The Rise of Nasserism (Part 1) - The Rise of Nasserism (Part 2)
Nasser as Leader
Nasser, who certainly in terms of heavy
workload and
lack of
material reward seemed to want little for himself,
would have been hard put to resist the
adulation for his
leadership of
Arab nationalism after 1956. But just as
important for him were the prudential reasons for an
active policy in the "
Arab circle". The
West may have been
divided and humiliated in 1956, but the
Middle East was
far too important
politically and
economically for it not to
have sought to recover its position. No more could there
be dreams of bringing Nasser down, such as those that had
inspired
Eden, but any growth of Nasser's influence,
especially now that he was associated with the
Soviet Union,
had to be contained if not actively countered by Western
policies not only towards
Egypt but the
Arab world as a
whole. Thus the stage was set for a new round of rivalry as
Nasser saw it, between
Arab nationalism under his leadership and the
Western powers as they sought to
manipulate
and encourage their allies in the Middle East.
The
weapons in this struggle were
ideological and
material. Ideologically Nasser's
charismatic appeal as
leader
of Arab nationalism won hands down among the masses,
but Arab states were not
democracies and among ruling
elites Nasser secretly evoked much
fear, whatever the
recognition given the conquering
hero publicly. Nasser's
appeal to the Arab masses, and unbridled critical comment
on the character and policies of other Arab rulers became
the staple diet of
Voice of the Arabs. More sinisterly, but with
a similar purpose of capitalizing on this new-found
popularity, Nasser's own special service agents, the
mukhabarat, were active in many parts of the Arab world.
Eisenhower Doctrine
His perceived major adversaries, the
Western powers,
could hardly reply ideologically, for their main weapon,
liberal democracy, had little appeal to many of their Arab
allies, while they themselves were dubious of its applicability in such a
volatile region. Their main weapon was in
materials, both economic and
military, which it was
believed could help stabilize shaky elites: at the same time
Western countries too could be active conspirators utilising
the rivalry and factionalism to be found in so many countries. The major Western initiative, in the wake of the
setback to Britain and France, lay with the
US pronouncement early in 1957 of the “
Eisenhower doctrine”. Significant
though
Eisenhower's attitude had been to the outcome of
the
Suez war, it was in no way an indication that
America
was enamoured with Nasser: rather it believed that the
European powers were overstretched and using inappropriate
policies. In particular Nasser was disliked in
Washington
for his reaching out to
Moscow, in spite of his efforts to
obtain Western arms and support for the
High Dam. The
Eisenhower doctrine in consequence offered military and
economic aid to Middle Eastern countries seeking help in
resisting communist pressure, whether from without or
within, and
Nasserist Arab nationalism, now with
Soviet
backing, fell broadly into this category. But like the
Baghdad Pact, to which it was obviously intended to be the
successor, the Eisenhower Doctrine also posed the danger
to would-be takers that they would be swiftly branded as
collaborators with
imperialism and targeted by Nasser and
his
charismatic appeal to the masses.
Neighours
The target in the struggle for the Middle East lay primarily in the
Fertile Crescent: that collection of new, arbitrarily
defined and heterogeneously populated countries at the
head of the
Arabian peninsula and its
deserts, which by
dint of political geography, oil and the birth of
Israel, had
become a hotbed of pressures of all kinds. The opposite
pole to Egypt lay in
Iraq, and for all the artificiality of that
country from its creation as a British
mandate at the end of
the
First World War,
Baghdad had always been one of the
great cities and centres of the Middle East. Iraq had had
one branch of the
Hashemite monarchies (the other was
Jordan) created by Britain, but the survival of the
monarchy had several times been threatened. In the post-war
period it had survived largely under the guidance of
Nuri
Said. Nuri had been an
Ottoman army officer when he
defected to the British-backed Arab revolt of 1916; later as
a long-serving politician he always made friendship with
Britain, still the dominant power in Iraq, the cornerstone
of his policy. Nuri had been Eden's main ally in constructing
the Baghdad Pact, and though Nasser's “
Czech” arms deal
with the
Soviet Union had aborted that effort, he remained
a staunch
ally and manoeuvre in regional politics, being
suspected in particular of seeking
Iraqi dominance of the
Fertile Crescent.
The second of the Hashemite kingdoms,
Jordan, was
more ambiguously pro-British, especially once young
King
Hussein had come to the throne in 1951 and sought to
walk a
tight rope both internally and externally. Internally
the creation of Israel from the division of
Palestine had left
Jordan a harbourer of internal pressures from
Palestinians,
which were largely countered by the support for the monarchy from the desert
Bedouin. The latter were particularly
strong in the Arab Legion built up and commanded by a
British general,
Glubb Pasha (and in receipt of a British
government subsidy). Externally there had been enormous
pressure on
Hussein both for and against joining the
Baghdad Pact, which he had resolved by rejecting the pact,
suddenly ousting Glubb, but at the same time seeking to
resist
Egyptian pressure in his foreign policy to fall in
behind that of
Cairo. Throughout the first half of 1957
there was a bitter war of words between Nasser and Hussein,
until eventually the former called it off, not least because
he had other matters to attend to, and of a very different
character.
