At first glance, the PDPR-EPR are very much your average guerrilla outfit: the store brand version of the ‘alphabet soup’ of obscure guerrilla movements in the forests of Latin America. In the academic and political literature they are consigned to a secondary role besides the EZLN to the point that even scholarship focusing on the group calls them “the other guerrillas12. Indeed, both groups emerged together in the crucible of Mexico’s explosive mid-90s out of the reconfiguration of numerous guerrilla groups3. While they have pursued decisively different courses both remain a counterpoint to the assertion that history has no more need for the guerrillas or their cause. As such, US-aligned state sources conclude the PDPR-EPR is a mere nuisance4. With EZLN capturing public attention, the indifference of mainstream as well as dissident society with the group is illustrated by an anecdote an alleged guerrillero had of Amnesty International visiting him in prison (only to never return): “They told us they were going to support us but they lied”5.

All this considered, why should one study the PDPR-EPR? Their organization durability, for one this, is exceptional, and the history of the Mexican guerrilla during the Dirty War show organizations of this type with the capacity to survive likewise possess the capacity to take on new forms67. More importantly, it could serve to upset conventional narratives around the concepts of “neoliberalism” and “transitions to democracy”. The group is especially fascinating because it provides an analysis of its own which both compliments and contradicts these. In some ways these idiosyncratic positions can serve as a mirror by which theorists can see the reception of the conceptual vocabulary in the minds of those who might be considered most affected. Shifting the focus away from Latin America’s more exceptional case studies such as the EZLN (or PCP-SL) towards more broadly representative ones opens up the potential for a study of the guerrilla subculture as a whole, one which is grounded in its social context instead of highly speculative projects of ‘political imagination’ which are prone to exaggerate and idealize. We can see this in the case of the EZLN, who have been greatly mythologized. It must be remembered that the EZLN, for almost every reason imaginable, are the exception to the guerrilla experience. What the PDPR-EPR can offer is, perhaps a view of the standard guerilla group, one which reaches deeper into the history of the Mexican Marxist guerilla organizations which the EZLN has veered away from. More intriguingly, its obscurity is the result of an isolation on the international level. While guerrilla groups typically have relations with others, usually on shared ideological lines, it seems that the PDPR-EPR can boast of no such ties. Its durability in the face of this points towards some combination of public support and organizational ability. For this, if nothing else, the PDPR-EPR deserve an introduction in English better than a barebones wiki page. This effort would attempt to compile all the available information about the group as well as situate it within the wider historical context.

The basis for this research originated out of the work carried out on the PDPR-EPR from both mexico scholars of guerrilla movements and American intelligence following their main period of activity. Early studies on the group was content to categorize the group as Maoist8 and predicted that it would be short-lived9. A cursory review of the group’s ideological and polemical output, along with their remarkable longevity calls into question these initial assumptions and demands a serious reconsideration for the group. The primary line of inquiry is therefore what factors serve to explain the group’s uncharacteristic duration despite its long periods of military inactivity with secondary considerations being the finer points of its ideological development over the same time-frame. In other words, why has the PDPR-EPR eludes predictions of its demise? Should it be understood as a conventional Maoist group? The research points towards a compelling interrelation of the two which could be summarized in an even more succinct form: How has the PDPR-EPR evolved ideologically?

The internet has in some measures made the group clearer and in others complicated it. What it does is present a stark contrast between the group’s military hibernation and its unflagging self-image as a potent guerrilla army and revolutionary vanguard10. Its activity corresponds to periods of state-involved outrages, such as the Aguas Blancas Massacre, the repression of the Oaxaca commune, and the Ayotzinapa killings and disappearances, a pattern of guerrilla mobilization predating the group back to the Tlatelolco and Corpus Christi massacres. Consequential guerrilla groups in Mexico such as the FLN are noted for the few known armed actions which they carried out and their long periods of military dormancy or ‘accumulation of forces’ during which they continued to publish polemics11.

The research is carried out on the basis of the group’s own publications as a thematic discourse analysis through literary review which is contextualized within a wider examination of the historical and social background of the organization. The group publishes the periodical El Insurgente as well as several book length efforts which concern its own history as well as that of the Mexican state it opposes. These are the main primary sources, which are readily available from the website cedema.org. The others include scholarly research on the group itself, which is largely restricted to the early 00s, as well as research into other international guerrilla organizations. El Insurgente is a mix of the agitational and theoretical with the latter gaining increasing prominence over the years. Besides this, there is the noteworthy cultural section, which includes fairly standard poetry and photography, digital collage, and drawings. The images are worthy of mention because they may serve to confirm some limited capacity on the group’s party in that they show uniformed members of the group drilling and bearing arms as a show of force. The drawings are of amateur quality and in recent issues might seem to stand in for photos of the group, pointing towards difficulties. The production values seem almost identical to the Communist Party of India(Maoist)'s People’s March and Columbian groups. It is the only known periodical produced by the group or its numerous splinter organizations.

In broaching this topic, some editorial and ideological slant is inevitable as there is no neutral information available. The point, however, is to ascertain the group’s own account of itself as a detailed case study in ethnography, which typically focuses on individuals. Indeed, as far as texts by individual members of the organization are available in the group’s publication, more often than not they deal with the transformation of the individual into part of the collective and ideological remoulding along these lines. Analysis of these theme is crucial to understanding the development of the group’s ideology and history, which is the topic at hand.

