Chanting down the wicked:
dun
CDTW:
ny
Logic is Hell:
what up
CDTW:
I just got home
CDTW:
there were no funny calls tonight
CDTW:
zzzz
LIH:
hahaha
CDTW:
I read lots of W. though
CDTW:
And the Staten book
CDTW:
§374 in PI is dope
LIH:
what’s that section?
LIH:
my copy is upstairs
LIH:
I'm dying trying to write this Frege
LIH:
I’m so fucking stupid
CDTW:
§374: The greatest difficulty here is not to represent the matter as if there were something one *couldn't* do. As if there really were an object, from which I derive its description, but I were unable to shew it to anyone.——And the best that I can propose is that we should yield to the temptation to use this picture, but then investigate how the *application* of the picture goes.
LIH:
hah yeah
LIH:
I have that in my junk file for this paper
LIH:
I didn’t know the number
CDTW:
I like that one
CDTW:
So the Frege's not going well?
LIH:
I’m too stupid for it
CDTW:
hahaha
LIH:
there’s one part I found that is interesting
LIH:
hold on
CDTW:
You've been reading Frege for like 3 months, chillax
LIH:
he says that even the Begriffsschrift can’t purify logic enough
LIH:
!
CDTW:
hahahahaha
CDTW:
that guy is a compulsive masturbator
CDTW:
guaranteed
LIH:
hahaha
LIH:
I think that him saying that means that he thinks logic can’t ever be pinned down
LIH:
and it makes him like Brouwer
CDTW:
word
LIH:
but he doesn’t stick to it
CDTW:
haha
LIH:
or he doesn’t mention it again anyway
CDTW:
He's the philosopher par excellence
LIH:
you’re right; I’m worrying too much about this stuff
LIH:
my notes to myself are pretty funny though
CDTW:
like what?
LIH:
Everything logically insignificant has been excised (how?)
Restriction to a single mode of inference (if p then q)
Aims at perspicuity and order
Even the BS cannot make thought pure again Frege is at bottom the same as Brouwer?]
“how they must think if they are not to miss the truth” 250
logic=timeless
CDTW:
"I'm stupid! stupid! stupid!"
LIH:
hahahaha
LIH:
omgs u r zo dum mark like omg
CDTW:
hahaha
CDTW:
I'm going to start writing some stuff on W. again soon
LIH:
I can’t even read the Tractatus fuck
LIH:
I feel really stupid lately
CDTW:
I'm thinking about §374, following a rule, and there was something else I was thinking of
CDTW:
Isn't it because you don't own it?
CDTW:
haha
LIH:
it’s all over the internet
LIH:
+I translated half of it
CDTW:
hahaha
CDTW:
It's an easy read, I think
LIH:
I don’t understand any of it
LIH:
I don’t even know what a state of affairs is
CDTW:
That's not true, you're just down in the dumps because this Frege thing
LIH:
nah, the more I read these guys the more I realize I don’t know what I’m talking about
CDTW:
There's no such thing as "a" "state of affairs"
CDTW:
hahaha
CDTW:
Yeah I was thinking about our conversation that you can't remember the other night and thinking about some of the things we were talking about
CDTW:
like "what is an inference?" "what is it to have something illustrate something else?" and all those questions we were finding so crucial
CDTW:
And then I was reading PI and realizing that we were doing it hahaha
LIH:
haha
LIH:
yeah
LIH:
that inference one is really bothering me
CDTW:
Even when I went to bed the whole thing was bothering me
LIH:
it seems like necessity is impossible
LIH:
haha
CDTW:
I dunno, thinking about rule following and the way that that Staten guy interprets it is really helpful
CDTW:
re: inference
CDTW:
or necessity
CDTW:
etc.
LIH:
explain
CDTW:
I'm too stupid to explain
CDTW:
haha
CDTW:
Hang on; let me re-read what he says
LIH:
rule following isn’t on my mind lately, though its connected, I want to know what you meant by logic being immanent in the proposition itself
CDTW:
Isn't that like a week ago that I said that?
CDTW:
I probably changed my mind or something
LIH:
I don’t know when or if you said it
LIH:
but that idea is gnawing at my brain
CDTW:
Yeah I did say it haha
CDTW:
I just can't remember what I meant
CDTW:
fuck
LIH:
w. says something like that
LIH:
here’s what I take it to mean
LIH:
language is already logically perfect and the attempt to 'purify' it into its logical structure is misguided
LIH:
but
LIH:
what is logic if it just is language?
LIH:
because it seems like we can do things with logic that aren’t linguistic
LIH:
I don’t know
LIH:
I’m not even thinking about it right
CDTW:
This is strictly Tractarian W. you're talking about here, right?
LIH:
no
LIH:
just w in general
LIH:
like I said
LIH:
I can’t even read the Tractatus
CDTW:
I think, yeah ... I dunno, it's probably a bit of a misstep to say "language is already logically perfect" given the metaphysical weight of it, you know?
CDTW:
But W. might say something like "Language is just fine as it is"
CDTW:
Later on anyway
CDTW:
I dunno ... he's way too troubled in his own inner dialogue to really pin it down
CDTW:
like, on the one hand, language is just fine as it is, yet it's within language that we get a mistaken view of language and we try to pigeonhole it through certain uses of it
LIH:
I think he does say language or grammar I guess is already logically perfect
LIH:
you can’t purify it
LIH:
you just have to see it right
CDTW:
I dunno, I don't know if he'd use that kind of terminology later on, like "perfect", he'd probably have lots of caveats
LIH:
maybe
LIH:
all i mean to say is this
LIH:
that language doesn’t need logic to boss it around
CDTW:
yeah
CDTW:
Like Carnap
LIH:
f. says that "logic judges language"
CDTW:
Language isn't a deficient version of what it could be
LIH:
ok lemme ask you a series of questions
CDTW:
Okay
CDTW:
What are my chances that I'll get the job?
LIH:
and maybe we can get clear on all the problems that are bothering me
LIH:
CDTW:
Are these like yes/no?
LIH:
zero, you’re already fired
CDTW:
Or one of those ones where there are no right answers?
CDTW:
fuck
LIH:
what do you think logic is?
CDTW:
what do I do?
CDTW:
Hmm ... I dunno. I think that it's a bunch of things
CDTW:
Like we seem to find that there's a "logic" inherent in the way that things happen
CDTW:
for one
LIH:
what does that mean?
CDTW:
like "what goes up must come down"
CDTW:
"If you drink beer you piss lots"
CDTW:
etc.
LIH:
so laws then
CDTW:
Yeah
LIH:
those are laws
LIH:
ok
LIH:
but it’s not those laws
LIH:
its not physics
CDTW:
So we seem to find like law like regularities or repetitive patterns
LIH:
its not just any laws
LIH:
so what kind of laws is it?
CDTW:
But we feel as though it's logical
LIH:
what is it a law of
LIH:
ok well what is logical about those laws then?
LIH:
let’s put it that way
CDTW:
I don't know ... I mean, don't you think it's getting ahead of ourselves to start talking about laws already when most people get along fine without thinking about what seems to occur naturally in terms of laws?
