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Severus, who dreaded neither his arms nor his enchantments, guarded
himself from the only danger of secret
conspiracy, by the
faithful attendance of six hundred chosen men, who never quitted his
person or their cuirasses, either by night or by day, during the
whole march. Advancing with a steady and rapid course, he passed,
without difficulty, the defiles of the
Apennine, received into his
party the troops and ambassadors sent to retard his progress, and made a
short halt at Interamnia, about seventy miles from Rome. His
victory was already secure, but the despair of the Praetorians might have
rendered it bloody; and
Severus had the laudable ambition of
ascending the throne without drawing the sword.
35 His
emissaries, dispersed in the capital, assured the guards, that provided
they
would abandon their worthless prince, and the perpetrators of the murder
of Pertinax, to the justice of the conqueror, he would no
longer consider that
melancholy event as the act of the whole body.
The faithless Praetorians, whose resistance was supported only by
sullen obstinacy, gladly complied with the easy conditions, seized the
greatest part of the assassins, and signified to the senate, that
they no longer defended the cause of Julian. That assembly, convoked
by the consul, unanimously acknowledged Severus as lawful
emperor, decreed divine honors to Pertinax, and pronounced a sentence
of
deposition and death against his unfortunate successor.
Julian was conducted into a private apartment of the baths of the
palace, and beheaded as a common
criminal, after having purchased,
with an immense treasure, an anxious and precarious reign of only
sixty-six days.
36 The almost incredible expedition of
Severus,
who, in so short a space of time, conducted a numerous army from the
banks of the Danube to those of the
Tiber, proves at once the
plenty of provisions produced by agriculture and commerce, the
goodness of the roads, the discipline of the legions, and the indolent,
subdued temper of the provinces.
37
Footnote 35: Victor and Eutropius, viii. 17, mention a
combat near the Milvian bridge, the Ponte
Molle, unknown to the better and more ancient writers.
Footnote 36: Dion, l. lxxiii. p. 1240. Herodian, l. ii. p.
83. Hist. August. p. 63.
Footnote 37: From these sixty-six days, we must first
deduct sixteen, as Pertinax was murdered on the 28th of March, and
Severus
most probably elected on the 13th of April, (see Hist. August. p. 65, and
Tillemont, Hist. des Empereurs, tom. iii. p. 393, note 7.) We
cannot allow less than ten days after his election, to put a numerous
army in motion. Forty days remain for this rapid march; and as
we may compute about eight hundred miles from Rome to the
neighborhood of Vienna, the army of Severus marched twenty miles
every day, without halt or intermission.
The first cares of Severus were bestowed on two measures the one
dictated by policy, the other by decency; the revenge, and the
honors, due to the memory of Pertinax. Before the new emperor entered
Rome, he issued his commands to the Praetorian guards,
directing them to wait his arrival on a large plain near the city, without
arms, but in the habits of ceremony, in which they were
accustomed to attend their sovereign. He was obeyed by those haughty
troops, whose contrition was the effect of their just terrors. A
chosen part of the Illyrian army encompassed them with levelled spears.
Incapable of flight or
resistance, they expected their fate in
silent
consternation. Severus mounted the tribunal, sternly reproached
them with perfidy and cowardice, dismissed them with
ignominy from the trust which they had betrayed, despoiled them of their
splendid ornaments, and banished them, on pain of death, to
the distance of a hundred miles from the capital. During the transaction,
another detachment had been sent to seize their arms, occupy
their camp, and prevent the hasty consequences of their despair.
38
Footnote 38: Dion, l. lxxiv. p. 1241. Herodian, l. ii. p.
84.
The funeral and consecration of Pertinax was next solemnized with every
circumstance of sad magnificence.
39 The
senate, with a
melancholy pleasure, performed the last rites to that excellent prince,
whom they had loved, and still regretted. The concern of his
successor was probably less sincere; he esteemed the virtues of Pertinax,
but those virtues would forever have confined his ambition
to a private station. Severus pronounced his funeral oration with studied
eloquence, inward satisfaction, and well-acted sorrow; and by
this pious regard to his memory, convinced the credulous multitude, that
he alone was worthy to supply his place. Sensible, however,
that arms, not ceremonies, must assert his claim to the empire, he left
Rome at the end of thirty days, and without suffering himself to
be elated by this easy victory, prepared to encounter his more formidable
rivals.
Footnote 39: Dion, (l. lxxiv. p. 1244,) who assisted at
the ceremony as a senator, gives a most pompous description of
it.
The uncommon abilities and fortune of Severus have induced an
elegant historian to compare him with the first and greatest of the
Caesars.
