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Here we go again  :  less than two months until hurricane season and now it is official; the storm names to be used in 2006 have been announced.

"Alberto" will lead the parade of boys and girls this year with the 21st and last little darling being "William". Biblical "Isaac" is on the list, genderless "Leslie", ooh-la-la "Nadine", Teutonic "Oscar", "Gordon" (will he disappear in a flash?), and "Helene" with an "e".

One thing is certain; many more of these names will be used than in the past.

Here in Central Florida we are finally beginning to acknowledge that what the National Weather Service tells us just possibly might be true  :  the Atlantic Ocean is in a period of increased hurricane activity (meaning more and stronger tropical storms and hurricanes) that is predicted to last another ten years or longer.

Two years ago (2004) we were hit with Charley, Frances and Jeanne in quick succession. At first it was scary and exciting. At the end of the season it was sweaty and fatiguing. When the hurricane season finally ended the full impact hadn't reached us.

Yes, we had neighborhoods under blue tarps. Our trailer parks (excuse me, mobile home communities) were expecting double digit increases in insurance premiums. But basically it was over, wasn't it?

Apparently not. Early in 2005 I decided to replace a glass sliding door opening onto the back patio with a new set of French doors. That was when I discovered the changes in the building code. It wasn't enough that the new doors had glass with a wind-resistant factor of 130 mph. They also had to be able to withstand a piece of 2x4 slamming into them at the same speed. No glass doors (other than very, very "special order") can promise that, so storm shutters had to be installed as well.

A bowfront window can no longer simply protrude from the front of a house; it must be supported top and bottom by solid structure. Garage doors have new requirements, and many items that formerly could be installed by the homeowner with no regulation now require a building permit.

I never did get to test my hurricane shutters. We had no direct visits in this area in 2005. With a certain smugness I told myself, "Better safe than sorry." Then in August the New Orleans area and Mississippi were hit. Suddenly hurricanes became frighteningly real again.

Today, with the official hurricane season starting on June 1, almost 100, 000 FEMA trailers (yes, trailers, not mobile homes) are the only roofs over the heads of last year's hurricane victims. Mobile homes and trailers are evacuated sooner and more surely than residential construction. Many of the Katrina survivors living in trailers do not own private transportation to use in evacuation. Any hurricane warning is going to throw an additional burden on public agencies.

Additionally, the U.S. Geological Survey warns that last year's storms destroyed many of the barrier islands and wetlands that offered mainland coastal areas some protection from hurricane damage. By all accounts, 2006 will have a busy and harrowing hurricane season.


Storm names for 2006 are: Alberto - Beryl - Chris - Debby - Ernesto - Florence - Gordon - Helene - Isaac - Joyce - Kirk - Leslie - Michael - Nadine - Oscar - Patty - Rafael - Sandy - Tony - Valerie - William.

Source: National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

RACIALLY CHARGED

Chanting down the wicked: dun

CDTW: ny

Logic is Hell: what up

CDTW: I just got home

CDTW: there were no funny calls tonight

CDTW: zzzz

LIH: hahaha

CDTW: I read lots of W. though

CDTW: And the Staten book

CDTW: §374 in PI is dope

LIH: what’s that section?

LIH: my copy is upstairs

LIH: I'm dying trying to write this Frege

LIH: I’m so fucking stupid

CDTW: §374: The greatest difficulty here is not to represent the matter as if there were something one *couldn't* do. As if there really were an object, from which I derive its description, but I were unable to shew it to anyone.——And the best that I can propose is that we should yield to the temptation to use this picture, but then investigate how the *application* of the picture goes.

LIH: hah yeah

LIH: I have that in my junk file for this paper

LIH: I didn’t know the number

CDTW: I like that one

CDTW: So the Frege's not going well?

LIH: I’m too stupid for it

CDTW: hahaha

LIH: there’s one part I found that is interesting

LIH: hold on

CDTW: You've been reading Frege for like 3 months, chillax

LIH: he says that even the Begriffsschrift can’t purify logic enough

LIH: !

CDTW: hahahahaha

CDTW: that guy is a compulsive masturbator

CDTW: guaranteed

LIH: hahaha

LIH: I think that him saying that means that he thinks logic can’t ever be pinned down

LIH: and it makes him like Brouwer

CDTW: word

LIH: but he doesn’t stick to it

CDTW: haha

LIH: or he doesn’t mention it again anyway

CDTW: He's the philosopher par excellence

LIH: you’re right; I’m worrying too much about this stuff

LIH: my notes to myself are pretty funny though

CDTW: like what?

LIH: Everything logically insignificant has been excised (how?) Restriction to a single mode of inference (if p then q) Aims at perspicuity and order Even the BS cannot make thought pure again Frege is at bottom the same as Brouwer?] “how they must think if they are not to miss the truth” 250 logic=timeless

CDTW: "I'm stupid! stupid! stupid!"

LIH: hahahaha

LIH: omgs u r zo dum mark like omg

CDTW: hahaha

CDTW: I'm going to start writing some stuff on W. again soon

LIH: I can’t even read the Tractatus fuck

LIH: I feel really stupid lately

CDTW: I'm thinking about §374, following a rule, and there was something else I was thinking of

CDTW: Isn't it because you don't own it?

CDTW: haha

LIH: it’s all over the internet

LIH: +I translated half of it

CDTW: hahaha

CDTW: It's an easy read, I think

LIH: I don’t understand any of it

LIH: I don’t even know what a state of affairs is

CDTW: That's not true, you're just down in the dumps because this Frege thing

LIH: nah, the more I read these guys the more I realize I don’t know what I’m talking about

CDTW: There's no such thing as "a" "state of affairs"

CDTW: hahaha

CDTW: Yeah I was thinking about our conversation that you can't remember the other night and thinking about some of the things we were talking about

CDTW: like "what is an inference?" "what is it to have something illustrate something else?" and all those questions we were finding so crucial

CDTW: And then I was reading PI and realizing that we were doing it hahaha

LIH: haha

LIH: yeah

LIH: that inference one is really bothering me

CDTW: Even when I went to bed the whole thing was bothering me

LIH: it seems like necessity is impossible

LIH: haha

CDTW: I dunno, thinking about rule following and the way that that Staten guy interprets it is really helpful

CDTW: re: inference

CDTW: or necessity

CDTW: etc.

LIH: explain

CDTW: I'm too stupid to explain

CDTW: haha

CDTW: Hang on; let me re-read what he says

LIH: rule following isn’t on my mind lately, though its connected, I want to know what you meant by logic being immanent in the proposition itself

CDTW: Isn't that like a week ago that I said that?

CDTW: I probably changed my mind or something

LIH: I don’t know when or if you said it

LIH: but that idea is gnawing at my brain

CDTW: Yeah I did say it haha

CDTW: I just can't remember what I meant

CDTW: fuck

LIH: w. says something like that

LIH: here’s what I take it to mean

LIH: language is already logically perfect and the attempt to 'purify' it into its logical structure is misguided

LIH: but

LIH: what is logic if it just is language?

LIH: because it seems like we can do things with logic that aren’t linguistic

LIH: I don’t know

LIH: I’m not even thinking about it right

CDTW: This is strictly Tractarian W. you're talking about here, right?