CDTW:
Like if you want to talk about logic, I'm trying to think of the most every day ways in which people might think or talk about it
LIH:
but I ask everyday ppl and they have no idea
LIH:
they say its valid reasoning
LIH:
and I’m not satisfied with that
LIH:
or with its "laws"
LIH:
those aren’t satisfying
CDTW:
Yeah I know
LIH:
and I don’t think it’s unreasonable to think further about it
CDTW:
You weren't letting me finish with what I was trying to say
LIH:
well type faster
LIH:
CDTW:
You need to respect the "go ahead" protocol, caller
CDTW:
Okay, like I said, these are some of the things I think of when I think of logic
CDTW:
1) That kind of everyday causality that you don't really even think twice about, like falling down or whatever
LIH:
I don’t think I even consider that logic though
LIH:
like just in an everyday sense
LIH:
I wouldn’t say that it’s logical that things fall
LIH:
or whatever
CDTW:
Well I'm talking about what I think
LIH:
unphilosophically I wouldn’t say that
CDTW:
Okay then haha
CDTW:
I don't really know what else to say
CDTW:
I'm trying to tell you what I think here
LIH:
yeah fair enough
LIH:
I’m just saying, I think logic has something to do with laws
LIH:
but I don’t think you can just stop at laws like those kinda laws
LIH:
I don’t think even reggo ppl think those are laws of logic
LIH:
I could be wrong though
CDTW:
I just mean that, I dunno, when I think about the apparent causality of things in the world that happen around me, I find that I sort of comfortably think of it in terms of its own immanent logic that appears to me because, I don't know, that it's what I'm used to and I couldn't really practically imagine it any other way
CDTW:
So there's that
LIH:
hm
LIH:
but you don’t infer that things will happen like that
LIH:
maybe I think logic is inference
CDTW:
And then there's logic in the sense that, I don't know, you think "logically", like you're being "logical" ... which often just amounts to "what's reasonable" or "what's practical and sound to do"
CDTW:
So it's often used that way
CDTW:
Then there's symbolic logic
CDTW:
I don't know, there's lots of things I think about it, I couldn't really say what I think it IS
CDTW:
Yeah well sure inference and logic can totally be linked together in a discussion about logic
CDTW:
I find it really helpful to keep in mind W.'s image of the rope that doesn't have a central thread but which is the interweaving of many different fibers
LIH:
I think there’s something special about logic
CDTW:
I dunno, that may be falling prey to the philosopher's illness to REALLY think that there's something special about logic. Then again there may not be, but there is something about it that draws you to it (the general you, not you in particular) because you can't picture anything other than it in a way
LIH:
yeah, if we want to talk about any kind of necessity we end up at logic
LIH:
even if necessity turns out to be some sort of tenuous fibrous thing
LIH:
ugh I dunno
LIH:
I’m not ready for Wittgenstein
CDTW:
Sure you are
CDTW:
You've just been rolling with the Ottawa department too much
CDTW:
hahahaha
LIH:
w. is too true
CDTW:
I always take him to be revealing that the agony you're experiencing will always be unavoidable the harder you struggle to nail down what you're after
LIH:
hahaha
CDTW:
And that there comes a point at which you just have to submit to the impossibility of reaching that ideal
LIH:
I dunno
CDTW:
But you can find out a lot of interesting and useful things on that journey to the inarticulate grunt
CDTW:
Like the collapse into the inarticulate grunt is a necessary component of philosophical investigation because you're trying to turn language back upon itself to keep yourself from falling prey to its tendency to dupe you
LIH:
what does w. think true means?
CDTW:
I think he probably tries to investigate its multifarious applications in order to give us pause when asking the question "what does true mean?"
CDTW:
Like I was thinking about how Davidson posits an axiomatic approach to conceiving truth
CDTW:
And how wowed I was by it
LIH:
what’s that mean
CDTW:
What, the W. part or the Davidson part?
LIH:
Davidson
CDTW:
Davidson argues that we can conceive truth in a minimal way, e.g. "'x' is true, if and only if x is true."
CDTW:
Like snow is white if and only if snow IS white
LIH:
that’s like Frege
LIH:
truth is redundant
LIH:
but necessary
CDTW:
Well he revises it in some ways
LIH:
Frege changes his mind a few times about it too
CDTW:
But yeah, I'm saying I was thinking about how I was all wowed by what Davidson says and all that
CDTW:
But then tonight I was thinking about how Foucault talks about truth, like, "Why should we let other people tell us our truths?" or something like that
CDTW:
And clearly "truth" means something different in both instances
LIH:
yeah?
CDTW:
Yeah, I feel that way anyway
CDTW:
To me it feels like two different things
LIH:
what are they
CDTW:
I mean not radically different obviously ... if they're part of the rope and its fibers they've got to have something to do with each other
CDTW:
Well Davidson is trying to get at a sense of how we can find truth in our talk insofar as we're looking at what's "true to the facts", and he also is always emphasizing that language isn't separate from the world so he's always pushing that agenda
LIH:
well how do they have to do with each other?
CDTW:
I think that with Foucault when he's talking about truth in that context he's talking about different conceptions of the "good life" or whatever he'd say in lieu of the "good life", like living in a way that's as unhindered as possible by the constraints of not investigating our "historical ontology" or whatever
CDTW:
Well they have to do with each other in that they're the same sound: "truth" used in a spectrum of different contexts over the passage of time in similar, repetitive ways
LIH:
well aside from the sound, which is a stupid connection, what makes them similar?
CDTW:
That's not a stupid connection
CDTW:
Why is that stupid?
LIH:
if it’s just the sound it is
CDTW:
It's also written down the same way every time?
LIH:
because its vrai and its true and its wahr
LIH:
and its verdad
LIH:
its not the sound
CDTW:
No it's not JUSt the sound, it's not JUST the writing, it's not JUST anything
LIH:
well anyway, what makes them similar
LIH:
its obviously not the sound
CDTW:
Duh
LIH:
we all agree wahr is true
LIH:
CDTW:
Not if you're looking at the sound as the only criteria
CDTW:
Of course not
LIH:
yeah yeah I know that’s not what you meant
CDTW:
But that's part of it, how could it be repeated in use?
LIH:
I was discounting it to move on
CDTW:
I mean how could it be repeated in use if it weren't for the sound? That's definitely part of it ... language is a spatiotemporal phenomenon, the materiality of it is definitely part of it
CDTW:
You can't discount that shit
LIH:
I think you can for the most part, in its particularity anyway
LIH:
we all feel like there is something other than their iterability as signs that makes wahr and true the same thing
LIH:
but whatever, the sound is part of it too
LIH:
or whatever the sign is
LIH:
a fart could be part of it if you wanted
LIH:
you have to have something iterable
CDTW:
Well yeah
CDTW:
You're getting all ornery with me haha
LIH:
haha I’m not really, it just sounds like it
LIH:
trust me
LIH:
CDTW:
I dunno, I just think that every time we ask these questions we have to be careful of what traps we're stepping in
CDTW:
like "what makes them similar?"
LIH:
I agree
CDTW:
We'd really have to say "well ______, and _______, and _______ ...."
