The idea in cultural anthropology that standards of good and evil vary from culture to culture. For example, female circumcision (or chopping the clitoris off a woman, and then sowing it back on) to encourage fidelity in the wife is considered to be a good thing in certain societies and showing the soles of the feet is considered to be a mortal insult in others.

This concept is the opposite of moral absolutism.

Saying the Obvious About Denying the Obvious

Cultural Relativism and Cultural Chauvinism. If that's all we have to choose from, as Postmodernism implies, why then Cultural Relativism is vastly preferable - if only because Cultural Relativism is always in large part a pose. It can never be entirely sincere since we can't know all the ways in which culture has shaped our own opinion, nor do we ever fully care to. We all have unconscious minds, and a highly developed capacity for special pleading for ourselves and those we consider to be like us; it's an important part of evolution's gift to each of us. Long courses in Philosophy and Logic may inure us - I'm sorry, inoculate us - to the most obvious ways in which we favor ourselves, but they may also make us into expert rationalizers at the same time. So however extreme or ridiculous, Cultural Relativism can never be quite so extreme or profound as Cultural Chauvinism. Moreover, historically and anthropologically, Cultural Chauvinism is overwhelmingly more popular - it's hard to find a tribe who's word for their own tribe wasn't simply whatever word in their own language designated "people" or "humans", which is to say, that all other tribes ain't and weren't, in their opinion. Voltaire's followers aside, envious admiration of other culture's habits isn't a commonplace.

So why shouldn't we all welcome "cultural relativism" of some stripe or other? Well, for starters, two opinions can be wrong at the same time, even if they contradict each other. Hegel may have been wrong about the number of planets, and several other things here and there, but he was right to suppose that human beings do tend to overseer cognitively (Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis). Sadly however, the precise opposite of an error is usually another error, else we'd all be able to get by with brains the size of walnuts. What's essential to recognize is that the converse of the idea that our own culture is right about everything, or nearly everything; is the idea that our own culture is undoubtedly wrong about much - and not the notion that every other culture is superior, or that no culture is or can be right about anything, or that truth is a geographical property and every culture is absolutely right about everything that happens wherever they are. It's not necessary to surrender to nihilism in fancy dress, or with a passport. We all would have been better off if we had stayed with the eminently sensible Marxist notion of "false consciousness" instead of trying to reinvent it - that is, to have stayed with the suspicion that reasons are attracted to money, or that while special pleading is universal the means to hire really good speech writers and purchase some jaunty printing presses are much more rare.

Now granted, we are all still human, and we will special plead. So any attempt to balance our own culture against others will fail. We won't ever find the mean precisely, and in retaining any belief in either morality or efficacy, we will in some part miss (or perhaps even inflate) the merits of other cultures. This may make it seem tempting to assume that the only escape from such special pleading is to go the the most opposite extreme of approving whatever is "other", under some rubric, or within some set of brackets or another - preferably angle brackets that can support a good bookcase. But the best answer to such inevitable failure is simply that it is part of the historical and dialectical process of learning, and an invitation to humility, not an invitation to pride in the certainty of knowing more profoundly than our fellows the impeccable and wonderful value of whatever is Other. Such beliefs might spare us all a great number of math courses, but they may lead to another sort of pride and a notion of the superiority of our beliefs within our own culture. It may be just another way to distinguish ourselves, and to borrow a little self-worth at second-hand, or even to indulge in the retributive thought that if we can't have the truth, why then nobody can have the truth.