LIH: no

LIH: just w in general

LIH: like I said

LIH: I can’t even read the Tractatus

CDTW: I think, yeah ... I dunno, it's probably a bit of a misstep to say "language is already logically perfect" given the metaphysical weight of it, you know?

CDTW: But W. might say something like "Language is just fine as it is"

CDTW: Later on anyway

CDTW: I dunno ... he's way too troubled in his own inner dialogue to really pin it down

CDTW: like, on the one hand, language is just fine as it is, yet it's within language that we get a mistaken view of language and we try to pigeonhole it through certain uses of it

LIH: I think he does say language or grammar I guess is already logically perfect

LIH: you can’t purify it

LIH: you just have to see it right

CDTW: I dunno, I don't know if he'd use that kind of terminology later on, like "perfect", he'd probably have lots of caveats

LIH: maybe

LIH: all i mean to say is this

LIH: that language doesn’t need logic to boss it around

CDTW: yeah

CDTW: Like Carnap

LIH: f. says that "logic judges language"

CDTW: Language isn't a deficient version of what it could be

LIH: ok lemme ask you a series of questions

CDTW: Okay

CDTW: What are my chances that I'll get the job?

LIH: and maybe we can get clear on all the problems that are bothering me

LIH:

CDTW: Are these like yes/no?

LIH: zero, you’re already fired

CDTW: Or one of those ones where there are no right answers?

CDTW: fuck

LIH: what do you think logic is?

CDTW: what do I do?

CDTW: Hmm ... I dunno. I think that it's a bunch of things

CDTW: Like we seem to find that there's a "logic" inherent in the way that things happen

CDTW: for one

LIH: what does that mean?

CDTW: like "what goes up must come down"

CDTW: "If you drink beer you piss lots"

CDTW: etc.

LIH: so laws then

CDTW: Yeah

LIH: those are laws

LIH: ok

LIH: but it’s not those laws

LIH: its not physics

CDTW: So we seem to find like law like regularities or repetitive patterns

LIH: its not just any laws

LIH: so what kind of laws is it?

CDTW: But we feel as though it's logical

LIH: what is it a law of

LIH: ok well what is logical about those laws then?

LIH: let’s put it that way

CDTW: I don't know ... I mean, don't you think it's getting ahead of ourselves to start talking about laws already when most people get along fine without thinking about what seems to occur naturally in terms of laws?

CDTW: Like if you want to talk about logic, I'm trying to think of the most every day ways in which people might think or talk about it

LIH: but I ask everyday ppl and they have no idea

LIH: they say its valid reasoning

LIH: and I’m not satisfied with that

LIH: or with its "laws"

LIH: those aren’t satisfying

CDTW: Yeah I know

LIH: and I don’t think it’s unreasonable to think further about it

CDTW: You weren't letting me finish with what I was trying to say

LIH: well type faster

LIH:

CDTW: You need to respect the "go ahead" protocol, caller

CDTW: Okay, like I said, these are some of the things I think of when I think of logic

CDTW: 1) That kind of everyday causality that you don't really even think twice about, like falling down or whatever

LIH: I don’t think I even consider that logic though

LIH: like just in an everyday sense

LIH: I wouldn’t say that it’s logical that things fall

LIH: or whatever

CDTW: Well I'm talking about what I think

LIH: unphilosophically I wouldn’t say that

CDTW: Okay then haha

CDTW: I don't really know what else to say

CDTW: I'm trying to tell you what I think here

LIH: yeah fair enough

LIH: I’m just saying, I think logic has something to do with laws

LIH: but I don’t think you can just stop at laws like those kinda laws

LIH: I don’t think even reggo ppl think those are laws of logic

LIH: I could be wrong though

CDTW: I just mean that, I dunno, when I think about the apparent causality of things in the world that happen around me, I find that I sort of comfortably think of it in terms of its own immanent logic that appears to me because, I don't know, that it's what I'm used to and I couldn't really practically imagine it any other way

CDTW: So there's that

LIH: hm

LIH: but you don’t infer that things will happen like that

LIH: maybe I think logic is inference

CDTW: And then there's logic in the sense that, I don't know, you think "logically", like you're being "logical" ... which often just amounts to "what's reasonable" or "what's practical and sound to do"

CDTW: So it's often used that way

CDTW: Then there's symbolic logic

CDTW: I don't know, there's lots of things I think about it, I couldn't really say what I think it IS

CDTW: Yeah well sure inference and logic can totally be linked together in a discussion about logic

CDTW: I find it really helpful to keep in mind W.'s image of the rope that doesn't have a central thread but which is the interweaving of many different fibers

LIH: I think there’s something special about logic

CDTW: I dunno, that may be falling prey to the philosopher's illness to REALLY think that there's something special about logic. Then again there may not be, but there is something about it that draws you to it (the general you, not you in particular) because you can't picture anything other than it in a way

LIH: yeah, if we want to talk about any kind of necessity we end up at logic

LIH: even if necessity turns out to be some sort of tenuous fibrous thing

LIH: ugh I dunno

LIH: I’m not ready for Wittgenstein

CDTW: Sure you are

CDTW: You've just been rolling with the Ottawa department too much

CDTW: hahahaha

LIH: w. is too true

CDTW: I always take him to be revealing that the agony you're experiencing will always be unavoidable the harder you struggle to nail down what you're after

LIH: hahaha

CDTW: And that there comes a point at which you just have to submit to the impossibility of reaching that ideal

LIH: I dunno

CDTW: But you can find out a lot of interesting and useful things on that journey to the inarticulate grunt

CDTW: Like the collapse into the inarticulate grunt is a necessary component of philosophical investigation because you're trying to turn language back upon itself to keep yourself from falling prey to its tendency to dupe you

LIH: what does w. think true means?

CDTW: I think he probably tries to investigate its multifarious applications in order to give us pause when asking the question "what does true mean?"

CDTW: Like I was thinking about how Davidson posits an axiomatic approach to conceiving truth

CDTW: And how wowed I was by it

LIH: what’s that mean

CDTW: What, the W. part or the Davidson part?

LIH: Davidson

CDTW: Davidson argues that we can conceive truth in a minimal way, e.g. "'x' is true, if and only if x is true."

CDTW: Like snow is white if and only if snow IS white

LIH: that’s like Frege

LIH: truth is redundant

LIH: but necessary

CDTW: Well he revises it in some ways

LIH: Frege changes his mind a few times about it too

CDTW: But yeah, I'm saying I was thinking about how I was all wowed by what Davidson says and all that

CDTW: But then tonight I was thinking about how Foucault talks about truth, like, "Why should we let other people tell us our truths?" or something like that

CDTW: And clearly "truth" means something different in both instances

LIH: yeah?

CDTW: Yeah, I feel that way anyway

CDTW: To me it feels like two different things

LIH: what are they

CDTW: I mean not radically different obviously ... if they're part of the rope and its fibers they've got to have something to do with each other

CDTW: Well Davidson is trying to get at a sense of how we can find truth in our talk insofar as we're looking at what's "true to the facts", and he also is always emphasizing that language isn't separate from the world so he's always pushing that agenda

LIH: well how do they have to do with each other?