40 The parallel is, at least, imperfect. Where shall
we find, in the character of Severus, the commanding superiority of soul,
the generous clemency, and the various genius, which could reconcile
and unite the love of pleasure, the thirst of
knowledge, and the
fire of ambition?
41 In one instance only, they may be
compared, with some degree of propriety, in the celerity of their motions,
and
their civil victories. In less than four years,
42 Severus
subdued the riches of the East, and the valor of the West. He vanquished
two
competitors of
reputation and ability, and defeated numerous armies,
provided with weapons and discipline equal to his own. In that
age, the art of
fortification, and the principles of tactics, were well
understood by all the Roman generals; and the constant
superiority
of Severus was that of an artist, who uses the same instruments with more
skill and industry than his rivals. I shall not, however,
enter into a minute
narrative of these military operations; but as the two
civil wars against Niger and against Albinus were almost the
same in their conduct, event, and consequences, I shall collect into one
point of view the most striking circumstances, tending to
develop the character of the conqueror and the state of the empire.
Footnote 40: Herodian, l. iii. p. 112
Footnote 41: Though it is not, most assuredly, the
intention of Lucan to exalt the character of Caesar, yet the idea he
gives of that
hero, in the tenth book of the Pharsalia, where he describes him, at the
same time, making love to Cleopatra, sustaining a siege against
the power of Egypt, and conversing with the sages of the country, is, in
reality, the noblest panegyric.
Note: Lord Byron wrote, no doubt, from a reminiscence of that passage
- "It is possible to be a very great man, and to be still very
inferior to Julius Caesar, the most complete character, so Lord Bacon
thought, of all antiquity. Nature seems incapable of such
extraordinary combinations as composed his versatile capacity, which
was the wonder even of the Romans themselves. The first
general; the only triumphant politician; inferior to none in point of
eloquence; comparable to any in the attainments of wisdom, in an
age made up of the greatest commanders, statesmen, orators, and
philosophers, that ever appeared in the world; an author who
composed a perfect specimen of military annals in his travelling
carriage; at one time in a controversy with Cato, at another writing a
treatise on punuing, and collecting a set of good sayings; fighting and
making love at the same moment, and willing to abandon both
his empire and his mistress for a sight of the fountains of the Nile. Such
did Julius Caesar appear to his contemporaries, and to those
of the subsequent ages who were the most inclined to deplore and
execrate his fatal genius." Note 47 to Canto iv. of Childe Harold. -
M.
Footnote 42: Reckoning from his election, April 13, 193,
to the death of Albinus, February 19, 197. See Tillemont's
Chronology.
Falsehood and
insincerity, unsuitable as they seem to the dignity of
public transactions, offend us with a less
degrading idea of
meanness, than when they are found in the intercourse of private life. In
the latter, they discover a want of courage; in the other, only
a defect of power: and, as it is impossible for the most able statesmen to
subdue millions of followers and enemies by their own
personal strength, the world, under the name of policy, seems to have
granted them a very liberal
indulgence of craft and
dissimulation. Yet the arts of Severus cannot be justified by the most
ample privileges of state reason. He promised only to betray, he
flattered only to ruin; and however he might occasionally bind himself by
oaths and treaties, his
conscience,
obsequious to his interest,
always released him from the inconvenient
obligation.
43
Footnote 43: Herodian, l. ii. p. 85.
If his two competitors, reconciled by their common danger, had
advanced upon him without delay, perhaps Severus would have sunk
under their united effort. Had they even attacked him, at the same time,
with separate views and separate armies, the contest might
have been long and doubtful. But they fell, singly and successively, an
easy prey to the arts as well as arms of their subtle enemy,
lulled into security by the moderation of his professions, and
overwhelmed by the rapidity of his action. He first marched against
Niger, whose reputation and power he the most dreaded: but he
declined any hostile declarations, suppressed the name of his
antagonist, and only signified to the senate and people his intention of
regulating the eastern provinces. In private, he spoke of Niger,
his old friend and intended successor,
44 with the most
affectionate regard, and highly applauded his generous design of
revenging
the murder of Pertinax. To punish the vile
usurper of the throne, was
the duty of every Roman general. To persevere in arms, and to
resist a lawful emperor, acknowledged by the senate, would alone render
him criminal.
45 The sons of Niger had fallen into his hands
among the children of the provincial governors, detained at Rome as
pledges for the loyalty of their parents.
46 As long as the
power
of Niger inspired terror, or even respect, they were educated with the
most tender care, with the children of
Severus himself; but they
were soon involved in their father's ruin, and removed first by exile, and
afterwards by death, from the eye of public compassion.