In early modernity, the pre-political ancestor of the guerrilla was the bandit, highwayman, or pirate most evocatively illustrated by Eric Hobsbawm or Eugen Weber. The enduring image of these figures in the popular imagination has been of a righteous criminal who enforces their own moral economy and vigilante justice upon an unjust, exploitative social order12. While this figure was not initially concern with advancing any social program, this would change following the French revolution13.18th century Ireland was particularly emblematic of this phenomenon marked by a preponderance of such agrarian societies among the peasantry, who fought back against abusive landlords and would later go on to play an important role in the Rising of 179814. The tradition of secret societies as wedded to revolutionary socialism was an innovation of August Blanqui, a central figure in the Paris Commune of 187115. Lenin was accused of Blanquism by German Social Democrats for promoting the role of a clandestine party as a vehicle for revolution, but the victory of the Bolsheviks and their followers across the world resulted in the widespread adoption of Marxism-Leninism in the socialist movement. The end of Comintern (and the Popular Front era) along with the beginning of the Cold War gave birth to the guerrilla as a thorn in the side of the imperialists - grafting a venerable tradition of agrarian resistance to an organized, forward-looking vanguard.

In the same year as the October Revolution, 1917, Mexico introduced its current constitution. The promise of the Mexican constitution would be in stark contrast the reality of the proceeding century. In spite of Mexican’s constitutional right to change their government, the proceeding decades were marked by political stagnation and repression punctuated by significant state led massacres16. This prompted the creation of guerrilla groups which invoked the spirit of both Mexican revolutionary era heros such as Zapata and Villa as well as international communist legends such as Che and others. As this familiar pattern has not stopped following the end of the Cold War and ‘transition to democracy’, the has process created a new generation of martyrs and myths wherein the PDPR-EPR locates its origins.

It would be impossible to do justice to the tragic at times quixotic history of Communist guerrilla movements in Mexico from the 1960s to the 1990s in so short a space, there are several important considerations from the period which are significant to the subject of this text. During the period, it was not unusual for groups to be militarily dormant for long periods of time while continuing to issue declarations and ‘accumulate forces’, a condition which describes the PDPR-EPR today. Contrary to some allegations that the group attempted to conceal their origins with the PROCUP and PDLP organization17, the group has claimed their origins within them throughout their existence18. The PDLP’s figure of Lucio Cabanas perhaps exemplifies the romantic figure of the guerrilla as an emblem of the schism between Mexico’s domestic guerrilla tradition and the international revolutionary movement, which has played a noted role in the support and development of guerrilla formations in Mexico19. During the 70s and 80s, the guerrilla movements had been silently gathering strength in the counryside, carrying out a struggle against local caciques with alleged aide from foreigners20.

The EPR was formed in May of 1994 out of no less than 14 minor groups, heir of the history of earlier PROCUP, the largest of these, replete with splits and regroupments and a cthonic history of underground maneuvers during the 80s similar to the EZLN’s precursor the FLN21. Following the EZLN uprising, the PROCUP carried out its final bombing campaign in solidarity before dissolving itself into the EPR22. In spite of this origin from the same context, the EPR and the EZLN have no relations beyond recognition of one another. One of PROCUP’s suspected final acts was the kidnapping and ransom of banker Alfredo Harp Helú for 30 million dollars23. This kingly sum may do much to explain the new group’s initial military capacity.

The Aguas Blancas massacre on June 1995, in which 17 members of a peasant organization were shot dead en route to a protest spurred the newly formed group into action, perhaps prematurely24. On the anniversary of the killings a year later, the group entered the town of Aguas Blancas in Guerrero where they had taken place, read a manifesto and fired 17 shots into the air25. This began an ongoing armed campaign which quickly reached its bloody peak a mere two months later with the launch of several simultaneous armed actions against the state26 which were met with brutal and indiscriminate reprisals against the indigenous populations from which the fighters were allegedly drawn centering around the village of San Augustin Loxica27. The state’s counterinsurgency measures managed to suppress the group’s armed campaign but could not destroy it and in 2000, the group reorganized itself into its current form, the PDPR-EPR, which merged the remaining guerrilla army and an underground party structure into one organization28.

While the topic at hand is the PDPR-EPR it would certainly be amiss not to briefly the address the EPRI and other offshoots on account of their crucial role of the parent organization’s ideological and strategic development during this time. The PDPR-EPR’s sustained presence in this regard has effectively marginalized the efforts of those who were in many cases their former comrades. What is left unsaid, however, often has much bearing on what is said: In their brief blaze of glory it is estimated that the ERPI made off with over half of the PDPR-EPR’s personnel and materiel29. While this may have figured heavily in the PDPR-EPR’s palpably reduced operational capacity in the 21st century, there is a case to be made that it contributed to the group’s ideological development. Evidently, for all that they took from the ERPI, they could not capture the group’s central organ. Following this and other splits, the group fell into a prolonged period of organizational decline as its military activity swiftly tapered off very early in the 20th century30. Mexican authorities succeeded in ‘decapitating’ the ERPI in October 2006, kidnapping their two main leaders31 at the same time they were also cracking down on the Oaxaca commune with lethal force. This bloody state repression would reliably goad the vigilantes to act.