CDTW: I think that with Foucault when he's talking about truth in that context he's talking about different conceptions of the "good life" or whatever he'd say in lieu of the "good life", like living in a way that's as unhindered as possible by the constraints of not investigating our "historical ontology" or whatever

CDTW: Well they have to do with each other in that they're the same sound: "truth" used in a spectrum of different contexts over the passage of time in similar, repetitive ways

LIH: well aside from the sound, which is a stupid connection, what makes them similar?

CDTW: That's not a stupid connection

CDTW: Why is that stupid?

LIH: if it’s just the sound it is

CDTW: It's also written down the same way every time?

LIH: because its vrai and its true and its wahr

LIH: and its verdad

LIH: its not the sound

CDTW: No it's not JUSt the sound, it's not JUST the writing, it's not JUST anything

LIH: well anyway, what makes them similar

LIH: its obviously not the sound

CDTW: Duh

LIH: we all agree wahr is true

LIH:

CDTW: Not if you're looking at the sound as the only criteria

CDTW: Of course not

LIH: yeah yeah I know that’s not what you meant

CDTW: But that's part of it, how could it be repeated in use?

LIH: I was discounting it to move on

CDTW: I mean how could it be repeated in use if it weren't for the sound? That's definitely part of it ... language is a spatiotemporal phenomenon, the materiality of it is definitely part of it

CDTW: You can't discount that shit

LIH: I think you can for the most part, in its particularity anyway

LIH: we all feel like there is something other than their iterability as signs that makes wahr and true the same thing

LIH: but whatever, the sound is part of it too

LIH: or whatever the sign is

LIH: a fart could be part of it if you wanted

LIH: you have to have something iterable

CDTW: Well yeah

CDTW: You're getting all ornery with me haha

LIH: haha I’m not really, it just sounds like it

LIH: trust me

LIH:

CDTW: I dunno, I just think that every time we ask these questions we have to be careful of what traps we're stepping in

CDTW: like "what makes them similar?"

LIH: I agree

CDTW: We'd really have to say "well ______, and _______, and _______ ...."

LIH: but we do say they are similar

CDTW: and then not say the stuff we forgot or didn't think of

LIH: why do we say that

CDTW: Because of history, because of the way WE use the words ourselves in our contexts, I dunno

CDTW: lots of stuff

CDTW: We've got a minimum of 2000 years to comb over to come up with that question

CDTW: I mean answer

LIH: so you think we cant answer any questions about what true is without tracing its history to its origins?>

CDTW: No, we can't trace the history of the concept (or whatever you want to call it) of truth to its origins

CDTW: You can only get a partial picture at best, and that's in part due to the impossibility of nailing down an origin and also in part due to the fact that tomorrow a new context of its use could arise

LIH: so what are we doing when we ask what truth is

CDTW: So we can make claims, of course, but they're bound to dissolve when we try to make an absolutely rigid claim that we can just sit back and rest easy about

CDTW: I dunno, we're doing any number of things, I guess it depends on what context we're asking it in, you know?

CDTW: hahaha

LIH: so what role does the context play?

LIH: it establishes the conditions of meaningful ness?

LIH: and I suppose the context is indeterminate

LIH: and so are the conditions

LIH: and so therefore the meaning

CDTW: This is why I find Staten's interpretation of rule-following helpful

CDTW:

CDTW: haha

LIH: explain

CDTW: Okay, say, for instance, that we take the notion that ... "context determines meaningfulness" to be the rule that we're applying to a discussion about what we're doing when we ask about what truth is

CDTW: Just think about that while I type this haha

CDTW: Or drink a beer

CDTW: something

LIH: I’m drinking a forty

LIH:

LIH: I dunno if you’d think of context determines meaningfulness as a rule

LIH: but maybe

LIH: anyway

LIH: ill wait to see what you got

LIH: haha

LIH: you fat fuck

LIH: hahahahahahahahaha

LIH: I like typing disses when you’re in the middle of typing

LIH: you’re so disappointing to your parents Matthew

LIH: GOD

LIH: get a haircut

CDTW: "W's critique of the concept of a rule is aimed at showing that the form of a rule is essentially multiple and that it is always possible to deviate from the established application of a rule while continuing to adhere to its form ...."

CDTW: hey, fuck you!

LIH:

CDTW: I've lost 30 pounds you fuck!

CDTW: haha

CDTW: I do need a haircut though

CDTW: Now I will continue typing

LIH: what does it mean to adhere to its form

CDTW: "In W's later work there is no boundary of form to meaning. It is true that for W words have meaning only in the context of 'language-games' and 'forms of life'. But neither language games nor forms of life are to be conceived as structured by some self-identical form that marks their boundaries and makes their varying manifestations instances of the same. W's account runs counter to those ...

LIH: what’s no boundary of form to meaning mean

LIH: I agree that he doesn’t have the stamp image of concepts

CDTW: views that see human activities as structured by 'implicit rules'; for him, the actual instances of usage are our 'rules'. The instances of usage are spatiotemporal phenomena, and are to be 'applied' to the understanding of new cases, not as a rule conceived as logos or intelligible form is applied"

LIH: or forms or whatever

LIH: so rules are immanent to practices

CDTW: boundary of form to meaning means, like counter to Aristotle's idea that words either have one meaning that's definite, or multiple meanings that are also definite and discrete

LIH: so logic is immanent to propositions

CDTW: for instance

LIH: I don’t get it

LIH: the boundary part

CDTW: He just means difference

CDTW: There's no boundary, like no elementary form

CDTW: it's not like that

LIH: I don’t get how a form is a boundary

LIH: oh

LIH: difference]

LIH: so meaning is its own form

LIH: ?

LIH: is that the idea

CDTW: Anyway I don't think he's saying that logic is immanent to propositions, because on Staten's view the repetitive use of words and sentences and meaningful grunts and all that shit is what makes it go

CDTW: He really emphasizes the idea of repetition and practice ... so okay, yes, you can say perhaps that in a sense that logic is immanent to propositions or practices or whatever

CDTW: but that logic would be a moot point if a practice only happened once, out of context

LIH: well what else could it be

LIH: yeah

LIH: that's what I’m saying

LIH: or what I think you should be saying at least

CDTW: Yeah but that also really does make you have to complicate the idea of "logic" and "immanence" and all that ... I mean they're dependent on repetition, so there's nothing to them in and of themselves

LIH: so what is repetition then

CDTW: well it can be different things

LIH: is it just what we accept as repetition

LIH: I guess there are criteria

LIH: but they’re just the ones we accept

LIH: right

LIH: ?

CDTW: Yeah, I guess so

LIH: and the reasons why we accept them are just the reasons we find acceptable right?

CDTW: I guess, I really don't know

LIH: and there’s nothing that makes us find them acceptable except precedent

LIH: or whatever it is

LIH: a complex of historical contingencies that resulted in these forms rather than others

LIH: ?

CDTW: Yeah, maybe that's fair to say, tentatively ...I except we don't see it as precedent I guess

CDTW: s

CDTW: I dunno haha

LIH: so its not even precedent?

LIH: what is it then!