LIH:
but we do say they are similar
CDTW:
and then not say the stuff we forgot or didn't think of
LIH:
why do we say that
CDTW:
Because of history, because of the way WE use the words ourselves in our contexts, I dunno
CDTW:
lots of stuff
CDTW:
We've got a minimum of 2000 years to comb over to come up with that question
CDTW:
I mean answer
LIH:
so you think we cant answer any questions about what true is without tracing its history to its origins?>
CDTW:
No, we can't trace the history of the concept (or whatever you want to call it) of truth to its origins
CDTW:
You can only get a partial picture at best, and that's in part due to the impossibility of nailing down an origin and also in part due to the fact that tomorrow a new context of its use could arise
LIH:
so what are we doing when we ask what truth is
CDTW:
So we can make claims, of course, but they're bound to dissolve when we try to make an absolutely rigid claim that we can just sit back and rest easy about
CDTW:
I dunno, we're doing any number of things, I guess it depends on what context we're asking it in, you know?
CDTW:
hahaha
LIH:
so what role does the context play?
LIH:
it establishes the conditions of meaningful ness?
LIH:
and I suppose the context is indeterminate
LIH:
and so are the conditions
LIH:
and so therefore the meaning
CDTW:
This is why I find Staten's interpretation of rule-following helpful
CDTW:
CDTW:
haha
LIH:
explain
CDTW:
Okay, say, for instance, that we take the notion that ... "context determines meaningfulness" to be the rule that we're applying to a discussion about what we're doing when we ask about what truth is
CDTW:
Just think about that while I type this haha
CDTW:
Or drink a beer
CDTW:
something
LIH:
I’m drinking a forty
LIH:
LIH:
I dunno if you’d think of context determines meaningfulness as a rule
LIH:
but maybe
LIH:
anyway
LIH:
ill wait to see what you got
LIH:
haha
LIH:
you fat fuck
LIH:
hahahahahahahahaha
LIH:
I like typing disses when you’re in the middle of typing
LIH:
you’re so disappointing to your parents Matthew
LIH:
GOD
LIH:
get a haircut
CDTW:
"W's critique of the concept of a rule is aimed at showing that the form of a rule is essentially multiple and that it is always possible to deviate from the established application of a rule while continuing to adhere to its form ...."
CDTW:
hey, fuck you!
LIH:
CDTW:
I've lost 30 pounds you fuck!
CDTW:
haha
CDTW:
I do need a haircut though
CDTW:
Now I will continue typing
LIH:
what does it mean to adhere to its form
CDTW:
"In W's later work there is no boundary of form to meaning. It is true that for W words have meaning only in the context of 'language-games' and 'forms of life'. But neither language games nor forms of life are to be conceived as structured by some self-identical form that marks their boundaries and makes their varying manifestations instances of the same. W's account runs counter to those ...
LIH:
what’s no boundary of form to meaning mean
LIH:
I agree that he doesn’t have the stamp image of concepts
CDTW:
views that see human activities as structured by 'implicit rules'; for him, the actual instances of usage are our 'rules'. The instances of usage are spatiotemporal phenomena, and are to be 'applied' to the understanding of new cases, not as a rule conceived as logos or intelligible form is applied"
LIH:
or forms or whatever
LIH:
so rules are immanent to practices
CDTW:
boundary of form to meaning means, like counter to Aristotle's idea that words either have one meaning that's definite, or multiple meanings that are also definite and discrete
LIH:
so logic is immanent to propositions
CDTW:
for instance
LIH:
I don’t get it
LIH:
the boundary part
CDTW:
He just means difference
CDTW:
There's no boundary, like no elementary form
CDTW:
it's not like that
LIH:
I don’t get how a form is a boundary
LIH:
oh
LIH:
difference]
LIH:
so meaning is its own form
LIH:
?
LIH:
is that the idea
CDTW:
Anyway I don't think he's saying that logic is immanent to propositions, because on Staten's view the repetitive use of words and sentences and meaningful grunts and all that shit is what makes it go
CDTW:
He really emphasizes the idea of repetition and practice ... so okay, yes, you can say perhaps that in a sense that logic is immanent to propositions or practices or whatever
CDTW:
but that logic would be a moot point if a practice only happened once, out of context
LIH:
well what else could it be
LIH:
yeah
LIH:
that's what I’m saying
LIH:
or what I think you should be saying at least
CDTW:
Yeah but that also really does make you have to complicate the idea of "logic" and "immanence" and all that ... I mean they're dependent on repetition, so there's nothing to them in and of themselves
LIH:
so what is repetition then
CDTW:
well it can be different things
LIH:
is it just what we accept as repetition
LIH:
I guess there are criteria
LIH:
but they’re just the ones we accept
LIH:
right
LIH:
?
CDTW:
Yeah, I guess so
LIH:
and the reasons why we accept them are just the reasons we find acceptable right?
CDTW:
I guess, I really don't know
LIH:
and there’s nothing that makes us find them acceptable except precedent
LIH:
or whatever it is
LIH:
a complex of historical contingencies that resulted in these forms rather than others
LIH:
?
CDTW:
Yeah, maybe that's fair to say, tentatively ...I except we don't see it as precedent I guess
CDTW:
s
CDTW:
I dunno haha
LIH:
so its not even precedent?
LIH:
what is it then!
CDTW:
I mean we can't see it like we can see a legal precedent
LIH:
haha
LIH:
nah its not that rigid
CDTW:
There is no "what" that "it is"
CDTW:
haha
LIH:
I don’t understand what you’re saying
LIH:
well I do
LIH:
but I don’t understand how to make sense of it
LIH:
there is no possibility of an ontology other than a provisional, indeterminate, and fluctuating one
LIH:
and that is satisfying in some way
LIH:
or the feeling of dissatisfaction is shown to be false
LIH:
or misguided
LIH:
or something?
CDTW:
Yeah, it's something along those lines
CDTW:
Yeah, this is a large chunk of what I said in my thesis actually haha
CDTW:
This is where I find the quasi-religiosity in Wittgenstein
LIH:
I’m resisting the urge to reject this view out of hand I honestly don’t understand it
CDTW:
Trying to let yourself give yourself over to this indeterminacy and flux when you want so, so, so bad to have solid form and determinacy
CDTW:
What are you talking about? You were all about this shit a year or two ago haha
CDTW:
CDTW:
haha
CDTW:
I'm telling you what you thought haha
LIH:
I can tell you for sure that I was never about this
LIH:
LIH:
haha
LIH:
and if you think I was, we were not understanding each other
CDTW:
Yeah, I honestly never thought that these kinds of problems plagued you as much as I'm starting to see
CDTW:
to see
LIH:
yeah I don’t get it
LIH:
when I read w. I definitely don’t see this radical indeterminacy
LIH:
and you’ll say its not radical
LIH:
unless you have a wrong view
LIH:
etc
LIH:
but I don’t even see that
CDTW:
Well it is radical
CDTW:
his approach is massively radical
LIH:
yeah obviously
CDTW:
Man, when I see W. that's what I see in the blank spots between the sections
LIH:
but I don’t see it as rejecting the whole notion of structure as such, or replacing it with the idea of structure as process
LIH:
or whatever it is that I’m not getting
CDTW:
I think he's saying that we can have more or less determinate, conventional, grammars, and language-games and whatnot, but that they're ultimately ungrounded by something much more indeterminate
LIH:
but you think its all grounded in some mysticism
LIH:
or religion
CDTW:
But you can have extremely rigorous systems within that field
LIH:
or deep ethical urgrund
CDTW:
I didn't say that
LIH:
that was a question
LIH:
LIH:
haha
LIH:
because I think you’ll agree there is a point at which you push Wittgenstein and he doesn’t budge
CDTW:
I see this radical indeterminacy in W. as preventing anyone from drawing a "religion" or a "mysticism" or a "deep ethical urgrund" out of it
LIH:
but to me it seems like you think that point is outside possible articulation?