Less than a year later, the state attempted a similar maneuver against the ERPI’s parent organization, but this had the opposite effect. Following the ‘disappearance’ (extrajudicial kidnapping) of militants Edmundo Reyes and Gabriel Cruz in 2007 the PDPR-EPR soon became active again, changing their tactics and bombing Pemex pipelines, Sears stores and banks32. This choice of targets corresponded to the group’s contempt for both foreign and domestic capital. After this the group went into another extended period of demobilization that ended with the 2014 abduction of 43 students from Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers’ College (alma mater of Lucio Cabañas), some of whom were later found dead. As a reprisal, the PDPR-EPR claimed responsibility for an explosion of a gas station in Ecatepec less than 2 months later, though authorities alleged the explosion was simply the result of poor maintenance33. Since then, the group’s activity has been restricted to the realm of words and during all the reversals of the armed campaign, they have been consistently publishing their journal El Insurgente, since 1996 in which dormancy has translated into ideological ferment which some have attempted to characterize as Maoist.

Maoism as a tendancy within the Communist movement has attracted attention from both admirers and detractors alike (and seemingly exclusively) with the former chiefly advocating for a narrow definition and the former for a broad definition. As such it represents both an indiscriminate pejorative and sought after affiliation. In relation to Mexico, scholar of guerrilla movements (one solidly within the first camp) Joshua Moufawad-Paul writes thus:

“The lingering fascination with EZLN is telling: there is a reason that the Zapatistas have received sainthood while the Sendero Luminoso has not. The latter’s aborted people’s war placed it firmly in the realm of failure; the former in refusing to attempt a seizure of state power, were to escape any resemblance of a catastrophic communism. But when a movement actually tries to take power, and goes so far as to almost succeed, in its collapse the meaning of its actions will be written by the ruling class intelligensia and everyone beholden to the common sense of this class. Organizations such as the EZLN have avoided the fate of the PCP because they did not walk the same path of revolutionary necessity that is often tragic and brutal – where there will always be mistakes, where the problem of differing class morality produces ethical confusion, where the failure is more spectacular with each heightened level of struggle.”34

Conversely the status of the PDPR-EPR within the wider guerrilla movement looks a lot like JMP’s story of PCP-SL within the left subculture writ small. On closer examination, it is not so simple. The PCP-SL is associated with violence and ideological rigidity, and the EZLN, with reformist restraint and eclecticism. The PDPR-EPR occupies a very awkward position between Moufawad-Paul’s two poles of the guerrilla experience. On one hand they come from the same time and place as the ELZN and on the other they share almost none of its eclectic, postmodern politics, with a more conventional Marxist orientation closer to PCP-SL, but by comparison, still startlingly eclectic within the perimeters of Marxism itself. While the EZLN has its origins within the early Mexican Maoist movement, following the uprising, it subsequently distanced itself from Marxism (along with all other qualifications)35, oftentimes quite forcefully36. While Marcos and the EZLN masterfully courted the attention of the world, the PDPR-EPR on the other hand, have taken a vastly different approach and largely restricted their audience to Mexico. Since their inception, the organization has grown increasingly and ever more explicitly Marxist, devoting increasing space in their publications to the discussion of the ideology. Taken at its own word, the group at some times offers a challenge to the official narratives of comparative politics and at others meshes with it.

In listing the Maoist People’s Wars which are either being prepared for or taking place within the world, led by various parties, Moufawad-Paul does not include the PDPR-EPR37. While seemingly odd for a document which is intended to highlight the signifigance of the Maoist movement it makes more sense when one considers the high demand for ideological rigour within the movement itself. It is nonetheless bold to pass over Mexico’s history of guerrilla movements in complete silence. As stated above, Washington affiliated intelligence and security analysts are quick to file them as such and be done with it. It would stand to reason that the Maoist categorization is built up entirely from the group’s advocacy of Protracted People’s War, a term all but synonymous with Mao Tse Tung, because bizarrely enough, there is very little else to suggest this in the group’s publications. Mao, and all forms of Maoism are conspicuously absent from the groups discourse. Indeed, there is more mention of Che and guerrilla movements in Latin America (with the baffling exception of Peru’s PCP-SL). References to domestic and international Maoist groupings such CPI(Maoist), Communist Party of the Philippines, and Communist Party of Peru, the RIM, etc are nowhere to be found. The internecine polemics and international solidarity declarations characteristic of Maoist guerrilla movements are conspicuously absent. Ironically, the group’s polemics are veiled in a manner which bear a passing resemblance to the period of high Maoism during the early Cultural Revolution, in which political struggle was carried out indirectly through a literary and artistic allusions. All this suggests that in spite of its marginalization, the group does have allies or sympathizers within the wider Mexican left which it intends to correct, but not confront while having few if any international links to Maoism. While the group may incorporate Maoist elements into its ideology, calling it Maoist would require broadening the definition to apply to include almost any guerrilla group.

