s which would prohibit its reproduction.
70. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts/1/
Washington, May 18, 1961, 3:40 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/5-1861. Secret; Priority.
Drafted by Boster and cleared with Davis, Bohlen, Guthrie (SOV), and the White
House. Also sent to the Mission at Berlin.
1823. At 10 AM Washington time Friday, May 19, President plans announce
meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna June 3 and 4. If this announcement made,/2/
missions may in their discretion draw on following background in discussions
with Government and public leaders where appropriate.
/2/For text of the announcement, see American Foreign Policy: Current
Documents, 1961, pp. 569-570.
Purpose of meeting is to take advantage of convenient opportunity for first
personal contact between two leaders and general exchange of views. Idea that
such a meeting might be useful when international atmosphere was right first
discussed through diplomatic channels earlier this year, but following developments
in Laos and Cuba US had dropped idea from active consideration. Soviet
Government recently reopened question of meeting and agreement was reached
to proceed at this time.
Mission officials should emphasize, in any discussions they may have, that meeting will not seek to negotiate or reach agreement on major international problems which it is recognized involve the interests of many countries and on which there must be full consultation between US and its allies.
Bowles
71. Editorial Note
On February 21, 1961, Assistant Secretary of State Kohler sent Secretary
of State Rusk a memorandum asking him to raise at a Cabinet meeting the question
of Soviet Ambassador Menshikov's appointments with U.S. officials. In
reply Rusk asked whether the U.S. Government might request the Ambassador
to make all such appointments through the Department of State and how this
practice conformed to Soviet procedures in Moscow. In an April 12 memorandum
Kohler replied that Soviet practice was to conduct all appointments through
either the Foreign Ministry or Ministry of Foreign Trade, but that in
recent years direct contacts with Soviet officials had expanded, and the Department
of State was "most reluctant to provide any excuse for a reversal of this
trend." To this end he suggested raising at Cabinet level coordination of
Menshikov's appointments "in some fashion." (All in Department of State,
Central Files, 601.6111/4-1261)
Under Secretary of State Bowles discussed the problem with McGeorge Bundy
following the Cabinet meeting on April 20 and proposed that the question be
handled in a memorandum from the Department of State to the White House suggesting
that individual memoranda be sent to each Cabinet member outlining the procedure
for making appointments with Menshikov. (S/S memorandum, May 3; ibid., 601.6111/5-361)
On May 20 the Department of State sent the memorandum to the White House
asking that any official having "any discussion" with Menshikov provide the
Department of State with a record of the conversation and offering to make
available for such meetings, officers proficient in Russian. (Ibid., 601.6111/5-2061)
72. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/
PMK-A/1
Washington, May 23, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1905. Secret. Drafted by Armitage and cleared by Kohler. In preparation for the Summit meeting the Department of State drafted five series of papers. Series A: General; Series B: Position Papers; Series C: Bilateral Issues; Series D: Background Papers; and Series E: Reference Papers. Complete sets of these papers, which were transmitted to the White House on May 27, are ibid.
PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH KHRUSHCHEV
Vienna, June 3-4, 1961
Scope Paper
I. U.S. Objectives
A. To improve the prospects of finding an acceptable and workable basis for
improving relations with the Soviet Union.
B. To impress on Khrushchev our capacity and resolve to resist Soviet
and communist encroachments if he is unwilling to seek a satisfactory basis
for better relations and to stress the dangers attendant on continued, sharp
confrontations between the two countries.
C. To communicate to Khrushchev the President's understanding and grasp of the world situation, in an historical as well as immediate sense, and his capacity and intent to influence the course of world events.
D. To gain a clearer understanding of Khrushchev as a man and of Soviet policy and intentions.
II. Khrushchev
A. Khrushchev will probably seek--directly or indirectly-- to convey and
gain acceptance of the following view of the world situation:
1. The world is divided into two power systems, the communist and the capitalist.
2. The communist system is firmly established beyond challenge in the bloc countries and the processes of political change can take place only in the non-communist countries.
3. The balance of world power has shifted and is shifting toward the communist
system, the Sino-Soviet bloc.
4. The Soviet Union does not wish to advance that process by war, that is, a major global nuclear war.
5. Neither can the capitalist powers afford to inhibit that process by
resort to war.
6. The capitalist powers must recognize the "realities" of the world situation,
i.e., the power shift toward the bloc, and accommodate themselves to changes
which accord with the "will of the people," i.e., Laos, Cuba, the Congo.
7. Part of this "realistic" approach requires the recognition that no significant
decision on international questions anywhere in the world or in international
bodies can be taken without accommodating the views of the Soviet Union.
8. The process of contention between the systems can be carried on by all
means short of war, i.e., overt war across international borders, without
the risk of global war and without serious effect on U.S.-Soviet relations
or the prospects of disarmament.
9. Those relations should be improved; there are no important bilateral differences
impeding them; but the U.S. should remove its discriminatory trade policies
and withdraw from foreign bases threatening the USSR.
10. The Soviet Union is seriously interested in disarmament but not control
and inspection systems without actual disarmament; its proposals are comprehensive
and control provisions could be worked out if the Western powers accepted
the Soviet proposals.
11. The problems of Berlin and a peace treaty are urgent and should be solved.
B. Khrushchev probably is confident that the communist chances in the long
run are good. However, he has a healthy respect and probably a reasonably
accurate understanding of the military power and productive capacity of the
Western nations, particularly the United States. He, therefore, has little
taste for risky adventures.
He believes that there is still room for steady communist gains. This belief
stems in part from his doubt that the Western powers have the will or resolve
to translate their resources into the elements of power sufficient to cope
with the bloc and his doubt that they can find the basis for building effective
non-communist political institutions in the under-developed countries. He,
consequently, is led to the conclusion that by alternating pressure and overtures
he can make the gains at the negotiating table and by shielding local Communist
advances with Soviet power. He is also constantly conscious of the specter
of growing Communist Chinese power and this gives him added reason to
maintain his communication with the Western powers and to explore the terms
of a possible accommodation with them.
There are indications that he is sufficiently concerned over the risks of
nuclear war and sufficiently convinced of Soviet political capabilities
abroad to be seriously interested in disarmament. However, he finds political
capital in playing on the disarmament issue and has apparently not thought
through the problems associated with disarmament in any meaningful way. He,
therefore, has probably not reached conclusions on the terms under which various
disarmament measures would be acceptable.
He will undoubtedly press hard his position on Berlin and a peace treaty
with East Germany and will try to get some form of commitment to negotiate
the Berlin question.
This meeting itself gratifies him and he may extend the President an invitation
to visit the Soviet Union if the talks go reasonably well from his point
of view.
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES - 1961-1963 - Volume V - Soviet Union P32