Western cultures will and ought to concede that a great many cultural features, habits and rules are relative, in the sense that they are like traffic regulations or tort law - it matters a great deal less just what regulation is chosen to govern what happens at a four-way stop, for example, than that some regulation exists. That people uniformly drive on one side of the road or another is extremely important, but whether they drive on the right or the left, if not unimportant, is still far, far less important. Whether we adopt the Hindu tradition of using rings on the hand to signify marriage, as first the Romans did, and now Western culture has done, or tattoos or beards is not especially significant. Nor is whether we throw confetti imitations of grain or old shoes at a newly married couple as a fertility charm - even if there are cultures who firmly believe that one of these charms really works and the other really doesn't. So it is with a great panoply of customs, many of which we may find emotionally revolting, such as eating horses rather than cows, or vice versa. (Leaving open for the moment of vegetarianism vs omnivery.) So lets concede that most of what causes us to go into culture shock of one kind or another isn't ultimately very important. And just what isn't important may yet surprise us. We might eventually find that clothing that conceals the faces of (at least) one sex have real benefits or even freedoms both for society and the occluded sex, whichever sex has their visages hidden away. I don't promise this, but it may be so. As a summary example, it matters that contract law specifies when interest is owed on delayed payments where no contingent specification has been made far more than precisely what rate of return is enforced by the courts or whether this is adjusted for inflation or not (barring long periods of runaway inflation or deflation). But that there be rule of some law and predictability is simply necessary for business or any complex endeavor.

However other cultural features, such as, say, Suttee - the ancient Hindu habit of burning widows to commemorate marriage that the West hasn't yet adopted along with rings; the denial of education to women; or for example a teaching that all others with different beliefs must be killed remorselessly without discussion until the silence can be called peace; are not relative or inconsequential in the same sense. These cultural ways can make societies, and the world, better and worse if anything possibly can. These days "relativists" and Postmodernists are edging away dramatic sorts of moral relativism even at the cost of consistency or import. But it's worth noting, nonetheless, that even the strictest Humean believes that placing one's hand on a red-hot burner feels quite different than putting your hand on a glass of beer. To stumble abruptly on a conclusion, there are a lot of ways to run a candy store, but they aren't all equal, as any accountant will be pleased to explain at length.

The world is complex. Technological and consequent social change have made all of our lives still more complex. We've all needed a good long coffee break from the endless negotiations and re-re-reconsiderations this entails. Cultural or moral relativism makes a hell of a fine coffee break. But it's no way to run a candy store, and the coffee break's over, as all coffee breaks or times or relaxation, in all cultures, must eventually be.

NOTE: I wrote this article at Wikipedia; having just finished it, I have posted it here as well, to keep a record of my original version (1/25/05)

Cultural relativism is the principle that an individual human's beliefs and activities make sense in terms of his or her own culture. This principle was established as axiomatic in anthropological research in by Franz Boas in the first few decades of the 20th century, and then popularized in the 1940s by Boas's students. Boas himself did not use the term, and the term became common among anthropologists after Boas's death in 1942 (the first use of the term in the journal American Anthropologist was in 1948); thus, the term itself represents how Boas's students summarized their own synthesis of many of the things Boas taught them.

Cultural relativism involves specific epistemological and methodological claims. Whether or not these claims necessitate a specific ethical stance is a matter of debate. Nevertheless, this principle should not be confused with moral relativism.

The Epistemological Origins of Cultural Relativism

The epistemological claims that led to the development of cultural relativism have their origins in the German Enlightenment. The philosopher Immanuel Kant, argued that human beings are not capable of direct, unmediated knowledge of the world. All of our experiences of the world are mediated through the human mind, which universally structures perceptions according to sensibilities concerning time and space.

Although Kant considered these mediating structures universal, his student Johann Gottfried Herder argued that human creativity, evidenced by the great variety in national cultures, revealed that human experience was mediated not only by universal structures, but by particular cultural structures as well. The great explorer and naturalist, Wilhelm von Humboldt, called for an anthropology that would synthesize Kant and Herder's ideas.

Although Herder focused on the positive value of cultural variety, the sociologist William Graham Sumner called attention to the fact that one's culture can limit one's perceptions. He called this principle ethnocentrism, the viewpoint that "one’s own group is the center of everything," against which all other groups are judged.

Cultural Relativism as a Methodological and Heuristic Device

According to George Marcus and Michael Fisher,

20th century social and cultural anthropology has promised its still largely Western readership enlightenment on two fronts. The one has been the salvaging of distinct cultural forms of life from a process of apparent global Westernization. With both its romantic appeal and its scientific intentions, anthropology has stood for the refusal to accept this conventional perception of homogenization toward a dominant Western model.