The group’s commissions are more startling than their omissions The rare international outlook the group does give do more to dispel the Maoist characterization than anything. A recent issue of El Insurgente went so far as to congratulate the Communist Party of China on its 100th anniversary38 at a time when Maoist movements were contemporaneously and unanimously issuing spirited denunciations of them as traitors to the revolutionary struggle39. Counter to the assertion that the group went to great lengths to hide its origins in PROCUP and the PDLP. the group actually proudly mentions PROCUP in numerous publications throughout its existence40 as part of its own attempt to synthesize their own half century historiography of the guerrilla movement in Mexico. This a document which, while no doubt not altogether impartial, merits serious consideration alongside academic studies of the period as a key primary source document. It places their origins within a very obscure groupuscle known as the UP which later joined up with PROCUP and PDLP41. While the story of the group represent a temporary convergence of 20th century guerrilla groups, it is significant that during the group’s disintegration, none of these left to resume their activities under the old name. The group’s longevity and ideological uniformity may be the result of the organizational experience of its members.

Whether or not that is a result of the ERPI’s departure, It may be said with some certainty that the ERP only truly became identifiably Marxist soon after the departure of ERPI42. With ERPI gone, so too was a need to maintain unity through imprecise ideological affiliation. It seems likely that the splinter groups hamstrung the original outfit’s ability to wage armed conflict without affecting the core nucleus of the group’s political leadership. Writing in 2006, Jorge Lofredo characterized the PDPR-EPR as falling into the traditional pattern of Mexican guerrilla groups toward dissolution43. This has, not, however, did not prove to be true, as the group exists in some form to this day whereas its offshoots have overwhelmingly vanished into complete obscurity.

The group, notably, lacks a prominent leading figure (“cult of personality” or jefatura). Even though the EZLN could be considered to have this to some degree around Subcommandante Marcos, this is nowhere to be found in the PDPR-EPR. Their campaign for the freedom of alleged leaders does not speak of them in terms of their great leadership or theoretical contributions but simply in terms of their rights being violated44. Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Che all figure quite prominently as figures of admiration and emulation, but the group itself has not made any apparent sustained effort to elevate one of their own to this level as is the case with certain guerrilla groups: most notably the Communist Party of Peru. The brief identification of the group’s mysterious leader and foil to the flamboyant Marcos: Commandante Jose Arturo45, as conspicuously Marxist in outlook make for intriguing speculation about the internal dynamics of the group, intimating that in spite of turmoil, the core leadership has remained stable. While the EZLN has explicitly disavowed not only vanguardism but seemingly all outside attempts at ideological classification, the PDPR-EPR’s output is peppered with references to Marx, Lenin, and even Stalin46. Though ostensibly doctrinaire, the PDPR-EPR possess a striking eclecticism of its own which colours the group’s analysis and inhibits its inclusion within any broader international movement. The idiosyncrasies of the group’s political line show that they are not tethered to any global affiliation.

Interestingly, the discourse of “neoliberalism” figures very heavily in the discourse of PDPR-EPR from the very beginning47. It is not a typically hardline Marxist-Leninist concept, but more typical of the liberal progressive left who would seek to establish a break between themselves and postwar liberalism and represent mid-century capitalism as a short-lived postwar consensus in the imperial world, such as David Harvey48. No doubt this is not specific to the PDPR-EPR, as this figures very heavily in the EZLN communiques as well49. On a broader scale, this underscores a certain saturation point of the ideas of the Western academic left as it filters down to even rural guerrilla movements in Southern Mexico that troubles conventional understandings of the respective role of the political left in both the imperialist world and the periphery as how their discourse are adapted for agitation. Economic outlook aside, politically the group, though not initially anti-electoral, presents an overarching narrative of unending repression diametrically opposed to the “transition to democracy” interpretation found within conventional comparative politics. For the PDPR-EPR, the withdrawal of the PRI has failed to significantly change the character of the Mexican state.

While there is no semblance of a consensus towards elections within the Maoist movement, the group displays a hardening anti-electoral stance which was not initially apparent50. Current President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who was once within the ambit of the wing of PRD, and to some extend sympathetic to the guerrilla cause (if not their means)51, is the recipient of as much scorn as the PAN and PRI presidents before him, with his “Fourth Transformation” program being characterized as a reaffirmation of the country’s age old status quo52. These are is not the only political development of the Mexican state which the group opposes. In the region where the group operates, state-led decolonization measures such as the usos have been lauded53. While there is considerable evidence to suggest their guerrilla activity expedited the introduction of these, these are viewed with suspicion as counterinsurgency measures54. The groups’ own conception of “indigenismo” in their polemic considers the indigenous people as peasants and affirms that capitalism does not distinguish between races and peoples55. While the indigenous dimension is central to the EZLN’s resistance56, the relationship between the EPR and indigeniety is less clear. In the context of the state repression of the organization, it is important to note that the indigenous community was subject to heavy and violent state repression immediately following the group’s initial period of activity. This gestures towards a multifaceted relationship with indigenous identity within wider Mexican society and a lack of consensus within this sector of the population. The shift in identification from peasant to indigenous might not be as unanimous as scholarship would suggest57. The group’s line on indigeneity shows that within the indigenous population itself there is a lingering identification with peasantry as a class category instead of an ethnic one. This serves as another line of demarcation with the EZLN. To further illustrates the marginality of the group’s stance, breaking with narratives of the COVID-19 pandemic as a singular catastrophe to which authorities have not responded adequately or form of class warfare, the group alleged that the danger of the virus itself is exaggerated ‘to cause panic’58, as they had done over a decade before during the H1N1 pandemic59. Within the left, a sustained skeptic position of this sort is almost unheard of outside of fringe circles, particularly anarchist ones.