47
Footnote 44: Whilst Severus was very dangerously ill, it
was industriously given out, that he intended to appoint Niger and
Albinus his
successors. As he could not be sincere with respect to both, he might not
be so with regard to either. Yet Severus carried his
hypocrisy so far, as to profess that intention in the memoirs of his own
life.
Footnote 45: Hist. August. p. 65.
Footnote 46: This practice, invented by Commodus,
proved very useful to Severus. He found at Rome the children of many of
the
principal adherents of his rivals; and he employed them more than once
to intimidate, or seduce, the parents.
Footnote 47: Herodian, l. iii. p. 95. Hist. August. p. 67,
68.
Whilst Severus was engaged in his eastern war, he had reason to
apprehend that the governor of
Britain might pass the sea and the
Alps, occupy the vacant seat of empire, and oppose his return with the
authority of the senate and the forces of the West. The
ambiguous conduct of Albinus, in not assuming the Imperial title, left
room for negotiation. Forgetting, at once, his professions of
patriotism, and the jealousy of sovereign power, he accepted the
precarious rank of Caesar, as a reward for his fatal neutrality. Till the
first contest was decided, Severus treated the man, whom he had
doomed to destruction, with every mark of
esteem and regard. Even
in the letter, in which he announced his victory over Niger, he styles
Albinus the brother of his soul and empire, sends him the
affectionate salutations of his wife Julia, and his young family, and
entreats him to preserve the armies and the republic faithful to their
common interest. The messengers charged with this letter were instructed
to accost the Caesar with respect, to desire a private
audience, and to plunge their daggers into his heart.
48
The conspiracy was discovered, and the too credulous Albinus, at length,
passed over to the continent, and prepared for an unequal contest with
his rival, who rushed upon him at the head of a veteran and
victorious army.
Footnote 48: Hist. August. p. 84. Spartianus has inserted
this curious letter at full length.
The military labors of Severus seem inadequate to the importance of his
conquests. Two engagements,
* the one near the
Hellespont,
the other in the narrow defiles of Cilicia, decided the fate of his Syrian
competitor; and the troops of Europe asserted their usual
ascendant over the effeminate natives of Asia.
49 The
battle of Lyons, where one hundred and fifty thousand Romans
50 were
engaged, was equally fatal to Albinus. The valor of the British army
maintained, indeed, a sharp and doubtful contest, with the hardy
discipline of the Illyrian legions. The fame and person of Severus
appeared, during a few moments, irrecoverably lost, till that warlike
prince rallied his fainting troops, and led them on to a decisive victory.
51 The war was finished by that memorable day.
*
Footnote *: There were three actions; one near Cyzicus,
on the Hellespont, one near Nice, in Bithynia, the third near the Issus, in
Cilicia, where Alexander conquered Darius. (Dion, lxiv. c. 6.
Herodian, iii. 2, 4.) - W Herodian represents the second battle as of less
importance than Dion - M.
Footnote
49: Consult the third
book of Herodian, and the seventy-fourth book of Dion
Cassius.
Footnote 50: Dion, l. lxxv. p. 1260.
Footnote 51: Dion, l. lxxv. p. 1261. Herodian, l. iii. p.
110. Hist. August. p. 68. The battle was fought in the plain of Trevoux,
three or
four leagues from Lyons. See Tillemont, tom. iii. p. 406, note
18.
Footnote *: According to
Herodian, it was his lieutenant Laetus
who led back the troops to the battle, and gained the day, which Severus
had almost lost. Dion also attributes to Laetus a great share in
the victory. Severus afterwards put him to death, either from fear or
jealousy. - W. and G. Wenck and M. Guizot have not given the
real statement of Herodian or of Dion. According to the former, Laetus
appeared with his own army entire, which he was suspected
of having designedly kept disengaged when the battle was still doudtful,
or rather after the rout of severus. Dion says that he did not
move till Severus had won the victory. - M.
The
civil wars of modern
Europe have been distinguished, not only by
the fierce
animosity, but likewise by the obstinate perseverance,
of the contending factions. They have generally been justified by some
principle, or, at least, colored by some
pretext, of religion,
freedom, or loyalty. The leaders were nobles of independent property
and hereditary influence. The troops fought like men interested
in the decision of the
quarrel; and as military spirit and party zeal were
strongly diffused throughout the whole
community, a
vanquished chief was immediately supplied with new adherents, eager
to shed their blood in the same cause. But the Romans, after the
fall of the
republic, combated only for the choice of masters. Under the
standard of a popular candidate for empire, a few enlisted
from affection, some from fear, many from interest, none from principle.
