Are omnibenevolence and omnipotence contradictory? Does one cancel out
the other?
St. Thomas Aquinas considers the following in his writings:
- God is omnibenevolent
- God can't sin
- There is something God cannot do
- God is not omnipotent
Hoffman and Rosenkrantz consider the same problem this way
- God is omnibenevolent
- God must create the best possible world
- God cannot create anything less than this world
- God is not omnipotent
Both of these arguments have the same essence at them and are much more interesting challenges to omnipotence than making impossible
rocks or
square circles.
Leibniz replies to this argument as follows in the Theodicy:
VIII. Objection.
Whoever cannot fail to choose the best, is not free.
God cannot fail to choose the best.
Hence, God is not free.
Answer. I deny the major of this argument; it is rather true liberty, and the most perfect, to be able to use one's free will for the best, and to always exercise this power, without ever being turned aside either by external force or by internal passions, the first of which causes slavery of the body, the second, slavery of the soul. There is nothing less servile, and nothing more in accordance with the highest degree of freedom, than to be always led toward the good, and always by one's own inclination, without any constraint and without any displeasure. And to object therefore that God had need of external things, is only a sophism. He created them freely; but having proposed to himself an end, which is to exercise his goodness, wisdom has determined him to choose the means best fitted to attain this end. To call this a need, is to take that term in an unusual sense which frees it from all imperfection, just as when we speak of the wrath of God.
Or in a more readable form:
Always choosing good is perfect freedom. It means you are free from external forces which lead you astray, and free from passions and temptations which "enslave" you.