The exceptional conflagration during the 1990s appears to have breathed new life into the movement when the EZLN, PDPR-EPR, and the latter’s offshoots entered the scene. This momentum has clearly not entirely run out, but how long it can last is another matter entirely. Understanding the proliferation and decline of guerrilla movements in Mexico, eperrista and otherwise, requires an understanding of the presence of the military and militarization within Mexican society, a phenomenon which has continued through the period of the PRI’s political dominance and one which cartel groups have been able to capitalize on by positing themselves as an alternative, with even army leaders themselves breaking ranks with the state’s military to join the cartels60. Where the military has long been conceived of as a vector of violence, indiscipline, and disorder within Mexico61, the cartels themselves have begun extending a demand of demilitarization of Mexican society, and in spite of their publicized deeds, might even present a plausible social alternative62.

As is seen most evocatively with the Corrido Vermelha  in Brazil, much of the activity former carried out by guerrilla armies is carried out by cartels and criminal organizations who appear to have their own code and restrictions which can be inscrutable to outsiders63. The development of police technology, clearly unhindered by any concern for human rights, has effectively made it impossible for any organization to carry out struggle against the state without a means of supporting themselves. It is within the scope of possibility that the guerrilla may present an escape from the life of drugs and violence presented by the cartels and perhaps even defend the people from them in some limited capacity in the vacuum left by the state, as the groups claim. The role of freemasonry within Mexican politics and its alleged relation to socialism and agrarianism might also serve to articulate the role of clandestine structures in the country’s political development64. Various traditions of clandestine organizations are interwoven through the country’s history. Secret societies, historically, have served as both their own demimonde as well as a vehicle with which to transform the world as they find it.

The guerrilla organization, absent the ability to carry out a sustained armed campaign, has begun a process of introspection, ideologically remoulding themselves in the image of Communist ideology as part of the process of preparation for ‘protracted people’s war’ or at least armed ‘self-defence’ or revindication. This turn towards ideology can be properly contextualized as the result of the creation of the ERPI, which absconded with their arms and membership while leaving the ideology. Despite taking the lion’s share of the capacity to wage war, their elimination served as a dire warning of the consequence of rashness and ideological inconsistency. In their process of ideological development, the PDPR-EPR has made it abundantly clear that they have absolutely no need for outside approval, viewing their (in)activity as “57 years of intense revolutionary combat”65. As such, it would be tenuous to characterize them as Maoist, which as an international movement jealously guards the name. Even from military terms, in spite of what it says, the group’s military efforts have more in common with armed propaganda or ‘propaganda of the deed’ in spite of a declared commitment to ‘protracted people’s war’. Rather than serving to be dismissive of the organization, this instead merits further study as a highly unique isolated development worthy of further study as the persistent of a historically specific type of group. As the EZLN departs significantly from what is expected from the traditional guerrilla organization practically and ideologically, the PDPR-EPR represents the ultimate trajectory of all 20th century guerrilla groups with its longevity being the result of adherents of the cause having simply nowhere else to go. It could similarly be conceived of as the post-Cold War afterlife of the movement, simply going through the motions and taking very sporadic symbolic actions. While the short lived offshoots of the group have attempted to situate themselves within Mexico’s own revolutionary tradition, they have left the PDPR-EPR occupying the place of Marxist convention as a small party which makes much of its history as an armed movement. Study of the group’s publications, however, reveals that this has not always been the case. Rather than beginning as an explicitly Marxist movement, the group initially grounded itself in a fairly general opposition towards 'neoliberal' policies not altogether unlike the EZLN. The flight of splinter groups from the organization shows that this outward political line is the development of internal processes which were in motion since the beginning. The departure of these has also solidified the grasp of Marxist ideology on the group which the group does not receive as part of any international tendency - allowing them to give it their own idiosyncratic interpretation.

Footnotes

1. Jorge Lofredo, “La otra guerrilla mexicana: Aproximaciones al estudio del Ejército Popular Revolucionario.” Desacatos 24 (2007) Retrieved November 15, 2021, from http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1607-050X2007000200012.

2. Graham Hall Turbiville, “Mexico's Other Insurgents.” Military Review 77 (1997): 81.

3. Lofredo, “La otra guerrilla mexicana”

4. Mark R Wrighte, “The Real Mexican Terrorists: A Group Profile of the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR)” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 25:4,(2002): 216.

5. Antonio Mundaca, “Los Guerrilleros de Loxicha, la permanente sombra del destierro.” Pie de Página (2020) Retrieved November 15, 2021, from https://piedepagina.mx/los-guerrilleros-de-loxicha-la-permanente-sombra-del-destierro/.

6. Adele Cedillo,“Armed Struggle without Revolution: The Organizing Process of the National Liberation Forces(FLN) and the Genesis of Neo-Zapatism (1969-1983)” in Challenging Authoritarianism in Mexico: Revolutionary Struggles and the Dirty War, 1964-1982 edited by Adela Cedillo and Fernando Calderón (New York: Routledge. 2012) 148-160.