CDTW: I mean we can't see it like we can see a legal precedent

LIH: haha

LIH: nah its not that rigid

CDTW: There is no "what" that "it is"

CDTW: haha

LIH: I don’t understand what you’re saying

LIH: well I do

LIH: but I don’t understand how to make sense of it

LIH: there is no possibility of an ontology other than a provisional, indeterminate, and fluctuating one

LIH: and that is satisfying in some way

LIH: or the feeling of dissatisfaction is shown to be false

LIH: or misguided

LIH: or something?

CDTW: Yeah, it's something along those lines

CDTW: Yeah, this is a large chunk of what I said in my thesis actually haha

CDTW: This is where I find the quasi-religiosity in Wittgenstein

LIH: I’m resisting the urge to reject this view out of hand I honestly don’t understand it

CDTW: Trying to let yourself give yourself over to this indeterminacy and flux when you want so, so, so bad to have solid form and determinacy

CDTW: What are you talking about? You were all about this shit a year or two ago haha

CDTW:

CDTW: haha

CDTW: I'm telling you what you thought haha

LIH: I can tell you for sure that I was never about this

LIH:

LIH: haha

LIH: and if you think I was, we were not understanding each other

CDTW: Yeah, I honestly never thought that these kinds of problems plagued you as much as I'm starting to see

CDTW: to see

LIH: yeah I don’t get it

LIH: when I read w. I definitely don’t see this radical indeterminacy

LIH: and you’ll say its not radical

LIH: unless you have a wrong view

LIH: etc

LIH: but I don’t even see that

CDTW: Well it is radical

CDTW: his approach is massively radical

LIH: yeah obviously

CDTW: Man, when I see W. that's what I see in the blank spots between the sections

LIH: but I don’t see it as rejecting the whole notion of structure as such, or replacing it with the idea of structure as process

LIH: or whatever it is that I’m not getting

CDTW: I think he's saying that we can have more or less determinate, conventional, grammars, and language-games and whatnot, but that they're ultimately ungrounded by something much more indeterminate

LIH: but you think its all grounded in some mysticism

LIH: or religion

CDTW: But you can have extremely rigorous systems within that field

LIH: or deep ethical urgrund

CDTW: I didn't say that

LIH: that was a question

LIH:

LIH: haha

LIH: because I think you’ll agree there is a point at which you push Wittgenstein and he doesn’t budge

CDTW: I see this radical indeterminacy in W. as preventing anyone from drawing a "religion" or a "mysticism" or a "deep ethical urgrund" out of it

LIH: but to me it seems like you think that point is outside possible articulation?

LIH: yeah you cant draw it out of it, its not articulable

CDTW: Yeah ... this is what prevents and also makes possible any kind of systematic thought

CDTW: It makes it possible but also prevents it from solidifying

CDTW: IF you have the right view

CDTW: i.e. you understand how you're being tricked by language

CDTW: Or by your own either laziness or philosophical mania

LIH: ok so at this point can you ask what it is?

LIH: what is this point?

LIH: or is that still inadmissible?

CDTW: Well there is no "this point"

LIH: so its still wrong to think of an is here

CDTW: It's like I said to Sauve the other night on MSN, for Wittgenstein as I understand him, there is a limit insofar as there is an absence of a limit

LIH: what does that mean

LIH: the limit is our infinitude?

CDTW: Yeah, I guess you could say that

CDTW: t

CDTW: I don't know if that's how I'd say it

LIH: how would you say it?

CDTW: But language is, according to how Wittgenstein seems to see it, such that it has no clear boundaries or rigid structures, there is no inside and outside of it, such a notion is nonsensical, and no "meaning" only "means" "itself" in such a way that we can rigidly define any limits at all

CDTW: It all falls away more and more the more you try to nail it down, and it's in that way you're limited

LIH: but the ethical moment in w. isn’t in language is it

LIH: ?

LIH: or is it

CDTW: You're not limited by a radical outside impinging upon a linguistic sphere trying to push out and touch the world, you're limited by language, which is worldly, which springs from "forms of life" or whatever you want to call it and which only arrives at rationality a posteriori

CDTW: like a rigid rationality, especially

CDTW: Well early in W. the ethical moment, for me, is your recognition of the truncation of any ethical system building and your inability to make a lasting claim to what's "right"

CDTW: And I do think there's something very very similar throughout his corups

CDTW: corps

CDTW: CORPUS

CDTW: It just happens for different reasons

LIH: I don’t get it

CDTW: In the early W. it's because you can't say it

LIH: ok

LIH: and in the later w?

LIH: is 1929 later?

LIH: hats middle I guess

CDTW: In the later W. it's not because there are no ethical ideals that you're trying to get outside language to touch, it's because the concepts you're using have a built-in indeterminacy to them and there simply no "good" or "just" that you can access, you can only try to investigate the applications of these terms in different contexts and try to understand how they relate to how we live

CDTW: live

CDTW: and have lived

CDTW: and might live

CDTW: Bear in mind I read Culture and Value a lot and think it's a very important part of his thought

LIH: what’s it mean to have an inbuilt indeterminacy

LIH: and

CDTW: meaning is like a rope, there is no central strand, it's the interweaving of the fibers, etc.

CDTW: each fiber is a different application

LIH: is understanding how something relates to the way we live understanding something or is it just approximating an understanding of something that cant be understood in toto

CDTW: and they're all made taut as a rope by one another

LIH: so what’s the inbuilt indeterminacy?

CDTW: the rope thing

CDTW: like the meaning of the word "true "

LIH: I don’t get the inbuilt part

LIH: part

CDTW: our inability to find a rigid definition of the word isn't accidental

CDTW: its constitutive of its having any meaning at all

LIH: well what has the meaning?

CDTW: because it's used in many different contexts over time and that's how it gets its meaning

CDTW: nothing "has" the meaning, meaning isn't a property

LIH: ok, so how can you talk about it getting its meaning

LIH: ?

CDTW: Well by paying attention to my nonsense

LIH: haha

CDTW: Think about it more verbally, I guess ... think about its getting and its having a meaning as a repetitive occurrence that happens again and again in singular instances

LIH: but what makes the repetition

CDTW: and which are circulated and happen over and over and over amongst us

LIH: just us accepting it as a repetition?

CDTW: Well maybe our acceptance is the same thing as our repeating its use

LIH: what is our repeating it

CDTW: I mean if we repeat a word in context we've already accepted it

CDTW: using it

LIH: what is using it

CDTW: haha what is with you?

LIH: I’m interested in what you think!

CDTW: Are you seriously asking these questions?

LIH: yes I am!

CDTW: hahaha

LIH: I don’t understand any of this

LIH: of course I’m interested

LIH: you seem to have thought about it more than me

CDTW: Using it is speaking it, writing it, hearing it, making puns with it, using it "seriously", rhyming it with other words, mispronouncing it, having to discern that someone is trying to use it when they mistype it on a relay call and they're trying to use English when their first language is sign language

CDTW: lots of stuff

LIH: ok well here is my problem

CDTW: Shoot

LIH: if you take things to be radically indeterminate

LIH: which I take it you do

LIH: like

LIH: you accept that context determines meaning

LIH: but

LIH: contexts themselves are fuzzy

LIH: and meaning is fuzzy

LIH: and the determination is fuzzy

LIH: right?

LIH: is that fair?