Cultural relativism was in part a response to Western ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism may take obvious forms, in which one consciously believes that one's people's arts are the most beautiful, values the most virtuous, and beliefs the most truthful. Franz Boas, originally trained in physics and geography, and heavily influenced by the thought of Kant, Herder, and von Humboldt, argued that one's culture may mediate and thus limit one's perceptions in less obvious ways. He understood "culture" to include not only certain tastes in food, art, and music, or beliefs about religion. He assumed a much broader notion of culture, defined as

the totality of the mental and physical reactions and activities that characterize the behavior of the individuals composing a social group collectively and individually in relation to their natural environment, to other groups, to members of the group itself, and of each individual to himself.

This understanding of culture confronts anthropologists with two problems: first, how to escape the unconscious bonds of one's own culture, which inevitably bias our perceptions of and reactions to the world, and second, how to make sense of an unfamiliar culture. The principle of cultural relativism thus forced anthropologists to develop innovative methods and heuristic strategies.

A Methodological Tool

Between World War I and World War II, "cultural relativism" was the central tool for American anthropologists in this refusal of Western claims to universality, and salvage of non-Western cultures. It functioned to transform Boas's epistemology into methodological lessons.

This is most obvious in the case of language. Although language is commonly thought of as a means of communication, Boas understood that it is also a means of categorizing experiences. The existence of different languages suggests that people categorize, and thus experience, language differently (this face was more fully developed in the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis). He especially called attention to language not as a means of communication but as a means of categorizing experiences. Thus, although all people perceive visible radiation the same way, in terms of a continuum of color, people who speak different languages slice up this continuum into discrete colors in different ways. Some languages have no word that corresponds to the English word "green." When people who speak such languages are shown a green chip, some identify it using their word for blue, others identify it using their word for yellow. Thus, Boas's student Melville Herskovits summed up the principal of cultural relativism thus: "Judgements are based on experience, and experience is interpreted by each individual in terms of his own enculturation."

Boas pointed out that scientists grow up and work in a particular culture, and are thus necessarily ethnocentric. He provided an example of this in his article, "On Alternating Sounds." Alternating sounds is a phenomena described by a number of linguists at Boas's time, in which speakers of a language pronounce a given word in two distinct ways. The difference is not a matter of accent but of specific phonetic elements. For example, when Chinese speakers speak in English, many English speakers here them alternate between pronouncing one word as "lice" and as "rice." Anthropologists in the 19th century observed that it was common in Native American languages that an individual would pronounce a word in his or her own language in such different ways. These anthropologists believed they had perceived a unique feature of Native American languages.

Boas, however, argued that in these cases Native Americans had been pronouncing the word in question the same way, consistently. He pointed out that the problem was that English lacks a certain sound (just as some languages lack a word for green). Consequently, when English speakers hear someone use that sound in another language, they systematically misperceive it as one of two similar sounds (just as some people classify a green chip as either blue or yellow).

Boas's students drew not only on his engagement with German philosophy. They also engaged the work of contemporary philosophers and scientists, such as Karl Pearson, Ernst Mach, Henri Poincaré, William James and John Dewey in an attempt to move, in the words of Boas's student Robert Lowie, from "a naively metaphysical to an epistemological stage" as a basis for revising the methods and theories of anthropology.

Boas and his students realized that if they were to conduct scientific research in other cultures, they would need to employ methods that would help them escape the limits of their own ethnocentrism. One such method is that of ethnography: basically, they advocated living with people of another culture for an extended period of time, so that they could learn the local language and be enculturated, at least partially, into that culture. In this context, cultural relativism is an attitude that is of fundamental methodological importance, because it calls attention to the importance of the local context in understanding the meaning of particular human beliefs and activities. Thus, in 1948 Virginia Heyer wrote, "Cultural relativity, to phrase it in starkest abstraction, states the relativity of the part to the whole. The part gains its cultural significance by its place in the whole, and cannot retain its integrity in a different situation."