7. Donald C. Hedges and Ross Gandy, Mexico Under Siege: Popular Resistance to Presidential Despotism. (London: Zed Books. 2002) 107-155.

8. Wrighte,“The Real Mexican Terrorists”, 207-225.

9. Lofredo, “La otra guerrilla mexicana”

10. Comité de Prensa y Propaganda del PDPR-EPR, 50 Años de Lucha Armada Revolucionaria: Breve historia del PDPR-EPR. (Editorial Del Pueblo, 2016) 141.

11. Adele Cedillo, “Armed Struggle without Revolution”, 148-160.

12.John P. Sullivan and Nathan P. Jones, “Bandits, Urban Guerrillas, and Criminal Insurgents Crime and Resistance in Latin America” in Problems and Alternatives in the Modern Americas (1st ed.) edited by Pablo A. Baisotti (New York: Routledge. 2021). 169.

13. ibid. 168.

14. Gale E. Christianson, “Secret Societies and Agrarian Violence in Ireland, 1790-1840.” Agricultural History 46, no. 3 (1972): 369–84.

15. Edward S. Mason,“Blanqui and Communism.” Political Science Quarterly 44, no. 4 (1929): 515–523.

16. Romain Robinet, “A Revolutionary Group Fighting Against a Revolutionary State: The September 23rd Communist League Against the PRI-State (1973-1975)” in Challenging Authoritarianism in Mexico: Revolutionary Struggles and the Dirty War, 1964-1982 edited by Adela Cedillo and Fernando Calderón (New York: Routledge. 2012) 144.

17. Gustavo Hirales Morán, “Radical Groups in Mexico Today” Policy Papers on the Americas Volume XIV, Study 9 (2003): 11.

18. Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario,“RESPUESTA A LA CARTA DE RODOLFO ECHEVERRIA PUBLICADA EN EL DIARIO "LA JORNADA" EL DIA 9 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1997.” El Insurgente 13 (1997): 29.

19. Hodges and Gandy,“Mexico Under Siege”, 116-118.

20. Miguel Ángel Maya, “Loxicha, la historia no contada de la guerrilla.” Pie de Página (2020) Retrieved November 15, 2021, from https://piedepagina.mx/loxicha-la-historia-no-contada-de-la-guerrilla/.

21. Bill Weinberg, Homage to Chiapas: The New Indigenous Struggles in Mexico. (United Kingdom: Verso Books, 2002) 261.

22. John Ross, "Strong Contrasts Between Zapatistas, New Guerrilla Movement in Guerrero." (1996) 3. Retrieved November 15, 2021, from https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/sourcemex/3633

23. Sam Dillon “Mexico Builds a Picture of Fanatic Rebel Group” The New York Times September 5th 1996

24. Lofredo, “La otra guerrilla mexicana”

25. David Lipshultz, “Mexican Town Skeptical About New Rebels” United Press International July 3rd, 1996

26. Wrighte. “Real Mexican Terrorists”, 222.

27. Maya. “Loxicha”

28. Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario “COMUNICADOS DEL PDPR-EPR” El Insurgente 176 (2017) 56-59

29. Morán, “Radical Groups”, 12.

30.Wrighte, “Real Mexican Terrorists”, 223.

31. Joshua Paulson, “Rural Rebellion in Southern Mexico: The Guerrillas of Guerrero” North American Congress on Latin America September 25, 2007 Retrieved November 15, 2021 from https://nacla.org/article/rural-rebellion-southern-mexico-guerrillas-guerrero

32. “Leftist rebels say they bombed Mexico pipelines” Reuters September 11, 2007 Retrieved November 15, 2021 from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-pipelines/leftist-rebels-say-they-bombed-mexico-pipelines-idUSN1139242220070911

33. “Edomex desmiente al EPR sobre explosión en Ecatepec” El Universal November 14, 2014 Retrieved November 15, 2021 from https://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion-mexico/2014/soriana-ecatepec-1054244.html

34. Joshua Moufawad-Paul, The Communist Necessity: Prolegomena to Any Future Radical Theory. (Montreal, Quebec: Kersplebedeb Publishing, 2014.) 46-47.

35. Subcommandante Marcos, Our Word Is Our Weapon: Selected Writings. (New York: Seven Stories, 2000) Print. 41.

36. Subcommandante Marcos, ‘I Shit On All the Revolutionary Vanguards of this Planet’ A Letter to the Basque Liberation Movement ETA” The Anarchist Library Retrieved November 15, 2021 from https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/subcomandante-marcos-i-shit-on-all-the-revolutionary-vanguards-of-this-planet

37. Moufawad Communist Necessity, 21-21.

38. Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario “A CIEN AÑOS DE LA FUNDACIÓN DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE CHINA ” El Insurgente 210 (2021): 44.

39. Communist Party of the Philipines “On the Centennial of the Once Great Communist Party of China” Philippine Revolution Web Central Retrieved November 14th 2021 from https://cpp.ph/statements/on-the-centennial-of-the-once-great-communist-party-of-china/

40. Comité de Prensa y Propaganda del PDPR-EPR, “50 Años” 141.

41. ibid.

42. Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario, “Editorial” El Insurgente 13 (1997): 4.