LIH:
yeah you cant draw it out of it, its not articulable
CDTW:
Yeah ... this is what prevents and also makes possible any kind of systematic thought
CDTW:
It makes it possible but also prevents it from solidifying
CDTW:
IF you have the right view
CDTW:
i.e. you understand how you're being tricked by language
CDTW:
Or by your own either laziness or philosophical mania
LIH:
ok so at this point can you ask what it is?
LIH:
what is this point?
LIH:
or is that still inadmissible?
CDTW:
Well there is no "this point"
LIH:
so its still wrong to think of an is here
CDTW:
It's like I said to Sauve the other night on MSN, for Wittgenstein as I understand him, there is a limit insofar as there is an absence of a limit
LIH:
what does that mean
LIH:
the limit is our infinitude?
CDTW:
Yeah, I guess you could say that
CDTW:
t
CDTW:
I don't know if that's how I'd say it
LIH:
how would you say it?
CDTW:
But language is, according to how Wittgenstein seems to see it, such that it has no clear boundaries or rigid structures, there is no inside and outside of it, such a notion is nonsensical, and no "meaning" only "means" "itself" in such a way that we can rigidly define any limits at all
CDTW:
It all falls away more and more the more you try to nail it down, and it's in that way you're limited
LIH:
but the ethical moment in w. isn’t in language is it
LIH:
?
LIH:
or is it
CDTW:
You're not limited by a radical outside impinging upon a linguistic sphere trying to push out and touch the world, you're limited by language, which is worldly, which springs from "forms of life" or whatever you want to call it and which only arrives at rationality a posteriori
CDTW:
like a rigid rationality, especially
CDTW:
Well early in W. the ethical moment, for me, is your recognition of the truncation of any ethical system building and your inability to make a lasting claim to what's "right"
CDTW:
And I do think there's something very very similar throughout his corups
CDTW:
corps
CDTW:
CORPUS
CDTW:
It just happens for different reasons
LIH:
I don’t get it
CDTW:
In the early W. it's because you can't say it
LIH:
ok
LIH:
and in the later w?
LIH:
is 1929 later?
LIH:
hats middle I guess
CDTW:
In the later W. it's not because there are no ethical ideals that you're trying to get outside language to touch, it's because the concepts you're using have a built-in indeterminacy to them and there simply no "good" or "just" that you can access, you can only try to investigate the applications of these terms in different contexts and try to understand how they relate to how we live
CDTW:
live
CDTW:
and have lived
CDTW:
and might live
CDTW:
Bear in mind I read Culture and Value a lot and think it's a very important part of his thought
LIH:
what’s it mean to have an inbuilt indeterminacy
LIH:
and
CDTW:
meaning is like a rope, there is no central strand, it's the interweaving of the fibers, etc.
CDTW:
each fiber is a different application
LIH:
is understanding how something relates to the way we live understanding something or is it just approximating an understanding of something that cant be understood in toto
CDTW:
and they're all made taut as a rope by one another
LIH:
so what’s the inbuilt indeterminacy?
CDTW:
the rope thing
CDTW:
like the meaning of the word "true
"
LIH:
I don’t get the inbuilt part
LIH:
part
CDTW:
our inability to find a rigid definition of the word isn't accidental
CDTW:
its constitutive of its having any meaning at all
LIH:
well what has the meaning?
CDTW:
because it's used in many different contexts over time and that's how it gets its meaning
CDTW:
nothing "has" the meaning, meaning isn't a property
LIH:
ok, so how can you talk about it getting its meaning
LIH:
?
CDTW:
Well by paying attention to my nonsense
LIH:
haha
CDTW:
Think about it more verbally, I guess ... think about its getting and its having a meaning as a repetitive occurrence that happens again and again in singular instances
LIH:
but what makes the repetition
CDTW:
and which are circulated and happen over and over and over amongst us
LIH:
just us accepting it as a repetition?
CDTW:
Well maybe our acceptance is the same thing as our repeating its use
LIH:
what is our repeating it
CDTW:
I mean if we repeat a word in context we've already accepted it
CDTW:
using it
LIH:
what is using it
CDTW:
haha what is with you?
LIH:
I’m interested in what you think!
CDTW:
Are you seriously asking these questions?
LIH:
yes I am!
CDTW:
hahaha
LIH:
I don’t understand any of this
LIH:
of course I’m interested
LIH:
you seem to have thought about it more than me
CDTW:
Using it is speaking it, writing it, hearing it, making puns with it, using it "seriously", rhyming it with other words, mispronouncing it, having to discern that someone is trying to use it when they mistype it on a relay call and they're trying to use English when their first language is sign language
CDTW:
lots of stuff
LIH:
ok well here is my problem
CDTW:
Shoot
LIH:
if you take things to be radically indeterminate
LIH:
which I take it you do
LIH:
like
LIH:
you accept that context determines meaning
LIH:
but
LIH:
contexts themselves are fuzzy
LIH:
and meaning is fuzzy
LIH:
and the determination is fuzzy
LIH:
right?
LIH:
is that fair?
CDTW:
well ... the broader you get the fuzzier you get ... the more close to thinking about singularities you get, the more acute you can get, but there's always a fuzziness that informs even the most robust and rigorous determinations we can come up with
CDTW:
I kind of think of it like this sometimes
LIH:
but how do you know when you're close or far
LIH:
what’s the difference
LIH:
I guess there cant "Be" a difference?
CDTW:
It's like somewhere Derrida says that a calculus or a symbolic logic - certainly, it can and does operate according to an "all or nothing", "yes or no" logic
CDTW:
It's like this increasing robustness that we somehow have the ability to approach and produce I guess
CDTW:
and inherit and use and pass on, of course
CDTW:
it's not just creation haha
CDTW:
But I feel like you can approach this extreme robustness but it will always necessarily kind of bleed back out at the edges into that fuzziness, because you take a step back and you're looking at a really robust form of expression in the context of, say, a set of similar types of expression that are similarly robust (like different symbolic logics, like Fregean vs. Davidsonian vs. Kripkean)
CDTW:
And then you take a step back and you look at those in the context of the history or histories of logic
CDTW:
so like Aristotelian, Hegelian, etc. etc .etc
CDTW:
Then you take a step back and you look at it in the history of philosophy
LIH:
but you don’t think that at the edges of the blur it bleeds back into rigidity then
LIH:
determinacy
LIH:
etc
CDTW:
then you take a step SIDEWAYS and look at the history of philosophy in relation to eastern thought, etc. etc.