CDTW: well ... the broader you get the fuzzier you get ... the more close to thinking about singularities you get, the more acute you can get, but there's always a fuzziness that informs even the most robust and rigorous determinations we can come up with

CDTW: I kind of think of it like this sometimes

LIH: but how do you know when you're close or far

LIH: what’s the difference

LIH: I guess there cant "Be" a difference?

CDTW: It's like somewhere Derrida says that a calculus or a symbolic logic - certainly, it can and does operate according to an "all or nothing", "yes or no" logic

CDTW: It's like this increasing robustness that we somehow have the ability to approach and produce I guess

CDTW: and inherit and use and pass on, of course

CDTW: it's not just creation haha

CDTW: But I feel like you can approach this extreme robustness but it will always necessarily kind of bleed back out at the edges into that fuzziness, because you take a step back and you're looking at a really robust form of expression in the context of, say, a set of similar types of expression that are similarly robust (like different symbolic logics, like Fregean vs. Davidsonian vs. Kripkean)

CDTW: And then you take a step back and you look at those in the context of the history or histories of logic

CDTW: so like Aristotelian, Hegelian, etc. etc .etc

CDTW: Then you take a step back and you look at it in the history of philosophy

LIH: but you don’t think that at the edges of the blur it bleeds back into rigidity then

LIH: determinacy

LIH: etc

CDTW: then you take a step SIDEWAYS and look at the history of philosophy in relation to eastern thought, etc. etc.

CDTW: I think that we can kind of move in and out of whole spectrums of determinacy and indeterminacy without even thinking about it

CDTW: like we do it all the time

LIH: but what are we doing when we do it

LIH: or are we doing nothing in particular

LIH: we're just doing what were doing?

CDTW: and I don't know if there's a way to really hierarchize the determinacy over the indeterminacy, because if it weren't for these robust grammatical arsenals that we have in philosophy, for instance, how and why would be be trying to articulate or identify these problems?

CDTW: I dunno, we're just living I guess when we do it without thinking

LIH: well you seem to have definitely preferred the indeterminacy

LIH: by far

CDTW: I don't think that's a fair thing to say haha

LIH: well

CDTW: I spent 150 pages in the last year alone trying to as rigorously as possible discuss these kinds of concerns

LIH: every question I've asked, you have basically answered that it cant be answered in the way I phrased it

LIH: I guess that could mean either

LIH: I’m an idiot, your indeterminate, or both

LIH: ]probably the latter

CDTW: We idioterminates

LIH: hahahahaha

LIH: that sounds like quine

LIH: "X socratizes"

LIH:

CDTW: No, I just think it means that it's a mistake to ask for absolute determinacy when we're speaking so broadly that it's impossible

CDTW: So you can try to develop something very rigorous for certain kinds of cases, like Davidson's truth axiomatic

CDTW: Or you can try your hardest to give up expecting an absolutely definable and absolutely broad definition of truth or inference, or whatever

LIH: I don’t think I was asking for absolute determinism

CDTW: Well okay

CDTW: haha

LIH: I think its fair to ask what something means

CDTW: I don't think I was asking for absolute indeterminism either

LIH: well you weren’t asking anything

LIH: haha

LIH: you were answering

CDTW: But how can you ask what something "means" if you're not asking what it means in context?

LIH: well I was asking what context means

LIH: is context contextual too then

LIH: and yes it is

LIH: for you

CDTW: Well how can it not be?

LIH: so how is that not indeterminate ?

LIH: I’m not objecting

LIH: I’m just trying to get clear on what you said

CDTW: Okay well yeah, I would have to say that "context" can only be said contextually, yeah

LIH: so what context do you mean that in

CDTW: Well if you say it in context, and then try to investigate THAT application in THAT context, you can get very determinate, and then you can compare it to other such investigations

LIH: so what you mean is in a meta context

LIH: or some large context

LIH: a philosophical context?

CDTW: Well right now I mean it in the context of our discussion

LIH: but that isn’t anything in particular

LIH: right?

LIH: you cant even say "it is what it is"

LIH: or can you?

CDTW: Sure you can

CDTW: Just pay attention

CDTW:

CDTW: hahaha

CDTW: i.e. to your nonsense hahaha

LIH: what kind of attention should I pay

LIH: so there are multiple contexts to every meaning though right

LIH: and the disjunction of them determines what is meant

LIH: or is what is meant determined even that far

LIH: is it more like]

LIH: a slew of possible meanings and one is happened upon somehow more often than the others

LIH: its something like that last one

LIH: only the somehow is more determinate

LIH: right?

CDTW: I guess so, but that doesn't indicate an actual hierarchy

LIH: I don’t know what you mean about hierarchy

LIH: where are you getting that

LIH: you mentioned it before and I didn’t get it

CDTW: I guess it could indicate a degree of familiarity which ties into the instances in which we feel comfortable with one use of a word versus instances in which we feel uncomfortable with another use of it

LIH: ok well isn’t that degree just another word for a hierarchical appreciation for?

LIH: what’s wrong with that?

CDTW: Like a hierarchy of meaning to a word, like one meaning has more of a claim to what that word means than any other meaning

CDTW: Well I'm just trying to think according to what I understand of Wittgenstein here too

LIH: yeah yeah, I’m not attacking you

LIH: I'm interested in these ideas

LIH: I don’t understand them

LIH: ok well lets run with the hierarchy

LIH: if a meaning has more claim

CDTW: Man, I don't mean to be a jerk but I have to say I'm surprised you're saying this, I mean, you've read as much Derrida and stuff as I have

CDTW: All that is in there too

LIH: is there something that makes it more relevant?

LIH: I think derrida is the most rigid of anyone I’ve ever read

CDTW: Are you like misunderstanding these things anew?

LIH: nah

LIH: I don’t think like this

LIH: I cant think of anyone more rigid than derrida

LIH: it always ends in some calcified idea for him

LIH: to me anyway

LIH: but whatever, I don’t care about derrida

LIH: I like the w. talk

CDTW: I read Derrida as using the language of calcified ideas but he turns it against itself

CDTW: much like w.

CDTW:

LIH: he just ossifies it in a dif. way

LIH: w. isn’t like that

CDTW: yeah, you've just gotta be careful with it

CDTW: But with W. yeah it's different

LIH: I don’t think w. and derrida are at all similar in spirit

CDTW: Really?

LIH: contra you and Staten

LIH:

CDTW: Man haha

LIH: ahah

CDTW: well they are in some ways and aren't in other ways

CDTW: I mean it's part of their style too

LIH: anyways, forget derrida, lets get back to what we were talking about

CDTW: hahaha

CDTW: you're such a hater

CDTW: you won't let me steer the conversation

CDTW:

CDTW: haha

LIH: nah I like derrida, I’m just focused right now

LIH: ! you’ve been steering it!

LIH: I’ve just been asking questions about what you say

CDTW: hahahaha

CDTW: Okay haha

CDTW: It would be easier if we were actually hanging out because the typing makes me feel like I'm a big ponce and I'm being browbeaten

CDTW: because I can't hear your tone haha

LIH: nah I’m not brow beating

CDTW: I do know better though

LIH: I have no idea what’s going on

CDTW: I'm just saying haha

LIH: I’m an idiot

CDTW: Okay, what were we talking about?

