Leibniz a raven, quoth discovers the calculus that is not flowery
Let us interpret.
An interpretation function is a function. It is a function. It is what it is. You can use an interpretation function to interpret a function, if the function is expressible in the relevant calculus. A calculus.
We like to use a predicate calculus because it is nice. Also an intensional logic would be nice. And flowers.
An interpretation function is a function it is a function from a domain into a codomain, from a domain onto an image. An image of meaning.
It is a very nice calculus we use. But you don't use a flowery one. Oddly though flowers especially dandelions are quite efficient at reproducing themselves a flowery calculus is not. A flowery calculus does not reproduce itself because nobody uses it. Nobody uses a flowery calculus but not because they don't like flowers. For you see it doesn't have any
flowers it just has too much of what it does have. We don't want to have too much of what we do have. A flower doesn't have too much of what it does have, and so it is not flowery. A logical calculus that can reproduce itself from mind to mind is likely not to be flowery either.
``Let us calculate.''---Leibniz, except that Leibniz didn't write in English. A calculation that Leibniz had imagined had not been. Except it had been. Another earlier logical language had been and am, but why will you say that I am mad? Leibniz a raven was stealing lines from the older authors. Leibniz a raven, quoth the monadology. Also wanted to prove necessity of God's existence. But Leibniz a raven decided to use a possible worlds ontological proof which had already been done by both Anselm and Descartes and
possibly others. Except that they didn't use the words ``possible worlds'' either. Neither the Leibniz a raven, quoth. Because wrote in Latin and not in English.
English a language and also Latin a language is. To translate. In order to enter the phase of progress in process an opportune time. A bad start. In order to translate, it takes a raven. A sentence structure syntax. With a flowery one is it possible but much easier with one that is not flowery. A tie-in. A tie between Leibniz a raven, quoth and also between Newton. Newton was not a raven because lived before Poe. But also Leibniz did. And so. also Leibniz a raven a language is written in. A progress of starting the monadology. Again to speak of flowers.
To speak of flowers it is necessary but not sufficient to refer to them successfully. One must refer with an appropriate semantic map. This is why we like an
interpretation function. This this this is a flowery rosebud chamomile orange blossom flowery flowery sentence. We like an interpretation function it is a function from a logical calculus to a flower and other things, quoth. A semantic map is appropriate if and only if it is. This is a tautology.
A tautology is not necessarily obvious. It is not merely that in some possible worlds there are tautologies which are not immediately obvious. For such a proposition might be controversial were there no evidence in the current world. But a tautology is simply a mathematical proposition. It is obvious. But not immediately. In the current world. Unless it switched, possible.
A return to mathematics and functions and current and possible worlds is a tie-in to change and therefore to Leibniz a raven, and Newton. We say that Newton discovered first the calculus because he did.
This is linguistic efficiency. Were we to say that Newton discovered not the calculus because he did so discover, we would not be using linguistic efficiency. And so we would be flowery. Flowery logic does not get used by the one who wants to use logic. This is a logical sentence, or else it isn't.
To speak of flowers it is necessary to refer to them successfully. This does not mean anything unless ``necessary'' does. It is necessary, we say, but it is not sufficient. It can be spoken of. It can be spoken of a flower as it were, being quoth around, without however quothed then about. Around is necessary for about, and perhaps around is successful reference. If successful reference must not only be close but right, perhaps about then is successful reference.
Leibniz though had seen Newton's papers and for what it is worth also had seen Spinoza's papers, discovered the calculus. But did not cite Newton as a
reference. A travesty. Except. Expect to hear from Newton's lawyers, but who cares around Newton? Spinoza's papers are not flowery. It is fun to read. An agreement in predicates with our subject will not have been discover. A Spinoza would be the best of elegant substructures of a calculus.
Little rocks are calculi. So are first- and second-order logic. A truth of logic is that if a is a member of b and c is a member of b then it is not necessarily the case that a and c are the same. Not necessarily is not true in all models. We take the de re reading here. And so a logical calculus is a calculus and the differential calculus that Leibniz stole discovered is a calculus. But a logical calculus is not necessarily a differential calculus. A differential calculus is a logical calculus but for reasons which need not detain us here. Just as a
discussion of the interpretation of seventeenth-century neologisms such a monadology need not detain us here. Detain need not flowery us to calculus us within a here.
We like a calculus us within a here. It is here that we encounter the next structure we need to build our theory. With a few more introductory remarks, my proof will be complete. From somebody else's essay. It was found there. Not in here, this is not a discovery. It is not new to like a flower. For a dandelion could be somebody's. Or a flower. A flower changes over time, and this is why Leibniz a raven, why quoth that the derivative of y with respect to x is what it is. This is beyond the scope of this paper but it is probably worth reading. Unless Latin can't read. But.
Also flower gardening might be nice accomplished with a logical program. It takes a referring expression to refer to a referent. That is.
That is
the end. No. This is.
-- mps (more poems)