A Heuristic Tool

Another method was ethnology: to compare and contrast as wide a range of cultures as possible, in a systematic and even-handed manner. Boas's student Alfred Kroeber described the rise of the relativist perspective thus:

Now while some of the interest in anthropology in its earlier stages was in the exotic and the out-of-the-way, yet even this antiquarian motivation ultimately contributed to a broader result. Anthropologists became aware of the diversity of culture. They began to see the tremendous range of its variations. From that, they commenced to envisage it as a totality, as no historian of one period or of a single people was likely to do, nor any analyst of his own type of civilization alone. They became aware of culture as a "universe," or vast field in which we of today and our own civilization occupy only one place of many. The result was a widening of a fundamental point of view, a departure from unconscious ethnocentricity toward relativity. This shift from naive self-centeredness in one's own time and spot to a broader view based on objective comparison is somewhat like the change from the original geocentric assumption of astronomy to the Copernican interpretation of the solar system and the subsequent still greater widening to a universe of galaxies.

This conception of culture, and principle of cultural relativism, were for Kroeber and his colleagues the fundamental contribution of anthropology, and what distinguished anthropology from similar disciplines such as sociology and psychology.

Ruth Benedict, another of Boas's students, also argued that an appreciation of the importance of culture and the problem of ethnocentrism demands that the scientist adopt cultural relativism as a method. Her book, Patterns of Culture, did much to popularize the term in the United States. In it, she explained that:

The study of custom can be profitable only after certain preliminary propositions have been violently opposed. In the first place any scientific study requires that there be no preferential weighting of one or another items in the series it selects for its consideration. In all the less controversial fields like the study of cacti or termites or the nature of nebulae, the necessary method of study is to group the relevant material and to take note of all possible variant forms and conditions. In this way we have learned all that we know of the laws of astronomy, or of the habits of the social insects, let us say. It is only in the study of man himself that the major social sciences have substituted the study of one local variation, that of Western civilization.

Benedict was adamant that she was not romanticizing so-called primitive societies; she was merely pointing out that any understanding of humanity must be based on as wide an varied a sample of cultures as possible. Moreover, it is only by appreciating a culture that is profoundly different than our own, that we can realize the extent to which our own beliefs and activities are culture-bound, rather than natural or universal. In this context, cultural relativism is a heuristic device of fundamental importance because it calls attention to the importance of variation in any sample that is used to derive generalizations about humanity.

Cultural Relativism as a Critical Device

Marcus and Fisher's attention to anthropology's refusal to accept Western culture's claims to universality implies that cultural relativism is a tool not only in cultural understanding, but in cultural critique. This points to the second front on which they believe anthropology offers people enlightenment:

The other promise of anthropology, one less fully distinguished and attended to than the first, has been to serve as a form of cultural critique for ourselves. In using portraits of other cultural patterns to reflect self-critically on our own ways, anthropology disrupts common sense and makes us reexamine our taken-for-granted assumptions.

The critical function of cultural relativism is widely understood; philosopher John Cook observed that "It is aimed at getting people to admit that although it may seem to them that their moral principles are self-evidently true, and hence seem to be grounds for passing judgement on other peoples, in fact, the self-evidence of these principles is a kind of illusion" (Cook 1978). Although Cook is misconstruing cultural relativism to be identical to moral relativism, his point still applies to the broader understanding of the term. Relativism does not mean that one's views are false, but it does mean that it is false to claim that one's views are self-evident. They only appear to be self-evident in a given cultural frame.

The critical function was indeed one of the ends to which Benedict hoped her own work would meet. The most famous use of cultural relativism as a means of cultural critique is Margaret Mead's dissertation research (under Boas) of adolescent female sexuality in Samoa. By contrasting the ease and freedom enjoyed by Samoan teenagers, Mead called into question claims that the stress and rebelliousness that characterize American adolescence is natural and inevitable.

As Marcus and Fisher point out, however, this use of relativism can be sustained only if there is ethnographic research in the United States comparable to the research conducted in Samoa. Although every decade has witnessed anthropologists conducting research in the United States, however, the very principles of relativism have led most anthropologists to conduct research in foreign countries.