CDTW:
I think that we can kind of move in and out of whole spectrums of determinacy and indeterminacy without even thinking about it
CDTW:
like we do it all the time
LIH:
but what are we doing when we do it
LIH:
or are we doing nothing in particular
LIH:
we're just doing what were doing?
CDTW:
and I don't know if there's a way to really hierarchize the determinacy over the indeterminacy, because if it weren't for these robust grammatical arsenals that we have in philosophy, for instance, how and why would be be trying to articulate or identify these problems?
CDTW:
I dunno, we're just living I guess when we do it without thinking
LIH:
well you seem to have definitely preferred the indeterminacy
LIH:
by far
CDTW:
I don't think that's a fair thing to say haha
LIH:
well
CDTW:
I spent 150 pages in the last year alone trying to as rigorously as possible discuss these kinds of concerns
LIH:
every question I've asked, you have basically answered that it cant be answered in the way I phrased it
LIH:
I guess that could mean either
LIH:
I’m an idiot, your indeterminate, or both
LIH:
]probably the latter
CDTW:
We idioterminates
LIH:
hahahahaha
LIH:
that sounds like quine
LIH:
"X socratizes"
LIH:
CDTW:
No, I just think it means that it's a mistake to ask for absolute determinacy when we're speaking so broadly that it's impossible
CDTW:
So you can try to develop something very rigorous for certain kinds of cases, like Davidson's truth axiomatic
CDTW:
Or you can try your hardest to give up expecting an absolutely definable and absolutely broad definition of truth or inference, or whatever
LIH:
I don’t think I was asking for absolute determinism
CDTW:
Well okay
CDTW:
haha
LIH:
I think its fair to ask what something means
CDTW:
I don't think I was asking for absolute indeterminism either
LIH:
well you weren’t asking anything
LIH:
haha
LIH:
you were answering
CDTW:
But how can you ask what something "means" if you're not asking what it means in context?
LIH:
well I was asking what context means
LIH:
is context contextual too then
LIH:
and yes it is
LIH:
for you
CDTW:
Well how can it not be?
LIH:
so how is that not indeterminate ?
LIH:
I’m not objecting
LIH:
I’m just trying to get clear on what you said
CDTW:
Okay well yeah, I would have to say that "context" can only be said contextually, yeah
LIH:
so what context do you mean that in
CDTW:
Well if you say it in context, and then try to investigate THAT application in THAT context, you can get very determinate, and then you can compare it to other such investigations
LIH:
so what you mean is in a meta context
LIH:
or some large context
LIH:
a philosophical context?
CDTW:
Well right now I mean it in the context of our discussion
LIH:
but that isn’t anything in particular
LIH:
right?
LIH:
you cant even say "it is what it is"
LIH:
or can you?
CDTW:
Sure you can
CDTW:
Just pay attention
CDTW:
CDTW:
hahaha
CDTW:
i.e. to your nonsense hahaha
LIH:
what kind of attention should I pay
LIH:
so there are multiple contexts to every meaning though right
LIH:
and the disjunction of them determines what is meant
LIH:
or is what is meant determined even that far
LIH:
is it more like]
LIH:
a slew of possible meanings and one is happened upon somehow more often than the others
LIH:
its something like that last one
LIH:
only the somehow is more determinate
LIH:
right?
CDTW:
I guess so, but that doesn't indicate an actual hierarchy
LIH:
I don’t know what you mean about hierarchy
LIH:
where are you getting that
LIH:
you mentioned it before and I didn’t get it
CDTW:
I guess it could indicate a degree of familiarity which ties into the instances in which we feel comfortable with one use of a word versus instances in which we feel uncomfortable with another use of it
LIH:
ok well isn’t that degree just another word for a hierarchical appreciation for?
LIH:
what’s wrong with that?
CDTW:
Like a hierarchy of meaning to a word, like one meaning has more of a claim to what that word means than any other meaning
CDTW:
Well I'm just trying to think according to what I understand of Wittgenstein here too
LIH:
yeah yeah, I’m not attacking you
LIH:
I'm interested in these ideas
LIH:
I don’t understand them
LIH:
ok well lets run with the hierarchy
LIH:
if a meaning has more claim
CDTW:
Man, I don't mean to be a jerk but I have to say I'm surprised you're saying this, I mean, you've read as much Derrida and stuff as I have
CDTW:
All that is in there too
LIH:
is there something that makes it more relevant?
LIH:
I think derrida is the most rigid of anyone I’ve ever read
CDTW:
Are you like misunderstanding these things anew?
LIH:
nah
LIH:
I don’t think like this
LIH:
I cant think of anyone more rigid than derrida
LIH:
it always ends in some calcified idea for him
LIH:
to me anyway
LIH:
but whatever, I don’t care about derrida
LIH:
I like the w. talk
CDTW:
I read Derrida as using the language of calcified ideas but he turns it against itself
CDTW:
much like w.
CDTW:
LIH:
he just ossifies it in a dif. way
LIH:
w. isn’t like that
CDTW:
yeah, you've just gotta be careful with it
CDTW:
But with W. yeah it's different
LIH:
I don’t think w. and derrida are at all similar in spirit
CDTW:
Really?
LIH:
contra you and Staten
LIH:
CDTW:
Man haha
LIH:
ahah
CDTW:
well they are in some ways and aren't in other ways
CDTW:
I mean it's part of their style too
LIH:
anyways, forget derrida, lets get back to what we were talking about
CDTW:
hahaha
CDTW:
you're such a hater
CDTW:
you won't let me steer the conversation
CDTW:
CDTW:
haha
LIH:
nah I like derrida, I’m just focused right now
LIH:
! you’ve been steering it!
LIH:
I’ve just been asking questions about what you say
CDTW:
hahahaha
CDTW:
Okay haha
CDTW:
It would be easier if we were actually hanging out because the typing makes me feel like I'm a big ponce and I'm being browbeaten
CDTW:
because I can't hear your tone haha
LIH:
nah I’m not brow beating
CDTW:
I do know better though
LIH:
I have no idea what’s going on
CDTW:
I'm just saying haha
LIH:
I’m an idiot
CDTW:
Okay, what were we talking about?
LIH:
hold on
LIH:
ill scroll up
LIH:
ok
LIH:
I think this is what you were saying
LIH:
when a word is uttered, it is uttered within a field of possible meanings, but when it is uttered in a particular context, we immediately? at least often it seems that way pick out what possible meaning that word has. you were thinking of this as hierarchical: the word or I guess, its better to think in terms of propositions has THIS meaning based on some hierarchical ordering. and I was asking
LIH:
what is the hierarchy
LIH:
/where does it come from
LIH:
I assume you say the context
LIH:
but then I ask
LIH:
how
LIH:
and you reply...
CDTW:
oh haha I thought you were continuing with a reply I made haha
CDTW:
hmmm
CDTW:
Okay
CDTW:
I think, tentatively at least, that if there is a hierarchy, it's from a greater degree of repetition in certain directions of usage
CDTW:
like .... okay, the word watr
CDTW:
water
LIH:
nah that cant be it at all
LIH:
because even if were using a word really weirdly
LIH:
well know what it means
LIH:
its not just the commonness of the meaning
CDTW:
I don't know
CDTW:
If you said for instance...
