The
abstention doctrine (or
doctrines), is a doctrine of
federalism based on the
recognition that, "[s]ince the beginning of this
country's history
Congress has, subject to few exceptions,
manifested a desire to permit
state courts to try state cases free from
interference by
federal courts."
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
I. Younger Abstention
There are two basic types of abstention. The first, based on the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Younger v. Harris, can be termed a "
nonintervention doctrine." The basic
principle is that federal courts may not
enjoin pending state court
criminal proceedings except in extraordinary circumstances. In ordinary cases, federal courts must dismiss a state criminal
defendant's
challenge to the
constitutionality of the law he is charged with violating, even if the
procedural requirements for filing the suit are otherwise met. The court based this principle on
traditional doctrines of
equity, which prevent courts from granting
equitable relief (e.g. an
injunction) if the person seeking the relief has an
adequate remedy at law, and will not suffer
irreparable harm if the injunction is denied. Accordingly,
Younger abstention requires federal courts refrain from intervening in state criminal proceedings if the state criminal defendant is able to raise the unconstitutionality of the
statute he is charged with violating as a
defence in the state
proceedings.
As currently understood,
Younger abstention will apply if (1) state proceedings are
pending, (2) " important state interests" are
implicated, and (3) the plaintiff
1 has an adequate opportunity to
litigate his federal
claims in the state proceedings.
E.g. H.C. ex rel Gordon v. Koppel, 203 F.3d 610, 613 (9
th Cir. 2000).
There are certain exceptions to the
Younger abstention doctrine. True to the equitable
roots of the doctrine, it will not apply if the
threat of irreparable injury to the plaintiff is "both great and
immediate" and "cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single
criminal prosecution."
Younger, 401 U.S., at 44.
While it was first applied to criminal cases, the Supreme Court
extended the application of the
Younger doctrine to include
civil nuisance actions in
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). The Court in
Huffman extended the doctrine to include state "
quasi-criminal" proceedings, which are "both in
aid of and closely related to criminal
statutes." The Court later further extended the doctrine to apply to purely civil proceedings in which the
State was a
party. Under the Court's
holding in
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977), "the principles of
Younger and
Huffman are
broad enough to apply to interference by a federal court with an ongoing civil
enforcement action such as this, brought by the State in its
sovereign capacity." The
flipside of
Hernandez is that federal courts do not have to
abstain if the state is not acting in a sovereign capacity seeking to
enforce a state programme, unless there is a substantial state interest at stake.
The Supreme Court has extended
Younger abstention further still, to include civil cases in which the State is not a party, but important state interests are a stake. For example, in
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1970), the Court held that the
integrity of the State's
contempt procedures was a sufficiently substantial interest to prevent federal interference. Some state
administrative proceedings, such as
attorney disciplinary proceedings, have also been held subject to
Younger abstention.
Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982). While the Court held
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) that
Younger did not apply to state administrative proceedings expressly declared by state
law not to be connected with the state
judicial system, it apparently
reversed course two years later in
Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian School, 477 U.S. 619 (1986), in which it held that abstention is required in administrative proceedings unconnected with the state judicial system if "important
state interests are
vindicated, so long as in the course of those proceedings the federal plaintiff would have had a full and
fair opportunity to
litigate his
constitutional claim," thus applying to state administrative proceedings to about the same extent as to state judicial proceedings
2.
II. Pullman Abstention
An older doctrine of abstention comes from the Supreme Court's decision in
Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). While
Younger may be termed a doctrine of nonintervention,
Pullman is more of a doctrine of
suspension. The basic
rule of
Pullman abstention is that federal proceedings must be held in
abeyance during the
pendency of state proceedings that may
clarify ambiguous state statutes, thus rendering a federal constitutional
ruling unnecessary.
3
While
Younger focuses on the state
interests at stake in the state proceedings, the
inquiry in
Pullman is (1) whether the meaning of a state law affecting a
significant social policy is substantially ambiguous, (2) whether clarification in state court would
obviate the need for a federal court to determine the state
statute's constitutionality, and (3) whether
erroneous construction by the federal courts would
disrupt important state
policies.
In deciding whether to abstain under
Pullman, another important
consideration is whether clarification in the state courts will have any effect at all. If, for example, there is no way in which a state court could
construe a state statute in order to render it
constitutional,
Pullman abstention would serve no purpose.
Another important difference between
Younger and
Pullman abstention is that, while
Younger abstention is mandatory, and must be applied if the requirements are fulfilled,
Pullman abstention is
discretionary, and a court has discretion not to apply it even if the requirements are all met.
1 To avoid confusion, "plaintiff" will always refer to the plaintiff in federal court who seeks to enjoin state proceedings.
2 Exception: Younger will not apply if a federal administrative proceeding that would have preclusive effect on the state administrative proceeding before the state proceeding was commenced.
3 In Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997), the Supreme Court raised some question about the continuing vitality of Pullman, holding that certification of state law questions - submitting them to the state supreme court for resolution - was the preferred route.