Cultural Relativism as Moral Relativism

Virtually all anthropologists today subscribe to the methodological and heuristic principles of Boas and his students in their research. But when the principle of cultural relativism was popularized after World War II, according to Marcus and Fisher it came to be understood "more as a doctrine, or position, than as a method." As a consequence, people reinterpreted cultural relativism to mean that all cultures are both separate and equal, and that all value systems, however different, are equally valid. Thus, people came to use the phrase "cultural relativism" to signify "moral relativism."

People generally understand moral relativism to mean that there are no absolute or universal moral standards. The nature of anthropological research lends itself to the search for universal standards (standards found in all societies), but not necessarily absolute standards; nevertheless, people often confuse the two. In 1944 Clyde Kluckholn (who studied at Harvard University, but who admired and worked with Boas and his students) attempted to address this issue:

The concept of culture, like any other piece of knowledge, can be abused and misinterpreted. Some fear that the principle of cultural relativity will weaken morality. "If the Bugabuga do it why can't we? It's all relative anyway." But this is exactly what cultural relativity does not mean. The principle of cultural relativity does not mean that because the members of some savage tribe are allowed to behave in a certain way that this fact gives intellectual warrant for such behavior in all groups. Cultural relativity means, on the contrary, that the appropriateness of any positive or negative custom must be evaluated with regard to how this habit fits with other group habits. Having several wives makes economic sense among herders, not among hunters. While breeding a healthy skepticism as to the eternity of any value prized by a particular people, anthropology does not as a matter of theory deny the existence of moral absolutes. Rather, the use of the comparative method provides a scientific means of discovering such absolutes. If all surviving societies have found it necessary to impose some of the same restrictions upon the behavior of their members, this makes a strong argument that these aspects of the moral code are indispensable.

Although Kluckholn was using antiquated and coarse language that was popular at the time (e.g. "savage tribe"), he was making a profound point: although there may be no universal moral standards, anthropological research reveals that the fact that people have moral standards is a universal. In other words, the one universal he is sure of is that no society embraces an "anything goes" approach to morality. Kluckhohn was especially interested in deriving specific moral standards that are universal, although few if any anthropologists think that he was successful.

There is, however, an ambiguity in Kluckhohn's formulation that would haunt anthropologists in the years to come. It makes it clear that one's moral standards make sense in terms of one's culture. He waffles, however, on whether the moral standards of one society could be applied to another. Four years later American anthropologists had to confront this issue head-on.

Statement on the Rights of Man

The transformation of cultural relativism as a heuristic tool into the doctrine of moral relativism occurred in the context of the work of the Commission of Human Rights of the United Nations in preparing the Declaration of the Rights of Man.

Melville Herskovits prepared a draft "Statement on Human Rights" which Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association revised, submitted to the Commission on Human Rights, and then published (Executive Board, AAA: 1947). The statement begins with a fairly straightforward explanation of the relevance of cultural relativism:

The problem is thus to formulate a statement of human rights that will do more than phrase respect for the individual as individual. It must also take into full account the individual as a member of a social group of which he is part, whose sanctioned modes of life shape his behavior, and with whose fate his own is thus inextricably bound.

The bulk of this statement emphasizes concern that the Declaration of Human Rights was being prepared primarily by people from Western societies, and would express values that, far from being universal, are really Western:

Today the problem is complicated by the fact that the Declaration must be of world-wide applicability. It must embrace and recognize the validity of many different ways of life. It will not be convincing to the Indonesian, the African, the Chinese, if it lies on the same plane as like documents of an earlier period. The rights of Man in the Twentieth Century cannot by circumscribed by the standards of any single culture, or be dictated by the aspirations of any single people. Such a document will lead to frustration, not realization of the personalities of vast numbers of human beings.

Although this statement could be read as making a procedural point (that the Commission must involve people of diverse cultures, especially cultures that had been or are still under European colonial or imperial domination), the document ended by making two substantive claims:

  • Even where political systems exist that deny citizens the right of participation in their government, or seek to conquer weaker peoples, underlying cultural values may be called on to bring the peoples of such states to a realization of the consequences of the acts of their governments, and thus enforce a brake upon discrimination and conquest.
  • World-wide standards of freedom and justice, based on the principle that man is free only when he lives as his society defines freedom, that his rights are those he recognizes as a member of his society, must be basic.