LIH:
like when I say "strippin the strips"
LIH:
hahha
CDTW:
"I water emcees" or whatever
CDTW:
are you thinking of a) h20, b)watering plants, etc. etc.? are you thinking about one of them in particular? are you thinking about all of them at once? could you say?
CDTW:
Could you look back and say what sense of "water" you were thinking of?
LIH:
well that’s a bad example for what I meant
LIH:
I’m just saying, that in any given case
CDTW:
well it's a really weird way
LIH:
we generally know what we mean
LIH:
and it has nothing to do with how commonly the words are used
LIH:
or
LIH:
if it does
LIH:
commonality has to have some weird sense
LIH:
because the way I say "z" has nothing to do with its common use
LIH:
so there has to be that context or whatever
LIH:
but then there also has to be a context in which that context is meaningful
CDTW:
I dunno... let me try to think of another way to say it
LIH:
or something like that?
CDTW:
I think that Deleuze is right on here in some ways
CDTW:
Like there is an interplay of differences and repetitions
CDTW:
and in that interplay we get commonality, sameness, etc.
CDTW:
so commonality is part of it
CDTW:
familiarity
LIH:
I don’t get it
CDTW:
We have to node this, by the way haha
CDTW:
You can be Socrates and I can be Theatetus
LIH:
I think its the other way around
LIH:
oh wait
LIH:
Socrates asks the questions
LIH:
haha
LIH:
nm
CDTW:
You're asking the questions haha
LIH:
don’t node that part
LIH:
LIH:
hahahahaha
CDTW:
HAHAHA
LIH:
"elenctic"
CDTW:
Peter Griffin: "Chris, everything I say is a lie. Except for that. and that. and that. and that and that that nthatnthatnthatnthatnthat. And that."
LIH:
hahahah
LIH:
that’s so analytic philosophy
CDTW:
I know! hahahaha
CDTW:
fuck
LIH:
ok, so I don’t understand anything still
LIH:
so we cant ask :
LIH:
what is meaning
LIH:
what is a context?
LIH:
right?
CDTW:
No, you can ask ... at least I read Wittgenstein as saying you can ask
LIH:
ok well I cant expect the kind of answer that says "a context is ____"
LIH:
or:
CDTW:
Yeah
LIH:
"a context determines meaning like this ______"
CDTW:
But you can get multiple answers that say "a context is _____" and then try to hold them up together in a kind of patchwork and see how they compare
LIH:
but how can you hold anything together
CDTW:
and then try to come away with some sense of a number of different ways
LIH:
what is the sense of the number of different ways
LIH:
it also isn’t anything in particular?
LIH:
its nebulous
LIH:
?
CDTW:
Yeah, I dunno ... I think it's at once nebulous and also definite, depending on how you look at it and the nature of your investigation
LIH:
well what are you looking at that allows "it" to be either of those
CDTW:
Like if you compare a number of different cases then at once there's a common nebulousness, but you can see in each case a determinacy that is also dependent on the nebulousness, it emerges out of it
LIH:
or is there anything in common with the determinacy and the indeterminacy
LIH:
that makes no sense to me
LIH:
what is it that you see
LIH:
unless you just make it up
CDTW:
What do you mean?
CDTW:
re: making it up
LIH:
what are you seeing in the each case that is a determinacy that is dependent on the nebulousness and emerges out of it
LIH:
if it isn’t something determinate
LIH:
what is it
LIH:
and if you cant answer that
LIH:
then isn’t it just...
LIH:
well what is it
LIH:
its not anything
LIH:
it "isn’t" anything in particular
CDTW:
It's an interplay, by means of the repetitive and circulatory use of language amongst humans over untold eons of time, between particularity and generality
CDTW:
I suppose
CDTW:
But you don't "see" it
CDTW:
It's not like that
LIH:
but what is a repetition!!!
LIH:
that’s the question
CDTW:
hahahaha
LIH:
if it isn’t anything in particular
LIH:
then what is being repeated
CDTW:
"I am going to the store today"
CDTW:
"I am going to the store today"
CDTW:
"I am going to the store today"
CDTW:
"I am going to the store today"
CDTW:
etc.
LIH:
but in ten different contexts that’s not the same thing
LIH:
its not even a repetition
LIH:
and even if it is, why is it
CDTW:
It's not totally the same thing or totally the different thing
LIH:
2+2=4
LIH:
2X2=4
LIH:
is that a repetition?
CDTW:
it presupposes similarity and difference at the same time
LIH:
zwei und zwei machen vier
LIH:
is that a repetition
LIH:
well what’s the similarity
LIH:
and what’s the difference
LIH:
or are they anything
LIH:
and if they aren’t what is the sense were talking about
LIH:
and if there is no sense
LIH:
what are we doing
CDTW:
Well Deleuze thinks that similarity is an effect produced by repetition
CDTW:
Haha I don't know man, I think you're going to polar extremes here and I think that's part of why we're not seeing eye to eye
CDTW:
Remember that even "repetition" is a word just like any other word that is dependent upon repetition
LIH:
you think I’m going to one place and then its opposite?
LIH:
so basically you’re saying repetition is at the basis of identity then
LIH:
but what do you mean by that
CDTW:
No, I mean I think you're making too radical a distinction between similarity and difference
LIH:
but I guess you cant mean anything in particular by it?
LIH:
I don’t think I am
LIH:
I’m asking what repetition is
CDTW:
like when you say that "I'm going to the store today" in 10 different contexts "isn't even the same thing", that's not entirely true
LIH:
is that a big distinction?
LIH:
well how is it the same thing
CDTW:
It has a touch of sameness too it, enough of a touch of sameness that we know what is or can be meant by it
CDTW:
Well when we were living together if I said "I'm going to the store, hold on..."
CDTW:
one night
CDTW:
and then the next night I said it again
LIH:
so that said in china has a touch of sameness?
CDTW:
Did you go "whoa, what the fuck are you talking about?
CDTW:
"
LIH:
no but that’s nothing to do with the words, according to you, its all to do with the context right?
LIH:
that’s what I understood
LIH:
its the combination of sound and context
LIH:
right?
LIH:
but why does that combination constitute a repetition
LIH:
or a difference
LIH:
what does it do
LIH:
what’s the relation between sound and context
LIH:
or is there one
LIH:
its not determinate I assume
CDTW:
Well re: the question about china ... I'm sure that whatever they say for "going to the store" has enough of a touch of sameness for them
LIH:
so I guess we don’t need determinacy to get what were talking about
CDTW:
and if you can speak both English and mandarin then either one might have enough of a touch of sameness to each other for you
LIH:
you’re missing my point I think
CDTW:
Okay, what is your point?
CDTW:
Maybe I am, it's probable haha
LIH:
that either the sound or the context or both makes the meaning, and that if its the sound, in china that wont fly, and if its the context, how do we know when the context is the same, and if its both, how do the two connect so that we find the meaning
LIH:
and if its none of those
LIH:
what is it, some immediacy
LIH:
but what is that?
CDTW:
well it's both
CDTW:
And if you know both languages, then both work for you
CDTW:
And there are lots of people, both English and Chinese who do know both
CDTW:
and also know other languages
LIH:
ok well then we get to the third point
LIH:
how do we connect the two
LIH:
the sound and the context
LIH:
to produce the meaning
LIH:
or is it immanent
LIH:
and if it is
CDTW:
I don't know, I don't even know if there's a process
LIH:
what is that?
