Some philosophers such as
Peter Strawson deny the problem of induction. Strawson uses what is known as The
Ordinary Language Response to claim that it is not in fact a problem at all.
Strawson claims that to doubt that relying on induction is "reasonable" is nonsensical. It is an Analytic truth that induction is reasonable. An example of an analytic truth is “A bachelor is an unmarried man”, we know this to be true as the definition of "Bachelor" is "An unmarried man".
In the same way, When we use words like "reasonable" and "justifiable" we mean: "Capable of being reasoned" (using inductive methods). When we claim that a scientific theory is "justifiable" we mean that it has been established based on an appropriate number of observed instances (i.e. using induction) . The way we ordinarily use the word "reasonable" includes the idea of inductive reasoning.
Thus, asking "Is induction reasonable?" is a confusion in a similar way as asking "Is the law legal?".
Strawson's argument is tempting because, as Bacchon points out, the problem of induction is annoying. We feel that Hume is wrong in some way but his argument doesn’t seem to have any major holes in it. We really just want a way to sweep it under the rug and get on with our lives and the ordinary language response works for this, “Ok, so maybe induction is a flawed way to go around determining stuff. But it’s close enough to common sense, in the way we usually use the term “common sense”.
But it’s still pretty obvious that the response sidesteps the problem, rather than solves it. The sceptic can just rephrase the problem of induction without using “immune” terms like reasonable or justified.
And also, you can try using Strawson’s argument to justify all kinds of fallacies. Suppose you were to find a community who consider “wishful thinking” to be a good way of establishing the future? With this communities linguistics wishful thinking would be perfectly “reasonable” by their definition of the term.