These claims provoked an immediate response by a number of anthropologists. Julian Steward (who, as a student of Alfred Kroeber and Robert Lowie, and as a professor at Columbia University, was situated firmly in the Boasian lineage) suggested that the first claim "may have been a loophole to exclude Germany from the advocated tolerance," but that it revealed the fundamental flaw in moral relativism: "Either we tolerate everything, and keep hands off, or we fight intolerance and conquest -- political and economic as well as military -- in all their forms." Similarly, he questioned whether the second principle means that anthropologists "approve the social caste system of India, the racial caste system of the United States, or many other varieties of social discrimination in the world" (Steward 1948). Steward and others (e.g. H.G. Barnett 1948) argued that any attempt to apply the principle of cultural relativism to moral problems would only end in contradiction: either a principle that seems to stand for tolerance ends up being used to excuse intolerance, or the principle of tolerance is revealed to be utterly intolerant of any society that seems to lack the (arguably, Western) value of tolerance. They concluded that anthropologists must stick to science, and engage in debates over values only as individuals.

Current Debates

The debates over the Statement on Human Rights, then, was not merely over the validity of cultural relativism, or the question of what makes a right universal. It forced anthropologists to confront the question of whether anthropological research is relevant to non-anthropologists. Although Steward and Barnett seemed to be suggesting that anthropology as such should restrict itself to purely academic affairs, people within and without the academy have continued to debate the ways non-anthropologists have used this principle in public policy concerning ethnic minorities or in international relations.

Political scientist Alison Dundes Renteln has recently argued that most debates over moral relativism misunderstand the import of cultural relativism (Renteln 1988). Most philosophers understand the Benedictine-Herskovits formulation of cultural relativism to mean "what is right or good for one individual or society is not right or good for another, even if the situations are similar, meaning not merely that what is thought right or good by one is not thought right or good by another ... but that what is really right or good in one case is not so in another." (Frankena 1973)

Although this formulation clearly echoes the kinds of example anthropologists used in elaborating cultural relativism, Renteln believes that it misses the spirit of the principle. Accordingly, she supports a different formulation: "there are or can be no value judgements that are true, that is, objectively justifiable, independent of specific cultures" (Schmidt 1955). Renteln seems to be reminding philosophers that any understanding of cultural relativism must recognize its heuristic and critical functions. Her main argument is that in order to understand the principle of cultural relativism, one must recognize the extent to which it is based on enculturation: "the idea that people unconsciously acquire the categories and standards of their culture." This observation, which echoes the arguments about culture that originally led Boas to develop the principle, suggests that the use of cultural relativism in debates of rights and morals is not substantive but procedural. That is, it does not require a relativist to sacrifices his or her values. But it does require anyone engaged in a consideration of rights and morals to reflect on how their own enculturation has shaped their views: “There is no reason why the relativist should be paralyzed, as critics have often asserted (Hartung 1954: 119-125). But a relativist will acknowledge that the criticism is based on his own ethnocentric standards and realizes also that the condemnation may be a form of cultural imperialism”.

Renteln thus bridges the gap between the anthropologist as scientist (whom Steward and Barnett felt had nothing to offer debates on rights and morality) and as private individual (who has every right to make value judgements). The individual keeps this right, but the scientist requires that the individual acknowledge that these judgements are neither self-evident universals, nor entirely personal (and idiosyncratic), but rather took form in relation to the individual's own culture.

For many others, however, cultural relativism is a doctrine that provides answers to moral questions; in the words of historian Wilcomb Washburn, "an explanation of, or solution to, cultural conflict." Moreover, in the guise of cultural relativism, moral relativism has been used to minimize or altogether disregard social inequalities and cultural politics within a given culture. Virtually all anthropologists reject these forms of moral relativism.