The legions, uninflamed by party
zeal, were allured into civil
war by liberal donatives, and still more liberal promises. A defeat, by
disabling the chief from the performance of his engagements,
dissolved the mercenary allegiance of his followers, and left them to
consult their own safety by a timely desertion of an unsuccessful
cause. It was of little moment to the provinces, under whose name they
were oppressed or governed; they were driven by the
impulsion of the present power, and as soon as that power yielded to a
superior force, they hastened to implore the clemency of the
conqueror, who, as he had an immense debt to discharge, was obliged
to sacrifice the most guilty countries to the avarice of his
soldiers. In the vast extent of the Roman empire, there were few fortified
cities capable of protecting a routed army; nor was there any
person, or family, or order of men, whose natural interest, unsupported by
the powers of
government, was capable of restoring the
cause of a sinking party.
52
Footnote 52: Montesquieu, Considerations sur la
Grandeur et la Decadence des Romains, c. xiii.
Yet, in the contest between Niger and Severus, a single city deserves an
honorable exception. As
Byzantium was one of the greatest
passages from Europe into Asia, it had been provided with a strong
garrison, and a fleet of five hundred vessels was anchored in the
harbor.
53 The impetuosity of Severus disappointed this
prudent scheme of defence; he left to his generals the siege of
Byzantium,
forced the less guarded passage of the Hellespont, and, impatient of a
meaner enemy, pressed forward to encounter his rival.
Byzantium, attacked by a numerous and increasing army, and afterwards
by the whole naval power of the
empire, sustained a
siege of
three years, and remained faithful to the name and memory of Niger.
The citizens and soldiers (we know not from what cause) were
animated with equal fury; several of the principal officers of Niger, who
despaired of, or who disdained, a pardon, had thrown
themselves into this last
refuge: the fortifications were esteemed
impregnable, and, in the defence of the place, a celebrated engineer
displayed all the mechanic powers known to the ancients.
54 Byzantium, at length, surrendered to famine. The
magistrates and
soldiers were put to the sword, the walls demolished, the privileges
suppressed, and the destined capital of the East subsisted only as
an open village, subject to the insulting jurisdiction of
Perinthus. The
historian Dion, who had admired the flourishing, and lamented the
desolate, state of Byzantium, accused the revenge of Severus, for
depriving the Roman people of the strongest bulwark against the
barbarians of
Pontus and Asia
55 The truth of this
observation was but too well justified in the succeeding age, when the
Gothic
fleets covered the Euxine, and passed through the undefined
Bosphorus into the centre of the
Mediterranean.
Footnote 53: Most of these, as may be supposed, were
small open vessels; some, however, were galleys of two, and a few of
three
ranks of oars.
Footnote 54: The
engineer's name was Priscus. His skill saved his life, and he was taken
into the service of the
conqueror. For the particular facts of the siege, consult Dion Cassius (l.
lxxv. p. 1251) and Herodian, (l. iii. p. 95;) for the theory of it,
the fanciful chevalier de Folard may be looked into. See Polybe, tom. i.
p. 76.
Footnote 55 : Notwithstanding the authority of
Spartianus, and some modern Greeks, we may be assured, from Dion
and Herodian,
that Byzantium, many years after the death of Severus, lay in ruins.
Footnote *: There is no contradiction between the relation of Dion and
that of Spartianus and the modern Greeks. Dion does not say that
Severus destroyed Byzantium, but that he deprived it of its franchises
and privileges, stripped the inhabitants of their property, razed the
fortifications, and subjected the city to the jurisdiction of Perinthus.
Therefore, when Spartian, Suidas, Cedrenus, say that
Severus and his son Antoninus restored to Byzantium its rights and
franchises, ordered temples to be built, &c., this is easily
reconciled with the relation of Dion. Perhaps the latter mentioned it in
some of the fragments of his history which have been lost. As
to Herodian, his expressions are evidently exaggerated, and he has been
guilty of so many inaccuracies in the history of Severus, that
we have a right to suppose one in this passage. - G. from W Wenck and
M. Guizot have omitted to cite Zosimus, who mentions a
particular portico built by Severus, and called, apparently, by his name.
Zosim. Hist. ii. c. xxx. p. 151, 153, edit Heyne. - M.
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To cite original text:
Gibbon, Edward, 1737-1794.
The history of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. 1st ed. (London : Printed for W. Strahan ; and T. Cadell, 1776-1788.), pp. 117-123.