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48. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of
State/1/
Moscow, March 20, 1961, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-2061. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.
2229. In frank but friendly discussion Kuznetsov yesterday believe made dent in his thinking but only small one. Depth of Soviet suspicions is incredible.
Here follow three paragraphs on Laos.
On disarmament Kuznetsov observed Stevenson and Gromyko had reached agreement
not discuss substance disarmament at GA but would confine debate to establishing
directive on general principles. I said certain we were not going to get ourselves
bound to principle one treaty on general and complete disarmament and pointed
out they had even exploited UN resolution to limit debate in previous meetings.
On forum I said we were beginning to think no point in making concessions
to Soviet point of view. We had reluctantly agreed to parity on disarmament
committee and now they were pressing for their thesis of a three bloc world.
I said even neutrals opposed to this and we considered committee already too
large.
Kuznetsov said they were trying to be considerate of our position to give
us time work out policies but pointed out we had many experts already familiar
with problem. I replied that in previous meetings and in Pugwash discussion
appeared to us they had not seriously studied disarmament problem. Each time
we were about to come to grips with real substance they broke up meeting and
walked out. I emphasized strongly seriousness with which we approaching problem
but said this involved questions which were vital to our survival and no attempt
of theirs to manipulate public opinion would cause us to jeopardize our security.
If they wanted to exploit this situation they could do so but this would not
advance cause of disarmament. Kuznetsov expressed suspicion we were merely
stalling in order build up our armaments. He referred to increases in US military
budget. He also referred number of times during our conversation to statements
made by President and others about Eastern Europe and particularly Bowles'
speech at Farmers Union Convention./2/ He quoted
several times sentence Bowles alleged to have used to effect US could not
tolerate Communist regimes. He said Soviet Govt was seriously studying meaning
this phrase and others used by American statesmen. I replied sentence he had
quoted did not appear in summary which I had received and basic thesis Bowles'
speech was endeavor find accommodation between us. I also pointed out that
after Declaration 81 parties and Khrushchev's Jan 6 speech they could scarcely
expect us not to reply. They had expressed readiness support so-called wars
of liberation. In contrast I cited restraint we had shown during Hungarian
affair. Would have been easy for us at that time to have stirred up Poles
and East Germans but we had no desire use force or cause useless waste of
lives. I said this in sharp contrast to their policy of stirring up trouble
wherever they could. When he tried to slide over Communist parties statement
I said declaration that US was enemy of peoples of world had made deep impression
in US. He tried contend this referred only to certain circles but I suggested
he re-read statement. I said we could never take actions condoning regimes
in Eastern Europe unless and until they were supported by people but this
did not mean we were going to take any action overthrow them.
/2/For text of this speech, March 14, see Department of State Bulletin, April 3, 1961, pp. 480-486.
I raised lend-lease question but got no reaction except his complaint that we were refusing sell them tractors which they could not understand.
Kuznetsov expressed opinion frank exchange of views had been helpful and hoped we would have further occasion discussions this kind.
Thompson
49. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts/1/
Washington, March 23, 1961, 9:05 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 961.63/3-2361. Confidential. Drafted by Richard T. Davies (SOV/P); cleared with McSweeney, USIA, P, AF/P, ARA/P, FE/P, and EUR/P; and approved by Davis.
1457. Joint State-USIA. According press reports from Moscow, Soviets have
lifted censorship on despatches filed from Moscow by foreign correspondents.
Dept has issued statement welcoming move as step towards removal barriers
to free flow information and expressing hope it will be followed by removal
bars to flow of information into USSR (principal bars are selective jamming
foreign broadcasts in Soviet languages and non-availability to general Soviet
public of representative non-Communist foreign periodicals and publications).
In commenting upon this action, US officials and output should take primary
guidance from Dept statement (carried in Wireless File). Officials should
avoid giving impression we do not regard lifting censorship as welcome advance,
should stress hope this step will eventually be followed by removal or attenuation
present severe controls on material from outside world available Soviet people
and should draw upon following background points in order put move in context.
1. Censorship of foreign correspondents' despatches was no longer effective bar to transmission censorable information to outside world, since present relatively heavy flow foreign visitors ensures many such items in any case become known outside USSR within a few days.
2. Consequently existence of censorship apparatus served only as propaganda
liability, in removing which Soviets now able create impression further
"liberalization''.
3. Ultimate sanction against foreign correspondents who seriously offend
regime or consistently transmit critical material remains, i.e., Soviet ability
either expel them from country or, in less urgent cases, refuse allow them
re-enter once they have left USSR on leave. (Since 1945, according Dept records,
six American correspondents expelled from USSR; nine refused visas.)
4. Removal censorship thus reinforces compulsion upon responsible correspondent
whose duty to his employer requires him strive maintain representation in
Moscow, to exercise self-censorship and avoid offending Soviet Government
to point at which it would expel him or refuse let him re-enter. While censorship
in operation correspondent could have some assurance it would excise material
Soviet Government might regard with disfavor. Correspondent must now be his
own judge in questionable cases.
5. Censorship has been lifted on outgoing material but situation unaltered
with regard material available to Soviet people: latter continues be as tightly
controlled as ever by Soviet Government. Most serious controls exercised through
continued selective jamming foreign radio broadcasts in Russian (about 30-35%
jammed out) and other Soviet languages (a high percentage of which jammed
out) and through fact non-Soviet-bloc periodicals and publications (except
for Communist Party literature) not available for purchase by Soviet citizens
and can be read in libraries only by those who have political clearance.
As facts warrant also useful cite situations elsewhere particularly in your host country, which emphasize general accessibility variety of foreign press, radio, television, motion-picture materials, in contrast with thoroughly controlled flow such materials to Soviet citizens.
Report official and press reactions to Soviet move.
Rusk
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES - 1961-1963 -
Volume V - Soviet Union P24