43. Lofredo. “La otra guerrilla mexicana”

44. Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario, “13 Años de Impunidad ” El Insurgente 200 (2020): 4.

45. Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario ,“Entrevista en la Sierra Madre Oriental Publicada en la revista “Proceso” num. 1032.”El Insurgente 1 (1996): 64.

46. Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario, “Revolución a debate: El camarada Stalin en el siglo XXI” El Insurgente 200 (2020): 21.

47. Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario “MANIFESTO DE EL SIERRA MDRE ORIENTAL” El Insurgente 1 (1996) 8.

48. David Harvey. A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2005) 9.

49. Subcomandante Marcos and Nathalie de Broglio, "The Fourth World War Has Begun." Nepantla: Views from South 2, no. 3 (2001): 559-572.

50. Betzabé Mendoza Paz, “Participación Social Armada en Oaxaca. Ejército Popular Revolucionario” Estudios Políticos 9(17) (2002): 69.

51. Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario, “Entrevista en el Valle de Mexico Publicada en la revista “Proceso” num. 1034.” El Insurgente 1 (1996): 71.

52. Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario, “A Tres Años De Gobierno De La 4T” El Insurgente 212 (2021): 17.

53. Alberto Díaz-Cayeros, Beatriz Magaloni, and Alexander Ruiz-Euler, "Traditional governance, citizen engagement, and local public goods: evidence from Mexico." World Development 53 (2014): 80-93.

54. Paz. “Participación Social Armada” 72-76.

55. Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario, “Marxismo e indigenismo” El Insurgente 91 (2006): 9.

56. Melissa M. Forbis, “After Autonomy: the Zapatistas, Insurgent Indigeneity, and Decolonization.” Settler Colonial Studies, 6:4 (2016) 365-384.

57. Jose Anthony Lucero, “Indigenous Political Voice and the Struggle for Recognition in Ecuador and Bolivia” Equity & Development World Development Report 2006 Background Papers (2004), 14.

58. Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario, “Editorial” El Insurgente 201 (2020): 3.

59. Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario, “COMUNICADOS DEL PDPR-EPR” El Insurgente 117 (2009): 34.

60. George W Grayson, Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State? (New Bruinwick and New Jersey:Transaction) Publishers, 2010. 158.

61. Thomas Rath, Myths of Demilitarization in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 1920-1960. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2013. 23.

62. Grayson, Mexico, 156-213.

63. Sullivan and Jones, “Bandits” 168-169.

64. Benjamin Smith, “Anticlericalism, Politics, and Freemasonary in Mexico, 1920-1940.” The Americas 65, no. 4 (2009): 559.

65. Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario, “Cartas de la militancia: sobre un año más de lucha revolucionaria” El Insurgente 209 (2021) 30

Bibliography

“Edomex desmiente al EPR sobre explosión en Ecatepec” El Universal November 14, 2014 Retrieved November 15, 2021 from https://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion-mexico/2014/soriana-ecatepec-1054244.html

“Leftist rebels say they bombed Mexico pipelines” Reuters September 11, 2007 Retrieved November 15, 2021 from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-pipelines/leftist-rebels-say-they-bombed-mexico-pipelines-idUSN1139242220070911

Cedillo, Adele. “Armed Struggle without Revolution: The Organizing Process of the National Liberation Forces(FLN) and the Genesis of Neo-Zapatism (1969-1983)” in Challenging Authoritarianism in Mexico: Revolutionary Struggles and the Dirty War, 1964-1982 edited by Adela Cedillo and Fernando Calderón (New York: Routledge. 2012) 148-160.

Christianson, Gale E. “Secret Societies and Agrarian Violence in Ireland, 1790-1840.” Agricultural History 46, no. 3 (1972): 369–84.

Comité de Prensa y Propaganda del PDPR-EPR. 50 Años de Lucha Armada Revolucionaria: Breve historia del PDPR-EPR. (Editorial Del Pueblo, 2016)

Díaz-Cayeros, Alberto. Beatriz Magaloni, and Alexander Ruiz-Euler. "Traditional governance, citizen engagement, and local public goods: evidence from Mexico." World Development 53 (2014): 80-93.

Dillon, Sam. “Mexico Builds a Picture of Fanatic Rebel Group” The New York Times September 5th 1996

Forbis, Melissa M. “After Autonomy: the Zapatistas, Insurgent Indigeneity, and Decolonization.” Settler Colonial Studies, 6:4 (2016) 365-384.

Grayson, George W. Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State? (New Bruinwick and New Jersey:Transaction Publishers, 2010) 156-213.

Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2005)

Hedges, Donald C. and Ross Gandy. Mexico Under Siege: Popular Resistance to Presidential Despotism. (London: Zed Books. 2002) 107-155.

Lipshultz, David. “Mexican Town Skeptical About New Rebels” United Press International July 3rd, 1996.

Lofredo, Jorge. “La otra guerrilla mexicana: Aproximaciones al estudio del Ejército Popular .” Desacatos 24 (2007) Retrieved November 15, 2021, from http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php? script=sci_arttext&pid=S1607-050X2007000200012

Lucero, Jose Anthony. “Indigenous Political Voice and the Struggle for Recognition in Ecuador and Bolivia” Equity & Development World Development Report 2006 Background Papers (2004), 14.