LIH: hold on

LIH: ill scroll up

LIH: ok

LIH: I think this is what you were saying

LIH: when a word is uttered, it is uttered within a field of possible meanings, but when it is uttered in a particular context, we immediately? at least often it seems that way pick out what possible meaning that word has. you were thinking of this as hierarchical: the word or I guess, its better to think in terms of propositions has THIS meaning based on some hierarchical ordering. and I was asking

LIH: what is the hierarchy

LIH: /where does it come from

LIH: I assume you say the context

LIH: but then I ask

LIH: how

LIH: and you reply...

CDTW: oh haha I thought you were continuing with a reply I made haha

CDTW: hmmm

CDTW: Okay

CDTW: I think, tentatively at least, that if there is a hierarchy, it's from a greater degree of repetition in certain directions of usage

CDTW: like .... okay, the word watr

CDTW: water

LIH: nah that cant be it at all

LIH: because even if were using a word really weirdly

LIH: well know what it means

LIH: its not just the commonness of the meaning

CDTW: I don't know

CDTW: If you said for instance...

LIH: like when I say "strippin the strips"

LIH: hahha

CDTW: "I water emcees" or whatever

CDTW: are you thinking of a) h20, b)watering plants, etc. etc.? are you thinking about one of them in particular? are you thinking about all of them at once? could you say?

CDTW: Could you look back and say what sense of "water" you were thinking of?

LIH: well that’s a bad example for what I meant

LIH: I’m just saying, that in any given case

CDTW: well it's a really weird way

LIH: we generally know what we mean

LIH: and it has nothing to do with how commonly the words are used

LIH: or

LIH: if it does

LIH: commonality has to have some weird sense

LIH: because the way I say "z" has nothing to do with its common use

LIH: so there has to be that context or whatever

LIH: but then there also has to be a context in which that context is meaningful

CDTW: I dunno... let me try to think of another way to say it

LIH: or something like that?

CDTW: I think that Deleuze is right on here in some ways

CDTW: Like there is an interplay of differences and repetitions

CDTW: and in that interplay we get commonality, sameness, etc.

CDTW: so commonality is part of it

CDTW: familiarity

LIH: I don’t get it

CDTW: We have to node this, by the way haha

CDTW: You can be Socrates and I can be Theatetus

LIH: I think its the other way around

LIH: oh wait

LIH: Socrates asks the questions

LIH: haha

LIH: nm

CDTW: You're asking the questions haha

LIH: don’t node that part

LIH:

LIH: hahahahaha

CDTW: HAHAHA

LIH: "elenctic"

CDTW: Peter Griffin: "Chris, everything I say is a lie. Except for that. and that. and that. and that and that that nthatnthatnthatnthatnthat. And that."

LIH: hahahah

LIH: that’s so analytic philosophy

CDTW: I know! hahahaha

CDTW: fuck

LIH: ok, so I don’t understand anything still

LIH: so we cant ask :

LIH: what is meaning

LIH: what is a context?

LIH: right?

CDTW: No, you can ask ... at least I read Wittgenstein as saying you can ask

LIH: ok well I cant expect the kind of answer that says "a context is ____"

LIH: or:

CDTW: Yeah

LIH: "a context determines meaning like this ______"

CDTW: But you can get multiple answers that say "a context is _____" and then try to hold them up together in a kind of patchwork and see how they compare

LIH: but how can you hold anything together

CDTW: and then try to come away with some sense of a number of different ways

LIH: what is the sense of the number of different ways

LIH: it also isn’t anything in particular?

LIH: its nebulous

LIH: ?

CDTW: Yeah, I dunno ... I think it's at once nebulous and also definite, depending on how you look at it and the nature of your investigation

LIH: well what are you looking at that allows "it" to be either of those

CDTW: Like if you compare a number of different cases then at once there's a common nebulousness, but you can see in each case a determinacy that is also dependent on the nebulousness, it emerges out of it

LIH: or is there anything in common with the determinacy and the indeterminacy

LIH: that makes no sense to me

LIH: what is it that you see

LIH: unless you just make it up

CDTW: What do you mean?

CDTW: re: making it up

LIH: what are you seeing in the each case that is a determinacy that is dependent on the nebulousness and emerges out of it

LIH: if it isn’t something determinate

LIH: what is it

LIH: and if you cant answer that

LIH: then isn’t it just...

LIH: well what is it

LIH: its not anything

LIH: it "isn’t" anything in particular

CDTW: It's an interplay, by means of the repetitive and circulatory use of language amongst humans over untold eons of time, between particularity and generality

CDTW: I suppose

CDTW: But you don't "see" it

CDTW: It's not like that

LIH: but what is a repetition!!!

LIH: that’s the question

CDTW: hahahaha

LIH: if it isn’t anything in particular

LIH: then what is being repeated

CDTW: "I am going to the store today"

CDTW: "I am going to the store today"

CDTW: "I am going to the store today"

CDTW: "I am going to the store today"

CDTW: etc.

LIH: but in ten different contexts that’s not the same thing

LIH: its not even a repetition

LIH: and even if it is, why is it

CDTW: It's not totally the same thing or totally the different thing

LIH: 2+2=4

LIH: 2X2=4

LIH: is that a repetition?

CDTW: it presupposes similarity and difference at the same time

LIH: zwei und zwei machen vier

LIH: is that a repetition

LIH: well what’s the similarity

LIH: and what’s the difference

LIH: or are they anything

LIH: and if they aren’t what is the sense were talking about

LIH: and if there is no sense

LIH: what are we doing

CDTW: Well Deleuze thinks that similarity is an effect produced by repetition

CDTW: Haha I don't know man, I think you're going to polar extremes here and I think that's part of why we're not seeing eye to eye

CDTW: Remember that even "repetition" is a word just like any other word that is dependent upon repetition

LIH: you think I’m going to one place and then its opposite?

LIH: so basically you’re saying repetition is at the basis of identity then

LIH: but what do you mean by that

CDTW: No, I mean I think you're making too radical a distinction between similarity and difference

LIH: but I guess you cant mean anything in particular by it?

LIH: I don’t think I am

LIH: I’m asking what repetition is

CDTW: like when you say that "I'm going to the store today" in 10 different contexts "isn't even the same thing", that's not entirely true

LIH: is that a big distinction?

LIH: well how is it the same thing

CDTW: It has a touch of sameness too it, enough of a touch of sameness that we know what is or can be meant by it

CDTW: Well when we were living together if I said "I'm going to the store, hold on..."

CDTW: one night

CDTW: and then the next night I said it again

LIH: so that said in china has a touch of sameness?

CDTW: Did you go "whoa, what the fuck are you talking about?

CDTW: "

LIH: no but that’s nothing to do with the words, according to you, its all to do with the context right?

LIH: that’s what I understood

LIH: its the combination of sound and context

LIH: right?

LIH: but why does that combination constitute a repetition

LIH: or a difference

LIH: what does it do

LIH: what’s the relation between sound and context

LIH: or is there one

LIH: its not determinate I assume

CDTW: Well re: the question about china ... I'm sure that whatever they say for "going to the store" has enough of a touch of sameness for them

LIH: so I guess we don’t need determinacy to get what were talking about

CDTW: and if you can speak both English and mandarin then either one might have enough of a touch of sameness to each other for you

LIH: you’re missing my point I think

CDTW: Okay, what is your point?