CDTW:
hahaha
LIH:
because it seems immanent
LIH:
but is it just inscrutable? or would you say that its seeming inscrutable is a wrongheaded view
CDTW:
Yeah but immanent in a way that we seem to have to ascribe to some originary contingency or, more to the point, non-origin
CDTW:
It's not transcendent
CDTW:
It's immanent, but not in the way that for Leibniz monadic qualities are immanent to monads
CDTW:
like a priori immanent
CDTW:
a priori in a real hard-core sick philosopher sense haha
CDTW:
as opposed to a more "always already" kind of sense
LIH:
but its not immanent in any particular way
CDTW:
If you know what I'm trying to say
LIH:
its just "there like our lives"
LIH:
?
CDTW:
yeah
CDTW:
That's kind of what I feel
LIH:
I don’t understand that
LIH:
what is thoughts relation to what it thinks
CDTW:
Dude
LIH:
or is that a stupid question
LIH:
for you?
CDTW:
I am SURE that you have written about Heidegger and the "enigmatic disclosure of the world"
CDTW:
I know you've written or talked about that shit
LIH:
yeah, I don’t understand it
CDTW:
I'm saying that I think that it's very much the same for Wittgenstein
LIH:
I don’t understand Heidegger
CDTW:
Well we can't get around it, we can't get over it, we can't bust through it
CDTW:
Existing, it is just THERE
LIH:
ok, but what is thought ?
LIH:
is thought important at all?
CDTW:
Our lives are just there, there's no justification, there's nothing to verify it or falsify it against, which is why "here is a hand" is at once perfectly good and utter nonsense
LIH:
well I don’t think there’s any justification
LIH:
but I also don’t think that attempting to understand something is finding a justification
LIH:
you could just stop at brute is-ness if you wanted
LIH:
but we don’t
LIH:
and we shouldn’t
LIH:
in my opinion at least
CDTW:
I don't think that "brute isness" really captures it for me
LIH:
and I think you have to ask what thought is and what thinking something means
LIH:
well just a halting
CDTW:
It's much more subtle and odd than that
CDTW:
haha
CDTW:
for me
LIH:
I don’t think its ever unfair to demand an answer to "what is ____" if you countenance that thing as a matter of concern
LIH:
that’s what I think is important to me anyway
LIH:
I don’t know how not to do it
LIH:
at least I haven’t learned
CDTW:
No, I don't think it's unfair
LIH:
well, I don’t know if I’ve misunderstood you
CDTW:
But what is it you're looking for in asking the question?
LIH:
I don’t think I’m looking for anything IN PARTICULAR
LIH:
I think the onus is on the person who is being asked
LIH:
you’ve countenanced certain things
LIH:
and I want to know what they are
LIH:
and if you haven’t countenanced them, or you think of thingliness otherwise than I do, maybe its your job to tell me what you mean
LIH:
and if you cant mean anything
LIH:
well
LIH:
I don’t know what to say
LIH:
I don’t know how to begin with that
CDTW:
I have to be honest, I'm not even sure what you're saying at this point haha
CDTW:
Oh okay
CDTW:
wait
CDTW:
okay, I am
LIH:
hahahahahaha
LIH:
awesome
LIH:
that’s when you know its good
LIH:
to me it seems like
LIH:
we cant agree on what meaning could be
LIH:
we cant even agree on that as a question
LIH:
so how do we start to talk
LIH:
unless meaning is a nonissue
CDTW:
I could give you a list of things that I think meaning could be, sure
LIH:
but that’s exactly what’s at issue
LIH:
yeah but whenever I press you on any suggestion, you retreat to something broader
LIH:
and when I ask you about that
LIH:
you do the same thing
LIH:
until we get to repetition
LIH:
and then we don’t know what to say
CDTW:
Dude, I'm not retreating to something broader
CDTW:
I'm trying to say that there is a necessary negotiation between the particular and the broad
LIH:
ok well something different
CDTW:
They're co-implicated in one another
LIH:
yeah but when I ask you what that means
LIH:
what do you say?
CDTW:
So if I say something about "truth" in a sentence, you can ask me "what do you mean by that?"
CDTW:
But when you say "what is truth?" I don't really know what to say
CDTW:
Because I could go off in lots of different directions
LIH:
ok well lets just say this
LIH:
WHY is there a necessary negation between the p and the broad?
LIH:
is it just that way?
CDTW:
negotiation, you mean? haah
LIH:
yeah
LIH:
typo
CDTW:
okay, I thought it was my typo for a second
LIH:
CDTW:
Okay, well, would a word mean anything if it were ever only said by one person once, and nobody was around to hear it, and he had anterogade amnesia and forgot that he ever said it and then it never came up again?
LIH:
I don’t know, I don’t know what meaning is
LIH:
it doesn’t seem impossible at least
LIH:
you could utter something
LIH:
I don’t know if you can make sense of someone like that though
LIH:
but I guess I don’t know what making sense of something really means
LIH:
anyway
LIH:
what I want to ask is this
LIH:
it seems to me that what you’re saying hinges on repetition being understandable to us, in some immanent or like a priori sense
LIH:
is that right do you think?
LIH:
that what I want to ask
Logic is Hell sends:
CDTW:
I guess so, I don't know
LIH:
we should probably start over
CDTW:
I'm getting exhausted thinking about this haha
LIH:
ok nm
LIH:
}
CDTW:
haha it's okay
CDTW:
Okay, let me try to put it another way
CDTW:
I feel like what you're asking of me when you ask about what I mean by "truth" or whatever is some kind of super-concept that I can satisfy you with
CDTW:
but I can't, all I'm trying to do is enumerate some kinds of uses of the word
LIH:
but what is using a word, I don’t understand that
LIH:
I’m not saying you have to give me an absolute answer
LIH:
but
LIH:
if you are going to say there is something in common with using a word
CDTW:
And I feel like we're running into trying to force a philosophical weight on some words or phrases that really leads us into the kind of sickness that Wittgenstein wants us to fight back against
LIH:
then there has to be something in common
LIH:
or you shouldn’t say it
LIH:
I think that’s fair
CDTW:
Dude, all I can say if that you tell me that you're going to the store, and I tell you that I'm going to the store, there's definitely something in common there
LIH:
the whole problem is the rope metaphor
LIH:
that’s fine
LIH:
but that can mean completely different things in different contexts
LIH:
I’m going to the store could be a Nazi cipher also
CDTW:
yeah, I know
LIH:
or Chinese for fart juice
LIH:
so what is it about the context that makes it mean what it means
LIH:
or is it anything
LIH:
and if it isn’t
LIH:
why not
CDTW:
I think that the questions you're asking have a philosophical weight that can't really match up to the language that we use every day
LIH:
it seems like you HAVE to retreat to behaviourism or quine or something
CDTW:
that's all I'm saying
LIH:
but I know you don’t want to
LIH:
I don’t think they do though
CDTW:
No I'm definitely not into behaviourism
LIH:
no no , not you, but what you’re saying
LIH:
implicitly
LIH:
anyway, maybe not I dunno
LIH:
well what I want to say is this
CDTW:
I was thinking about Behaviourism tonight
CDTW:
and my objections to it
LIH:
if you mean something, you mean something
CDTW:
when I was at work
LIH:
and there is a way in which you mean it
LIH:
and if THAT is indeterminate, then
LIH:
well actually
LIH:
I don’t think it is indeterminate
CDTW:
No, that's not indeterminate
LIH:
it is determinate
LIH:
we mean things
LIH:
ok lets start there
CDTW:
but it's dependent upon something more indeterminate
LIH:
how do we mean things
CDTW:
and it feeds back into something more indeterminate
LIH:
ok this is what I don’t get
LIH:
we both agree that we mean things]
LIH:
lets start there
LIH:
how do we mean something
LIH:
is that a bad question?