Syria, like the other Arab states, had its own peculiar
characteristics. One of them was its marked political
heterogeneity involving different
ethnic factions: marked
regional differences around major towns; and extremes of
wealth among large landowners and businessmen and
poverty among peasants on its harsh marginal lands. In
addition parties of the
Left and
Right had emerged, as well
as the
Ba'ath Party, founded by the young radical nationalists
Michel Aflaq and
Salah Bitar, which through a vague
romantic-sounding ideology espoused Arab unity and
socialism. Since
France had been forced out of Syria in 1946 the
country had experienced both civilian and military regimes
without achieving any long-term stability. Another of its
features was that
Damascus had from the late nineteenth
century been a centre of unambiguous Arab nationalism,
and of a more profound and organic character than Nasser
envisaged. Partly in recognition of an evolving common
outlook, Syria and Egypt signed a military pact in October
1955. Nasser's Suez triumph soon brought a reaction in
Syria when
leftist pro-Nasser elements were coming to the
fore, leading late in 1956 to the breaking of relations with
the West and an arms deal with the Soviet Union. The
move though served only to deepen division in Syria,
where it was feared in particular that the right might turn
to the West, which through the
CIA had been discovered
trying to engineer a
coup, and that Syria might become
aligned with Iraq, pulling Jordan too into the net.
Union with Syria
In the growing
chaos in Syria a group of leftist officers
began overtures towards Egypt seeking a union of the two
major Arab nationalist powers; and after much complex
manoeuvring a direct approach to Nasser was finally made.
Nasser was initially somewhat uncertain. He had never
been to Syria and showed a lack of
confidence in understanding its bewildering politics. He seemed to feel that
union would present all kinds of unforeseen problems. But
while showing his customary suspicion, Nasser felt that he
was faced with an option that really left him with little
choice. If he missed the opportunity it might never be
repeated, and he was now the widely recognised leader of
pan-Arabism. Furthermore a failure to accept the union
could see Syria swing into the arms of
Nuri and the
West
reinforcing those against whom Nasser believed it was his
destiny to act.
For a while it seemed that union might be limited to
some kind of
federal basis, with the major emphasis on
defence and
foreign policy, which was probably Nasser's
main concern. But this had potential faults: it would have
meant coming to terms with Syria's political parties and
these were not institutions for which Nasser had any more
respect in a
Syrian context than he had had in Egypt.
Moreover, Nasser was not experienced in working within
an institutional framework or sharing power - both
necessities if there was to be a federal union. He thus
insisted that if there was to be a union, as the Syrian
government was requesting, then it should be a full union
and of course he, Nasser, the leader of the much larger
and stronger Egyptian state, would be at its head. In
February 1958 Nasser and Syria's President
Quwaitly stood
together in Cairo and proclaimed the foundation of the
United Arab Republic (
UAR). It appeared a major extension of Nasser's power in the Middle East, and inevitably
led to both acclaim and fear among friends and foes. The
most immediate consequences were in the two neighbouring countries of Syria that stood to be most directly
affected:
Lebanon and Iraq. Syria had long regarded Lebanon
and its wealthy
market of
Beirut as being properly a part
of Syria, divided from it by the French in 1920 who had
then departed in 1946 leaving a new state shared between
its two major confessional groups, the
Maronite Christians
and the
Muslims. Under the leadership of the
Christian
President,
Chamoun, Lebanon, fearful of Arab domination,
had been the one state in the Middle East keen to take up
the Eisenhower Doctrine. The appeal of the UAR at the
same time found a response amongst the Muslims of
Lebanon, just as Nasser and his busy agents there intended
it should. Fed by arms from Syria it looked in 1958 as if
Lebanon might be heading for
civil war. Then, dramatically, the situation worsened on 14 July 1958, when it was
announced from Baghdad that the Western-backed
monarchy run by Nuri had been overthrown. An unknown
army officer, Brigadier
Abdel Karim Kassem, had staged a
coup that had been swiftly followed by the killing of the
royal family and Nuri himself. Fearing an immediate
worsening of the crisis in Lebanon, Chamoun called on the
Americans to send in the
marines. Shortly afterwards, and
worried too by developments in Iraq, where the king (his
cousin) had been killed,
Hussein asked Britain to follow
America's lead and send troops to Jordan.
Near Disaster, Averted
The events in Iraq appeared scarcely less significant than
the proclamation of the UAR or developments in Lebanon.
Not only had Iraq been a bulwark of the West, but with the
proclamation of the UAR, a counter
Arab Union had been
announced between Iraq and Jordan, widely seen as a
British and Hashemite plot. The unexpected coup in Iraq
brought an immediate end to the newly proclaimed union.
It was also widely assumed that events in the Middle East
since Suez had contributed directly to the coup, and that
in all probability it was Nasserist in inclination and quite
possibly had been masterminded by Nasser himself. As if to
underline this view, Nasser met secretly with Kassem's
deputy, and a friendship pact was signed which suggested
the possibility of Iraq joining the UAR.