CDTW: Maybe I am, it's probable haha

LIH: that either the sound or the context or both makes the meaning, and that if its the sound, in china that wont fly, and if its the context, how do we know when the context is the same, and if its both, how do the two connect so that we find the meaning

LIH: and if its none of those

LIH: what is it, some immediacy

LIH: but what is that?

CDTW: well it's both

CDTW: And if you know both languages, then both work for you

CDTW: And there are lots of people, both English and Chinese who do know both

CDTW: and also know other languages

LIH: ok well then we get to the third point

LIH: how do we connect the two

LIH: the sound and the context

LIH: to produce the meaning

LIH: or is it immanent

LIH: and if it is

CDTW: I don't know, I don't even know if there's a process

LIH: what is that?

CDTW: hahaha

LIH: because it seems immanent

LIH: but is it just inscrutable? or would you say that its seeming inscrutable is a wrongheaded view

CDTW: Yeah but immanent in a way that we seem to have to ascribe to some originary contingency or, more to the point, non-origin

CDTW: It's not transcendent

CDTW: It's immanent, but not in the way that for Leibniz monadic qualities are immanent to monads

CDTW: like a priori immanent

CDTW: a priori in a real hard-core sick philosopher sense haha

CDTW: as opposed to a more "always already" kind of sense

LIH: but its not immanent in any particular way

CDTW: If you know what I'm trying to say

LIH: its just "there like our lives"

LIH: ?

CDTW: yeah

CDTW: That's kind of what I feel

LIH: I don’t understand that

LIH: what is thoughts relation to what it thinks

CDTW: Dude

LIH: or is that a stupid question

LIH: for you?

CDTW: I am SURE that you have written about Heidegger and the "enigmatic disclosure of the world"

CDTW: I know you've written or talked about that shit

LIH: yeah, I don’t understand it

CDTW: I'm saying that I think that it's very much the same for Wittgenstein

LIH: I don’t understand Heidegger

CDTW: Well we can't get around it, we can't get over it, we can't bust through it

CDTW: Existing, it is just THERE

LIH: ok, but what is thought ?

LIH: is thought important at all?

CDTW: Our lives are just there, there's no justification, there's nothing to verify it or falsify it against, which is why "here is a hand" is at once perfectly good and utter nonsense

LIH: well I don’t think there’s any justification

LIH: but I also don’t think that attempting to understand something is finding a justification

LIH: you could just stop at brute is-ness if you wanted

LIH: but we don’t

LIH: and we shouldn’t

LIH: in my opinion at least

CDTW: I don't think that "brute isness" really captures it for me

LIH: and I think you have to ask what thought is and what thinking something means

LIH: well just a halting

CDTW: It's much more subtle and odd than that

CDTW: haha

CDTW: for me

LIH: I don’t think its ever unfair to demand an answer to "what is ____" if you countenance that thing as a matter of concern

LIH: that’s what I think is important to me anyway

LIH: I don’t know how not to do it

LIH: at least I haven’t learned

CDTW: No, I don't think it's unfair

LIH: well, I don’t know if I’ve misunderstood you

CDTW: But what is it you're looking for in asking the question?

LIH: I don’t think I’m looking for anything IN PARTICULAR

LIH: I think the onus is on the person who is being asked

LIH: you’ve countenanced certain things

LIH: and I want to know what they are

LIH: and if you haven’t countenanced them, or you think of thingliness otherwise than I do, maybe its your job to tell me what you mean

LIH: and if you cant mean anything

LIH: well

LIH: I don’t know what to say

LIH: I don’t know how to begin with that

CDTW: I have to be honest, I'm not even sure what you're saying at this point haha

CDTW: Oh okay

CDTW: wait

CDTW: okay, I am

LIH: hahahahahaha

LIH: awesome

LIH: that’s when you know its good

LIH: to me it seems like

LIH: we cant agree on what meaning could be

LIH: we cant even agree on that as a question

LIH: so how do we start to talk

LIH: unless meaning is a nonissue

CDTW: I could give you a list of things that I think meaning could be, sure

LIH: but that’s exactly what’s at issue

LIH: yeah but whenever I press you on any suggestion, you retreat to something broader

LIH: and when I ask you about that

LIH: you do the same thing

LIH: until we get to repetition

LIH: and then we don’t know what to say

CDTW: Dude, I'm not retreating to something broader

CDTW: I'm trying to say that there is a necessary negotiation between the particular and the broad

LIH: ok well something different

CDTW: They're co-implicated in one another

LIH: yeah but when I ask you what that means

LIH: what do you say?

CDTW: So if I say something about "truth" in a sentence, you can ask me "what do you mean by that?"

CDTW: But when you say "what is truth?" I don't really know what to say

CDTW: Because I could go off in lots of different directions

LIH: ok well lets just say this

LIH: WHY is there a necessary negation between the p and the broad?

LIH: is it just that way?

CDTW: negotiation, you mean? haah

LIH: yeah

LIH: typo

CDTW: okay, I thought it was my typo for a second

LIH:

CDTW: Okay, well, would a word mean anything if it were ever only said by one person once, and nobody was around to hear it, and he had anterogade amnesia and forgot that he ever said it and then it never came up again?

LIH: I don’t know, I don’t know what meaning is

LIH: it doesn’t seem impossible at least

LIH: you could utter something

LIH: I don’t know if you can make sense of someone like that though

LIH: but I guess I don’t know what making sense of something really means

LIH: anyway

LIH: what I want to ask is this

LIH: it seems to me that what you’re saying hinges on repetition being understandable to us, in some immanent or like a priori sense

LIH: is that right do you think?

LIH: that what I want to ask Logic is Hell sends:

CDTW: I guess so, I don't know

LIH: we should probably start over

CDTW: I'm getting exhausted thinking about this haha

LIH: ok nm

LIH: }

CDTW: haha it's okay

CDTW: Okay, let me try to put it another way

CDTW: I feel like what you're asking of me when you ask about what I mean by "truth" or whatever is some kind of super-concept that I can satisfy you with

CDTW: but I can't, all I'm trying to do is enumerate some kinds of uses of the word

LIH: but what is using a word, I don’t understand that

LIH: I’m not saying you have to give me an absolute answer

LIH: but

LIH: if you are going to say there is something in common with using a word

CDTW: And I feel like we're running into trying to force a philosophical weight on some words or phrases that really leads us into the kind of sickness that Wittgenstein wants us to fight back against

LIH: then there has to be something in common

LIH: or you shouldn’t say it

LIH: I think that’s fair

CDTW: Dude, all I can say if that you tell me that you're going to the store, and I tell you that I'm going to the store, there's definitely something in common there

LIH: the whole problem is the rope metaphor

LIH: that’s fine

LIH: but that can mean completely different things in different contexts

LIH: I’m going to the store could be a Nazi cipher also

CDTW: yeah, I know

LIH: or Chinese for fart juice

LIH: so what is it about the context that makes it mean what it means

LIH: or is it anything

LIH: and if it isn’t

LIH: why not

CDTW: I think that the questions you're asking have a philosophical weight that can't really match up to the language that we use every day

