
places share the tastes of Sardanapallus. A consideration of the prominent
types of life shows that people of superior refinement and of active
disposition identify happiness with honour; for this is, roughly speaking,
the end of the political life. But it seems too superficial to be
what we are looking for, since it is thought to depend on those who
bestow honour rather than on him who receives it, but the good we
divine to be something proper to a man and not easily taken from him.
Further, men seem to pursue honour in order that they may be assured
of their goodness; at least it is by men of practical wisdom that
they seek to be honoured, and among those who know them, and on the
ground of their virtue; clearly, then, according to them, at any rate,
virtue is better. And perhaps one might even suppose this to be, rather
than honour, the end of the political life. But even this appears
somewhat incomplete; for possession of virtue seems actually compatible
with being asleep, or with lifelong inactivity, and, further, with
the greatest sufferings and misfortunes; but a man who was living
so no one would call happy, unless he were maintaining a thesis at
all costs. But enough of this; for the subject has been sufficiently
treated even in the current discussions. Third comes the contemplative
life, which we shall consider later.
The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth
is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful
and for the sake of something else. And so one might rather take the
aforenamed objects to be ends; for they are loved for themselves.
But it is evident that not even these are ends; yet many arguments
have been thrown away in support of them. Let us leave this subject,
then.
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