Marcos, Subcommandante. Our Word Is Our Weapon: Selected Writings. (New York: Seven Stories, 2000) Print. 41.

Marcos, Subcommandante.“‘I Shit On All the Revolutionary Vanguards of this Planet’ A Letter to the Basque Liberation Movement ETA” The Anarchist Library. Retrieved November 15, 2021 from https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/subcomandante-marcos-i-shit-on-all-the-revolutionary-vanguards-of-this-planet

Marcos, Subcomandante and Nathalie de Broglio. "The Fourth World War Has Begun." Nepantla: Views from South 2, no. 3 (2001): 559-572.

Mason, Edward S. “Blanqui and Communism.” Political Science Quarterly 44, no. 4 (1929): 515–523.

Maya, Miguel Ángel. “Loxicha, la historia no contada de la guerrilla.” Pie de Página (2020) Retrieved November 15, 2021, from https://piedepagina.mx/loxicha-la-historia-no-contada-de-la-guerrilla/.

Morán. Gustavo Hirales. “Radical Groups in Mexico Today” Policy Papers on the Americas Volume XIV, Study 9 (2003): 11.

Moufawad-Paul, Joshua. The Communist Necessity: Prolegomena to Any Future Radical Theory. (Montreal, Quebec: Kersplebedeb Publishing, 2014.) 46-47.

Mundaca, Antonio. “Los Guerrilleros de Loxicha, la permanente sombra del destierro.” Pie de Página (2020) Retrieved November 15, 2021, from https://piedepagina.mx/los-guerrilleros-de-loxicha-la- permanente-sombra-del-destierro/.

Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario “RESPUESTA A LA CARTA DE RODOLFO ECHEVERRIA PUBLICADA EN EL DIARIO "LA JORNADA" EL DIA 9 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1997.” El Insurgente 13 (1997): 29.

Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario “COMUNICADOS DEL PDPR-EPR” El Insurgente 176 (2017) 56-59

Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario “A CIEN AÑOS DE LA FUNDACIÓN DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE CHINA ” El Insurgente 210 (2021): 44.

Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario “Editorial” El Insurgente 13 (1997): 4.

Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario El Insurgente “13 Años de Impunidad ” El Insurgente 200 (2020): 4.

Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario “Entrevista en la Sierra Madre Oriental Publicada en la revista “Proceso” num. 1032.”El Insurgente 1 (1996): 64.

Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario “Revolución a debate: El camarada Stalin en el siglo XXI” El Insurgente 200 (2020): 21.

Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario “MANIFESTO DE EL SIERRA MDRE ORIENTAL” El Insurgente 1 (1996) 8.

Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario “Entrevista en el Valle de Mexico Publicada en la revista “Proceso” num. 1034.” El Insurgente 1 (1996): 71.

Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario. “A Tres Años De Gobierno De La 4T” El Insurgente 212 (2021): 17.

Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario. “Marxismo e indigenismo” El Insurgente 91 (2006): 9.

Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario. “Editorial” El Insurgente 201 (2020): 3.

Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario. “COMUNICADOS DEL PDPR-EPR” El Insurgente 117 (2009): 34.

Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario- Ejercito Popular Revolutionario. “Cartas de la militancia: sobre un año más de lucha revolucionaria” El Insurgente 209 (2021) 30.

Paulson, Joshua. “Rural Rebellion in Southern Mexico: The Guerrillas of Guerrero” North American Congress on Latin America September 25, 2007 Retrieved November 15, 2021 from https://nacla.org/article/rural-rebellion-southern-mexico-guerrillas-guerrero

Paz, Betzabé Mendoza. “Participación Social Armada en Oaxaca. Ejército Popular Revolucionario” Estudios Políticos 9(17) (2002): 69.

Rath, Thomas. Myths of Demilitarization in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 1920-1960. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2013). 23.

Robinet, Romain. “A Revolutionary Group Fighting Against a Revolutionary State: The September 23rd Communist League Against the PRI-State (1973-1975)” in Challenging Authoritarianism in Mexico: Revolutionary Struggles and the Dirty War, 1964-1982 edited by Adela Cedillo and Fernando Calderón (New York: Routledge. 2012) 144.

Ross, John. "Strong Contrasts Between Zapatistas, New Guerrilla Movement in Guerrero." (1996) 3. Retrieved November 15, 2021, from https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/sourcemex/3633

Sullivan, John P. and Nathan P. Jones “Bandits, Urban Guerrillas, and Criminal Insurgents Crime and Resistance in Latin America” in Problems and Alternatives in the Modern Americas (1st ed.) edited by Pablo A. Baisotti (New York: Routledge. 2021). 168-169.

Smith, Benjamin. “Anticlericalism, Politics, and Freemasonary in Mexico, 1920-1940.” The Americas 65, no. 4 (2009): 559.

Turbiville, Graham Hall. “Mexico's Other Insurgents.” Military Review 77 (1997)

Weinberg, Bill. Homage to Chiapas: The New Indigenous Struggles in Mexico. (United Kingdom: Verso Books, 2002) 261.

Wrighte, Mark R. “The Real Mexican Terrorists: A Group Profile of the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR)” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 25:4,(2002)

Log in or register to write something here or to contact authors.