Since "cultural relativism" and "moral relativism" have been used interchangeably, and as doctrines, by non-anthropologists in the post-World War II era, many American anthropologists abandoned the concept of relativism. In the 1950s many turned to the model of structural-functionalism that had developed in the United Kingdom as a way to model their research, and retreated from popular political debates over rights and morality.

Cultural Relativism and Post-Colonial Politics

In the wake of the breakup of the British and French colonial empires, and in the wake of U.S. defeat in Vietnam, anthropologists became especially attentive to relations of domination and subjugation that link Western and non-Western societies, and that structure relations within any given society. In the context of the Cold War, however, anthropologists once again confronted the relationship between politics and science.

Boas and his students understood anthropology to be an historical, or human science, in that it involves subjects (anthropologists) studying other subjects (humans and their activities), rather than subjects studying objects (such as rocks or stars). Under such conditions, it is fairly obvious that scientific research may have political consequences, and the Boasians saw no conflict between their scientific attempts to understand other cultures, and the political implications of critiquing their own culture. For anthropologists working in this tradition, the doctrine of cultural relativism as a basis for moral relativism was anathema. For politicians, moralists, and many social scientists (but few anthropologists) who saw science and human interests as necessarily independent or even opposed, however, the earlier Boasian principle of cultural relativism was anathema. Thus, cultural relativism came under attack, but from opposing sides and for opposing reasons.

The Political Critique of Cultural Relativism

On the one hand, many anthropologists began to criticize the way moral relativism, in the guise of cultural relativism, is used to mask the effects of Western colonialism and imperialism. Thus, Stanley Diamond wrote argued that when the term "cultural relativism" entered popular culture, popular culture coopted anthropology in a way that voided the principle of any critical function:

Relativism is the bad faith of the conqueror, who has become secure enough to become a tourist.... Cultural relativism is a purely intellectual attitude; it does not inhibit the anthropologist from participating as a professional in his own milieu; on the contrary, it rationalizes that milieu. Relativism is self-critical only in the abstract. Nor does it lead to engagement. It only converts the anthropologist into a shadowy figure, prone to newsworthy and shallow pronouncements about the cosmic condition of the human race. It has the effect of mystifying the profession, so that the very term anthropologist ("student of man") commands the attention of an increasingly "popular" audience in search of novelty. But the search for self-knowledge, which Montaigne was the first to link to the annihilation of prejudice, is reduced to the experience of culture shock, a phrase used by both anthropologists and the State Department to account for the disorientation that usually follows an encounter with an alien way of life. But culture shock is a condition one recovers from; it is not experienced as an authentic redefinition of the personality but as a testing of its tolerance .... The tenancy of relativism, which it never quite achieves, is to detach the anthropologist from all particular cultures. Nor does it provide him with a moral center, only a job.

Diamond's critique is biting and partly ironic, since Boas and his supporters were themselves critical of colonialism and imperialism. George Stocking summarized this view with the observation that "Cultural relativism, which had buttressed the attack against racialism, [can] be perceived as a sort of neo-racialism justifying the backward techno-economic status of once colonized peoples"

The Political Defense of Relativism

On the other hand, the most common and popular criticisms of relativism come not from anthropologists like Stanley Diamond, but rather from political conservatives. By the 1980s many anthropologists had absorbed the Boasian critique of moral relativism, were ready to reevaluate the origins and uses of cultural relativism. In a distinguished lecture before the American Anthropological Association in 1984, Clifford Geertz pointed out that the conservative critics of cultural relativism did not really understand, and were not really responding to, the ideas of Benedict, Herskovits, Kroeber and Kluckholn. Consequently, the various critics and proponents of cultural relativism were talking past one another. What these different positions have in common, Geertz argued, is that they are all responding to the same thing: knowledge about other ways of life.