LIH: it seems like you HAVE to retreat to behaviourism or quine or something

CDTW: that's all I'm saying

LIH: but I know you don’t want to

LIH: I don’t think they do though

CDTW: No I'm definitely not into behaviourism

LIH: no no , not you, but what you’re saying

LIH: implicitly

LIH: anyway, maybe not I dunno

LIH: well what I want to say is this

CDTW: I was thinking about Behaviourism tonight

CDTW: and my objections to it

LIH: if you mean something, you mean something

CDTW: when I was at work

LIH: and there is a way in which you mean it

LIH: and if THAT is indeterminate, then

LIH: well actually

LIH: I don’t think it is indeterminate

CDTW: No, that's not indeterminate

LIH: it is determinate

LIH: we mean things

LIH: ok lets start there

CDTW: but it's dependent upon something more indeterminate

LIH: how do we mean things

CDTW: and it feeds back into something more indeterminate

LIH: ok this is what I don’t get

LIH: we both agree that we mean things]

LIH: lets start there

LIH: how do we mean something

LIH: is that a bad question?

LIH: question

CDTW: No, I mean in one way none of these are bad questions

CDTW: (Again I'm trying to speak from how I understand Wittgenstein)

LIH: ok well in what way are they bad and in what way are they good

LIH: yeah I know that

LIH: that context is understood

LIH: hahahahaha

LIH:

CDTW: haha there you go!

LIH: but what I’m asking you

LIH: is

LIH: how

LIH: and what am I understanding

CDTW: See, there was nothing problematic about saying that

LIH: why not

CDTW: Okay, let me put it again another way

LIH: so its pure immanence all the way down then

LIH: ?

LIH: or is that too conceptual?

LIH: is it just what happens

LIH: and asking about it is stupid?

CDTW: I think Wittgenstein is saying that when you say "that context is understood" and we both laughed about it and understood it, then the whole strain we're putting on ourselves to define context should really vanish, it's unimportant

CDTW: Not only should it vanish

LIH: so asking about it is stupid

CDTW: It DID vanish when you said that

LIH: no it didn’t really

CDTW: No, I mean ... it came out of a discussion in which we were asking about these things

LIH: I think its still an object of concern

CDTW: No, yeah it is ... I think W. thinks that we can't make it vanish for once and for all

LIH: I think thought can still turn back and try and see what "doing" is

LIH: thought isn’t just doing

LIH: in the beginning was the deed, sure

LIH: but

LIH: the deed isn’t the thought

LIH: thought is different than just use or act

CDTW: Well but it's not radically different

LIH: and if it isn’t I don’t understand how it isn’t

CDTW: it's not compartmentalized

CDTW: they all play into each other

LIH: what does that mean

CDTW: they're all part of being human in the world Transfer of "05 - dj grand wizard theodore - subway theme.mp3" is complete.

LIH: yeah but that doesn’t mean they’re all the same

CDTW: no, they're not equivocal or totally alien to one another

LIH: and its not clear what being part of being in the world means

LIH: to me at least

CDTW: but they're part of a field in which they all occur in conjunction

LIH: what is it they’re a part of

LIH: what’s the field

LIH: what’s the conjunction

LIH: "life

LIH: "

LIH: ?

CDTW: Okay I can't talk about this anymore

CDTW: This is insane

CDTW: I'm sorry, I really can't

LIH: hahah!

LIH: aight

CDTW: I didn't mean that as a dick either

CDTW: haha

CDTW: I'm just saying

LIH: ha whatever

LIH: I’m just curious is all

LIH:

CDTW: No, I'm serious, I wasn't trying to be rude

LIH: listen to that song its the essence of what’s up

LIH: man you don’t have to worry about being rude to me

LIH: get outta here

CDTW: hahaha

LIH: even if you are rude to me I wont care

LIH: you shouldn’t think that I’m just being antagonistic though, because I actually think this is all interesting

LIH: I’m starting to see how I don’t see anything correctly

CDTW: I just really don't understand the impetus of your questions and when it got down to trying to parse out each word in that last sentence I kind of cracked

CDTW: I actually shuddered

LIH: hahaha

LIH: sorry

CDTW: It was like the Kantian sublime haha

CDTW: It's okay

LIH: my stupidity is that vast

LIH: hahaha

CDTW: I honestly have to say I'm surprised we see things that differently

CDTW: I thought we were mostly the same

LIH: the devils in the details

LIH: haha

CDTW: hahaha

LIH: I’m surprised you thought I was so "indeterministic" to put a label on it

LIH: I think there are things

LIH: hahah

CDTW: Well I mean we were in CSP and we always talked about Blanchot and Jabes and Heidegger and we always seemed to understand each other

CDTW: I think there are things too, come on haha

LIH: not in the same way I do

LIH: yeah I don’t think jabes and Blanchot have anything to do with this

LIH: and my understanding of Heidegger is stupid as shit

CDTW: Well the way I read Wittgenstein and the way I read Blanchot have certain very strong affinities

CDTW: But also lots of disparities

LIH: yeah, Blanchot is a lot less fundamental

LIH: in my opinion

CDTW: It's not like I'm a Heidegger expert either haha

LIH: he’s on the surface

LIH: in an important way though

LIH: Levinas is altogether different

CDTW: Well I do think he's really heartfelt in his writing

CDTW: that's important to me

LIH: yeah I don’t think he’s fake

LIH: I just think he’s on the surface

LIH: he’s like deep about the surface

LIH: if that makes sense

LIH:

CDTW: Yeah hahaha

LIH: its not the same thing as w.

LIH: to me anyway

LIH: y

CDTW: I was thinking about our discussion of the relative importance of people we read actually

CDTW: when you were drunk haha

CDTW: and I was thinking about Levinas

CDTW: I feel like Levinas is the hidden heavyweight

LIH: yeah he’s not a Heideggerian

LIH: ppl think of him like that

LIH: I don’t get him, but I know he’s not a Heideggerian

LIH: something about the "face" stuff I think is his most important stuff

LIH: but I don’t understand it really

LIH: I’ve only read very little really

CDTW: Yeah, his shit is mad enigmatic

CDTW: IT's just ... crazy shit

CDTW: haha

LIH: its probably not if you're in the right mode

LIH: we're not in the right mode or something

LIH: psometimes I really hate philosophy[

CDTW: I mostly love it haha

CDTW: I'm a sucker

LIH: what’s the difference haha

LIH: its all the same

LIH: "we stand in a relation to philosophy"

LIH: hahahahahaha

LIH: I’m rereading our convo from the start

CDTW: hahahaha

CDTW: oh shit

CDTW: is it bad? haha

LIH: I dunno

LIH: ill let you know

LIH: haha

LIH: is on my scratch pad

CDTW: nice

CDTW: smug it up

LIH: haha

LIH: I feel like a jerk

LIH: haha

LIH: I should just keep my thoughts to myself

CDTW: why do you feel like a jerk?

CDTW: haha

LIH: because you think I’m being all curmudgeonly

CDTW: it was just more like a barrage

CDTW: haha

LIH: well a barrage of questions as mu

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