Observations of War
In his war against America and Britain the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein has recently begun using two rather suspect tactics. Iraq has begun deploying his Fedayeen in civilian garb and in civilian vehicles in ambush against coalition forces. Some Iraqi units have begun to fake surrender in order to ambush American and British soldiers. There are believable, yet unconfirmed, reports that chemical weapons will be used once coalition forces penetrate a so called "red line" around Baghdad. Each of these tactics may provide the Ba'athis regime some military advantage. The price for this is that those forces using such tactics give up much international protection after Iraq's defeat.
One of the more suprising (to the media) was the use irregular forces in the areas occupied, but not pacified by Coalition forces. That such small scale guerrilla tactics would be used, and somewhat successful should not be surprising to the serious student of military history. Mobile warfare is full of small ambushes as competing armies maintain fluid and unsecured rear echelons.
In more familiar terms, this means that the coalition decided to deploy almost all it's combat units forward, and left very few troops behind to secure their supply lines. The choice to do this was pretty much determined by the very small ground forces deployed in light of both the size of Iraq and the size of Iraq's army. (See my w/u March 20, 2003) With only three divisions of combat troops available-- only half of whom are really fighting soldiers-- there just aren't enough troops going around to secure very much territory. Particularly if you want to attack.
This means there are only a few hundred combat troops left to patrol several thousand square kilometers of territory. The reason US commander General Tommy Franks felt able to do this was total air superiority and the very low mobility of Iraq's military. Air power gave Franks not only an enormous striking capacity, but also an absolute advantage in the battle for information. Any Iraqi subunits large enough to sever the communications lines of the Third Infantry Division would be detected and attacked long before they could move far. And US mechanised forces are very, very fast. Such a rear battle would very much favor the coalition, whose troops are better trained, better equipped and able to see over the horizon. Think Little Big Horn.
Smaller forces might slip by now and then, and could do some damage. However, radio calls from the ambushed units would bring rapid help and decisive firepower. So while Iraq can hurt the coalition, it has little possibility of inflicting a really severe blow. When a Pentagon spokesperson tells you they really aren't very worried about the small wrong turns and ambushes, they aren't bullshitting. That sort of thing happens in desert warfare. If you doubt that read a good history of Rommel's Afrika Korps.
Still, it has come as a suprise that the Iraqis have chosen to fight by and large. At least a surprise to the civilians running the war, who counted on rapid surrender. Those battles haven't proven very effective by and large, but one of the more interesting tactics have been the guerrilla attacks of the Iraqi fedayeen. Normally clad in black uniforms, they are the thugs and enforcers of Saddam's regime. Chips off the ol' block.
Of course a black uniform and BRDM are a trifle obvious, and these people aren't trained to NATO standards. In a straight up fight against British Royal Marines they're toast. So they have taken off their uniforms and traded their APCs for SUVs with the machine gun option installed.
Mao once wrote that a guerrilla 'must swim in the civilian population as a fish swims in the sea'. The fedayeen have decided that to kill Marines it must cheat. They cruise about pretending to be civilians. As civilians they can move about looking for opportunity, while in uniforms they get shot. The can choose to attack only when the opportuniity is choice.
Such tactics serve the Iraqi purpose well. First of all, the Fedayeen get to kill coalition troopers, and the casualties will appear on TV news. Dead coalition troopers can't fight any more. If their deaths can be accomplished without corresponding loss to your own troopers, so much the better. Dealing with them absorbs soldiers in an expidition that was undermanned from the beginning. Another plus is that such attacks will make coaltion troopers much quicker on the trigger. The Marine who lost a buddy to the fedayeen may still not wish to shoot at civilians, but the civilian who appears suddenly is swiss cheese.
Dead Iraqi civilians are something Saddam very much wants. First of all, they're irrelevent as people if they're not from Tikrit. Plus they abet his strategy. He hopes to hold out long enough, and lose enough Iraqis that public opinion on the street will force other Arab governments to curtail their support for the coalition. He also seems to think that the US and Britain have no stomach for casualties, mistaking our respect for human life as weakness. The combination of Western Wimpiness and Islamic anger is supposed to force W. to give up and go home, leaving Saddam alive and the new Saladin. That miscalculation will cost him his life.
For the fedayeen the consequences are more serious. By putting on civliian clothes they give up all protections of the Geneva Conventionand the Hague Convention. Under the Laws of War irregular and militia forces are entitled to the same protections as other POWs, provided that they have a leader, carry weapons and wear a clear insignia marking them as combatatants. In other words, some form of uniform or flag that is known to their keeper.
Certainly ruses and deception is permitted by the laws of war, but soldiers cannot pretend to be civilians for military advantage. Captured Fedayeen can expect to be shot. A trial is supposed to precede execution but such rules are often honored in the breach, when military necessity makes punctilio impractical. Coaltion forces may choose not to execute captured fedayeen for intelligence or political reasons but they have no right to expect mercy. The executing soldiers are not liable for War Crimes charges.
Other Iraqi units have begun to pretend surrender in order to draw coaltion soldiers into an ambush. This is also a violation of both the Geneva and Hague conventions. Such actions are considered perfidy under international law and expressly forbidden in the Hague Treaty. The reason for this is simple: feigned surrenders may make all surrenders impossible, effectively preventing any humane treatement of prisoners of war.
So an Iraqi units faking a surrender had best expect their real surrender won't be honored. Unless it comes as part of a total and unconditional surrender of all Iraqi forces. Even then they may be charged with a war crime.
But faked surrenders do serve Iraqi purpose. They represent a calculation that dead Americans will do more for them on the Arab street than flaunting the conventions will hurt. In that they may be right. In addition, a new reluctance among coaliton units to accept surrenders (and perhaps a bit of retribution) may stiffen the backbone of faltering Iraqi units. Either way suits Saddam.
The use of these outlawed tactics may very well aid Saddam, and they are not necessarily irrational. The Special Republican Guards and the Fedayeen owe their power, income and prestige to Saddam's regime. With him gone, they have none of those things. And the people they bullied may seek to teach them what brutality is like when the shoe is on the other foot. These people may not fear summary execution, as they may see themselves as dead anyway if they lose. Bullies are often the biggest cowards.
Selected excerpts from the Hague and Geneva Conventions
Militia and irregular forces under the First Geneva Convention
Article 4
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:
1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) That of carrying arms openly;
(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Article 4
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:
1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) openly;
(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
These conditions are repated verbatim in the Hague Convention of the Laws of War
from the Hague Convention, Second Section, "Hostilities", Means of Injuring enemy combatants
Article 23: In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden -
To employ poison or poisoned weapons;
To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army;
To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion;
To declare that no quarter will be given;
To employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering;
To make improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive badges of the Geneva Convention;
To destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war;
To declare abolished, suspended, or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party. A belligerent is likewise forbidden to compel the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's service before the commencement of the war.
Chapter 3: Flags of Truce
Art. 32. A person is regarded as a parlementaire who has been authorized by one of the belligerents to enter into communication with the other, and who advances bearing a white flag. He has a right to inviolability, as well as the trumpeter, bugler or drummer, the flag-bearer and interpreter who may accompany him.
Art. 33. The commander to whom a parlementaire is sent is not in all cases obliged to receive him.
He may take all the necessary steps to prevent the parlementaire taking advantage of his mission to obtain information.
In case of abuse, he has the right to detain the parlementaire temporarily.
Art. 34. The parlementaire loses his rights of inviolability if it is proved in a clear and incontestable manner that he has taken advantage of his privileged position to provoke or commit an act of treason.