LIH:
question
CDTW:
No, I mean in one way none of these are bad questions
CDTW:
(Again I'm trying to speak from how I understand Wittgenstein)
LIH:
ok well in what way are they bad and in what way are they good
LIH:
yeah I know that
LIH:
that context is understood
LIH:
hahahahaha
LIH:
CDTW:
haha there you go!
LIH:
but what I’m asking you
LIH:
is
LIH:
how
LIH:
and what am I understanding
CDTW:
See, there was nothing problematic about saying that
LIH:
why not
CDTW:
Okay, let me put it again another way
LIH:
so its pure immanence all the way down then
LIH:
?
LIH:
or is that too conceptual?
LIH:
is it just what happens
LIH:
and asking about it is stupid?
CDTW:
I think Wittgenstein is saying that when you say "that context is understood" and we both laughed about it and understood it, then the whole strain we're putting on ourselves to define context should really vanish, it's unimportant
CDTW:
Not only should it vanish
LIH:
so asking about it is stupid
CDTW:
It DID vanish when you said that
LIH:
no it didn’t really
CDTW:
No, I mean ... it came out of a discussion in which we were asking about these things
LIH:
I think its still an object of concern
CDTW:
No, yeah it is ... I think W. thinks that we can't make it vanish for once and for all
LIH:
I think thought can still turn back and try and see what "doing" is
LIH:
thought isn’t just doing
LIH:
in the beginning was the deed, sure
LIH:
but
LIH:
the deed isn’t the thought
LIH:
thought is different than just use or act
CDTW:
Well but it's not radically different
LIH:
and if it isn’t I don’t understand how it isn’t
CDTW:
it's not compartmentalized
CDTW:
they all play into each other
LIH:
what does that mean
CDTW:
they're all part of being human in the world
Transfer of "05 - dj grand wizard theodore - subway theme.mp3" is complete.
LIH:
yeah but that doesn’t mean they’re all the same
CDTW:
no, they're not equivocal or totally alien to one another
LIH:
and its not clear what being part of being in the world means
LIH:
to me at least
CDTW:
but they're part of a field in which they all occur in conjunction
LIH:
what is it they’re a part of
LIH:
what’s the field
LIH:
what’s the conjunction
LIH:
"life
LIH:
"
LIH:
?
CDTW:
Okay I can't talk about this anymore
CDTW:
This is insane
CDTW:
I'm sorry, I really can't
LIH:
hahah!
LIH:
aight
CDTW:
I didn't mean that as a dick either
CDTW:
haha
CDTW:
I'm just saying
LIH:
ha whatever
LIH:
I’m just curious is all
LIH:
CDTW:
No, I'm serious, I wasn't trying to be rude
LIH:
listen to that song its the essence of what’s up
LIH:
man you don’t have to worry about being rude to me
LIH:
get outta here
CDTW:
hahaha
LIH:
even if you are rude to me I wont care
LIH:
you shouldn’t think that I’m just being antagonistic though, because I actually think this is all interesting
LIH:
I’m starting to see how I don’t see anything correctly
CDTW:
I just really don't understand the impetus of your questions and when it got down to trying to parse out each word in that last sentence I kind of cracked
CDTW:
I actually shuddered
LIH:
hahaha
LIH:
sorry
CDTW:
It was like the Kantian sublime haha
CDTW:
It's okay
LIH:
my stupidity is that vast
LIH:
hahaha
CDTW:
I honestly have to say I'm surprised we see things that differently
CDTW:
I thought we were mostly the same
LIH:
the devils in the details
LIH:
haha
CDTW:
hahaha
LIH:
I’m surprised you thought I was so "indeterministic" to put a label on it
LIH:
I think there are things
LIH:
hahah
CDTW:
Well I mean we were in CSP and we always talked about Blanchot and Jabes and Heidegger and we always seemed to understand each other
CDTW:
I think there are things too, come on haha
LIH:
not in the same way I do
LIH:
yeah I don’t think jabes and Blanchot have anything to do with this
LIH:
and my understanding of Heidegger is stupid as shit
CDTW:
Well the way I read Wittgenstein and the way I read Blanchot have certain very strong affinities
CDTW:
But also lots of disparities
LIH:
yeah, Blanchot is a lot less fundamental
LIH:
in my opinion
CDTW:
It's not like I'm a Heidegger expert either haha
LIH:
he’s on the surface
LIH:
in an important way though
LIH:
Levinas is altogether different
CDTW:
Well I do think he's really heartfelt in his writing
CDTW:
that's important to me
LIH:
yeah I don’t think he’s fake
LIH:
I just think he’s on the surface
LIH:
he’s like deep about the surface
LIH:
if that makes sense
LIH:
CDTW:
Yeah hahaha
LIH:
its not the same thing as w.
LIH:
to me anyway
LIH:
y
CDTW:
I was thinking about our discussion of the relative importance of people we read actually
CDTW:
when you were drunk haha
CDTW:
and I was thinking about Levinas
CDTW:
I feel like Levinas is the hidden heavyweight
LIH:
yeah he’s not a Heideggerian
LIH:
ppl think of him like that
LIH:
I don’t get him, but I know he’s not a Heideggerian
LIH:
something about the "face" stuff I think is his most important stuff
LIH:
but I don’t understand it really
LIH:
I’ve only read very little really
CDTW:
Yeah, his shit is mad enigmatic
CDTW:
IT's just ... crazy shit
CDTW:
haha
LIH:
its probably not if you're in the right mode
LIH:
we're not in the right mode or something
LIH:
psometimes I really hate philosophy[
CDTW:
I mostly love it haha
CDTW:
I'm a sucker
LIH:
what’s the difference haha
LIH:
its all the same
LIH:
"we stand in a relation to philosophy"
LIH:
hahahahahaha
LIH:
I’m rereading our convo from the start
CDTW:
hahahaha
CDTW:
oh shit
CDTW:
is it bad? haha
LIH:
I dunno
LIH:
ill let you know
LIH:
haha
LIH:
is on my scratch pad
CDTW:
nice
CDTW:
smug it up
LIH:
haha
LIH:
I feel like a jerk
LIH:
haha
LIH:
I should just keep my thoughts to myself
CDTW:
why do you feel like a jerk?
CDTW:
haha
LIH:
because you think I’m being all curmudgeonly
CDTW:
it was just more like a barrage
CDTW:
haha
LIH:
well a barrage of questions as mu