Egypt had naturally had its agents at work in Iraq,
including those among the factions of the Iraqi army, but
the coup was Kassem's own effort and owed much to a
moment of opportunism which accounted for its unexpectedness. Kassem and his men were supposed to be on their
way to strengthen the Jordanian end of the new union
(and some suggested to threaten Syria) when he saw a
chance to effect a coup he had been plotting for some
time. It was not only the immediate circumstances, but the
parallel with events in Egypt on a July night six years
earlier, which led the world to assume though that it was in
all probability Nasser's handiwork, or at least that it would
proclaim itself for Nasserism and the new UAR.
Nasser’s Successes
The combination of Kassem's success in Iraq, and the
need for the “reactionary”
governments in Lebanon and
Jordan to scuttle for help to their Western friends all added
to the picture of Nasserism rampant in the Middle East.
Throughout the region, from
Morocco in the west to Iraq
and the Gulf in the east, the waves of his
charisma could be
felt, not only in
pan-Arab states but as a popular movement
among those whose rulers were still resisting his call. And
with the UAR established as a first step in pan-Arabism, it
seemed that a new movement embodied in the personality
of and faith in one man, Nasser, had indeed established
itself in the Arab world.
It was undoubtedly in the field of
foreign affairs that
Nasser had achieved his greatest success, and it was seen as
very much a personal achievement. Suez had of course
been the great glory, indeed the crowning glory, of his rise
to power in Egypt, after which he was to remain unchallenged until his death. Though militarily inconclusive Suez
was seen as a great political victory, both in confirming that
the British had not only left, but could never again return,
and in establishing Nasser as the leader of a wave of Arab
nationalism reaching out to all corners of the Middle East.
As he once remarked, “I have an exact knowledge of the
frontiers of the Arab nation. I do not place it in the
future
for I think and I act as though it already existed. These
frontiers end where my
propaganda no longer rouses an
echo. Beyond this point, something else begins.” By the
end of the decade in which he came to power that appeal
had been translated into the formation of the
United Arab
Republic. Egypt, the most powerful Arab state, was united
with Syria, home of Arab nationalist thinking, and whose
capital, Damascus, had once been the centre of the
greatest moments of
Arab history. As his close confidant,
Mohamed Heikal, the editor of the leading daily paper,
al-
Ahram (
The Pyramid) once remarked, “In Egypt Nasserism
was
hukm (
rule), but elsewhere in the Arab world it was
hulm (a
dream).”
This international
stature accounted for much of the
success of the revolution in Egypt, but there were other
reasons too. The
revolution of 1952 had had its path eased
by the lack of roots of the
regime it overthrew. The manner
in which it focused on the foreign elements, from
King
Farouk and his courtiers, to the foreign companies sequestrated after Suez, meant that it had few internal enemies of
substance. Nasser was Egypt's first
indigenous ruler for
2,000 years and his manner and style of speech bore this
out, making it hard for Egyptians to have serious grounds
for objection. Nor had he trod on the toes of many Egyptians in the changes wrought by the revolution. Within the
army the old senior officers had soon gone, but the army
was well looked after, and military men used in other areas,
thus ensuring very little factional struggling within the
armed forces. True, different branches were rivals, but
within Nasser's hierarchical system rather than seeking to
overturn it in the way, for instance, factional military
struggles had been a feature of Syrian political instability
since 1949. The
bureaucracy had swollen, helped by the
sequestration as well as expanded social policies, but this
too was hierarchical and loyal, if not very efficient. The
Egyptian business community faced growing state control,
but also new opportunities with the departure of the foreigners; and it was in any case not a group to mount its
own political challenge, preferring to manoeuvre within
the context of the Egyptian state rather than to challenge
the new system that Nasser topped. In the countryside the
land reform had hit the major landholders, but they were
few in number, and often of foreign derivation. In the
villages the larger peasants were untouched, and continued to serve as the middle-men between the state and the
rural masses. The revolution had brought superficial
change, but for the vast majority rural relations of all
kinds remained relatively untouched. The
economy
showed some signs of improvement and there was clear evidence that
social programmes were being expanded, so
that there was certainly no more call for complaint than
usual - and thus in much of the country Nasser's achievements were not unrecognised.
As one writer put it: “These
really important men of personality and power, who defy
the foreigner with impunity and yet speak a language the
peasant can understand, these are good men”, and
Nasser was their undoubted
leader.
References:
Naguib, M. Egypt's Destiny. Doubleday, 1955.
Nutting, A. Nasser. Constable, 1967.
Nasser, G. Philosophy of the Revolution. 1972.
Dessouki, A.H. “Nasser and the Struggle for Independence”, in Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences. Louis W.R. and Owen R. (eds). Clarendon Press, 1989.
Mansfield, P. Nasser's Egypt. Penguin, 1969.
Seale, P. The Struggle for Syria. Oxford University Press, 1965.
Ajami, F. The Arab Predicament. Cambridge University Press, 1981.
The Rise of Nasserism (Part 1) - The Rise of Nasserism (Part 2)