The supposed conflict between Benedict's and Herskovits's call for tolerance and the untolerant passion with which they called for it turns out not to be the simple contradiction so many amateur logicians have held it to be, but the expression of a perception, caused by thinking a lot about Zunis and Dahomys, that the world being so full of a number of things, rushing to judgement is more than a mistake, it is a crime. Similarly, Kroeber's and Kluckholn's verities -- Kroeber's were mostly about messy creatural matters like delerium and menstruation, Kluckholn's were mostly about messy social ones like lying and killing within the in-group, turn out not to be just the arbitrary personal obsessions they so much look like, but the expression of a much vaster concern, caused by thinking a lot about anthropos in general, that if something isn't anchored everywhere nothing can be anchored anywhere. Theory here -- if that is what these earnest advices about how we must look at things if we are to be accounted as decent should be called -- is more an exchange of warnings than an analytical debate. We are being offered a choice of worries.

What the relativists -- so-called -- want us to worry about is provincialism -- the danger that our perceptions will be dulled, our intellects constricted, and our sympathies narrowed by the overlearned and overvalued acceptances of our own society. What the anti-relativists --self-declared -- want us to worry about, and worry about and worry about, as though our very souls depended on it, a kind of spiritual entropy, a heat death of the mind, in which everything is as significant, and thus as insignificant, as everything else: anything goes, to each his own, you pays your money and you takes your choice, I know what I like, not in the couth, tout compredre, c'est tout pardonner.

Geertz concludes this discussion by commenting, "As I have already suggested, I myself find provincialism altogether the more real concern as far what actually goes on in the world is concerned."

Geertz' defense of cultural relativism as a concern which should motivate various inquiries, rather than as an explanation or solution, echoed a comment Alfred Kroeber made in reply to earlier critics of cultural relativism, in 1949:

Obviously, relativism poses certain problems when from trying merely to understand the world we pass on to taking action in the world: and right decisions are not always easy to find. However, it is also obvious that authoritarians who know the complete answers beforehand will necessarily be intolerant of relativism: they should be, if there is only one truth and that is theirs. I admit that hatred of the intolerant for relativism does not suffice to make relativism true. But most of us are human enough for our belief in relativism to be somewhat reenforced just by that fact. At any rate, it would seem that the world has come far enough so that it is only by starting from relativism and its tolerations that we may hope to work out a new set of absolute values and standards, if such are attainable at all or prove to be desirable.


  • Barnett, H.G."On Science and Human Rights" in American Anthropologist 50(2) 352-355
  • Benedict, Ruth 1934 Patterns of Culture
  • Boas, Franz 1911 The Mind of Primitive Man
  • Cook, John 1978 "Cultural Relativism as an Ethnocentric Notion," in The Philosophy of Society
  • Diamond, Stanley 1974 In Search of the Primitive
  • Executive Board, American Anthropological Association 1947 "Statement on Human Rights" in American Anthropologist 49(4) 539-543
  • Frankena, Willian 1973 Ethics
  • Hartung, Frank 1954 '"Cultural Relativity and Moral Judgements" in Philosophy of Science 21: 118-126
  • Herskovitz, Melvill J. 1956 Man and His Works
  • Geertz, Clifford 1984 "Anti-Anti-Relativism" in American Anthropologist 86 (2) 263-278.
  • Heyer, Virgina 1948 "In Reply to Elgin Williams" in American Anthropologist 50(1) 163-166
  • Kluckhohn, Clyde 1944 Mirror For Man
  • Kroeber, Alfred 1923 Anthropology
  • Kroeber, Alfred 1949 "An Authoritarian Panacea" in American Anthropologist 51(2) 318-320
  • Marcus, George and Michael Fischer 1986 Anthropology as Cultural Critique
  • Murphy, Robert F., 1972 Robert Lowie
  • Renteln, Alison 1988 "Relativism and the Search for Human Rights" in American Anthropologist 90(1) 56-72
  • Schmidt, Paul 1955 Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism in Journal of Philosophy 70: 780-791
  • Steward, Julian 1948 "Comments on the Statement of Human Rights" in American Anthropologist 50(2) 351-352
  • Stocking, George W. Jr. 1982 "Afterward: A View from the Center" in Ethnos 47: 172-286
  • Washburn, Wilcomb 1987 Cultural Relativism, Human Rights, and the AAA" in American Anthropologist 89(4) 939-943

Log in or register to write something here or to contact authors.